

The GNN Effect: Global News Networks as Intelligence Gathering and Diplomatic Institutions

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that no parts of this dissertation have been accepted for any other degrees in any other institutions. This dissertation contains no materials previously written and/or published by another person, except where appropriate acknowledgment is made in the form of bibliographical reference.

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ABSTRACT

News and information organizations have an apparent effect on foreign policymaking. Generally, it takes the form of influence on agendas or elites. But there is a less apparent, and arguably more important role they play in both forming and carrying out foreign policy: they are active participants in both diplomacy and intelligence gathering.

Journalists are not diplomats or spies, but they often perform those roles – whether they know it or not and whether they admit it or not. This study looks at what has been overlooked and it uses exclusive and, by necessity, mostly confidential interviews to expose and contextualize this long-established, yet mostly hidden, practice.

Western journalists have long dominated the global news and information system. But that is changing rapidly. Chinese and Russian capacities are currently expanding and developing at an unprecedented pace while the West's are diminishing and degrading, due primarily to the collapse of the traditional, non-state Western news business model.

The world's fastest growing players in these Global News Networks (GNNs) and in this evolving media ecology are now the Chinese and Russians. Both states control and are investing heavily in market-agnostic, state-owned news and information enterprises. This study reveals that Russian and Chinese GNNs are actively exploiting the same diplomatic and intelligence gathering practices as those who preceded them in the West—where the practice continues, but capacities are relatively diminished.

Further, the Chinese and Russians have long formalized the roles of spying and diplomacy into their journalistic system and are actively exploiting new opportunities in globalized media, non-governmental organizations, and the academy. As a result, the costs, risks, and inherent limitations borne by non-Western states establishing traditional intelligence and diplomatic outposts are minimized by exploiting GNNs—and the journalists, NGO

workers, and academics who comprise contemporary GNNs—to undertake more of their states’ intelligence gathering and diplomatic burden. The players may be new (and there are certainly more of them), but the game is old.

What this means is that the West is losing absolute and relative diplomatic and intelligence gathering capacities it may never have controlled, but always exploited. The Chinese and other non-Western countries, on the other hand, are rapidly gaining greater capacities from institutions and individuals they have always controlled. This relative shift in capacities from West to non-West is certainly having an effect on state intelligence and diplomatic practice. The ultimate effect of this shifting relative power between the two is the material power gain of capacities for the non-West, often at the expense of the West. This is today’s GNN Effect.

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INTRODUCTION

It was a momentous time in the 20th century when a new electronic technology allowed for messages to be sent instantaneously and internationally across borders by short audible data bursts. The first political leader to exploit the technology put it bluntly: “The matter is *of immense importance* (a newspaper without paper and without wires...all Russia will be able to hear a newspaper read in Moscow)” (Lenin [1926] 1973, 473).¹ The technology was shortwave radio. The writer was V.I. Lenin. When the newspaper *Pravda* published this in 1926, nine years after the initial Bolshevik broadcasts in Morse code, Lenin clearly envisioned the potentially unlimited opportunities of being able to transmit messages far and wide via radio.

The goal of these early radio transmissions was to broadcast ideas and exhort revolutionary ideals to a distant and often illiterate mass, moving quickly from the initial impersonal Morse code in 1917 to Lenin’s own passionately voiced speeches. The next to follow internationally on-air, with the direct help of radio inventor Guglielmo Marconi, was Pope Pius XI, who established Vatican Radio shortly after the Vatican was granted full sovereignty in 1929 (Bucci et al. 2003).² Many states eventually followed and developed their own international broadcasting capacities, but the first two state broadcasters believed that they could proselytize the distantly unconverted and speak to their remote loyal flock (Matelski 1995; Street and Matelski 1997).³

From the very first days of the technological advancement allowing for cross-border transmission and instantaneous mass communication, transnational global broadcasting has been used to varying degrees and in different ways as a tool of international statecraft (Wasburn 1997).⁴

¹ The full citation follows: “The matter is of immense importance (a newspaper without paper and without wires, for with a loudspeaker and with the receiver which Bonch-Bruyevich has developed in such a way that it will be easy for us to produce hundreds of receivers, all Russia will be able to hear a newspaper read in Moscow)” (Lenin 1921).

² According to Bucci et al. (2003), the Pope was personally involved in the establishment, development, and first historic transmission from Castel Gandolfo.

³ Matelski and Street's work (1997) is written as a comprehensive historical analysis of the use of radio for religious, as well as politically ideological, proselytizing and propagation.

⁴ In this review of Gary D. Rawnsley’s volume, Wasburn (1997) looks at the struggle between broadcasters and their state sponsors in the execution of their established and historically consistent roles in state information, disinformation, and, in particular, diplomatic functions during war and peace. Most studies, however, focus on the propagandistic and ideational role within statecraft.

While the goals might have remained the same, the means for broadcasting has evolved tremendously during the last century; the reach of global networks has become vast. Now, as for instance Wikileaks shows, any individual owning a mobile phone has access to global news networks and has “the communication power that was the monopoly of the nation state in the previous century” (Cull 2011, 2).

The contemporary inheritors of the early state broadcasters are today’s larger and more complex institutional news ecologies, often state-controlled and/or underwritten global news networks⁵ (GNNs), organizations such as the Broadcast Board of Governors’ Voice of America and Radio Free Europe (BBG), Russia Today (RT), Al Jazeera (AJ), and China Central Television/Xinhua (CCTV/X) as well as the individuals, both employed there or working with those GNNs, who are an increasingly integrated part of this broader news ecology. Equally important parts of the broader international media ecology are both non-state news institutions—and the individuals within them—and hybrid state/non-state GNNs, respectively and most significantly CNN and the BBC, who work collaboratively, symbiotically, or in parallel with individuals and other national newsgathering broadcast, internet, and print institutions in open and non-sovereign media environments to round out the institutional global newsgathering and distribution system.

This dissertation recognizes the historical and contemporary soft power importance of the mass broadcasting and disseminating functions of GNNs. Further, however, it takes a deep dive into GNN functions that deliver news and information to limited, narrower and sometimes targeted state audiences with the effect, if not always the desire, of delivering information and data as a hard material resource.

What follows in this introductory chapter is, first, a discussion around the concept of Global News Networks—GNNs—and how that concept has both evolved and how its functions

⁵ The term, coined by the author here and used throughout this study, bears no relation to the Philippines-based cable television channel with the same name.

relate to the state. The remainder of this chapter will proceed with a brief discussion on the dissertation’s relevance in today’s geopolitical sphere, followed by a look at the methodological approaches of this study. Predominantly reliant on elite interviewing, the study is informed by individuals both who have agreed to waive anonymity and those who demanded anonymity given the sensitive nature of this study. Further, the case study method is employed to look at the practices and performance of both Western GNNs and non-Western GNNs. The introductory chapter will end with a roadmap to the chapters that follow.

Global News Networks: Definition and Typology

Table 1 below is a limited representation of what constitutes a state, non-state, or hybrid GNN.

	CNN, The New York Times, Associated Press, Bloomberg	BBC World, Internews Network, HRW	RT, Al Jazeera, CCTV, Xinhua, BBG, Deutsche Welle
Non-State (Type I)	X		
Hybrid (Type II)		X	
State (Type III)			X

Table 1: Typology of Global News Networks

A GNN in this study is generally defined as a network of nationally identified and aligned institutions and individuals that report, collect, curate, edit, broadcast, and distribute print and

electronic productions,⁶ relying on foreign offices or bureaus and expatriate or traveling researchers, reporters, and correspondents. Their publicized work product reaches or targets international audiences.

The main definitional characteristic of GNNs for this study is dominantly the formal relationship to the state, primarily defined by the management, assignment, and editorial GNN structures, but also the informal state relationship and any level of direct or indirect state financial underwriting, grant funding, or Request for Proposal (RFP) fulfillment. Some GNNs are exclusively funded and managed by the state (State—Type III) and others are exclusively funded via their commercial enterprise or non-profit fundraising (Non-state—Type I), without state funds, relying on advertising and sponsorship revenue, and with no obvious or apparent structural direct state links or relationship. The third type (Hybrid—Type II) is an admixture of the aforementioned two types.⁷

For a broadcast or print news network to be included in the GNN typology, it must have programming or a distribution arm that targets an international audience and often includes multiple languages. In this study, GNNs always include a dominant English-language presence. A network that does not incorporate an English language service in its news and information distribution is not considered a full GNN or a globally competitive institution for the purposes of this study. Other factors that are necessary for fitting into the GNN typology include having global news collection and distribution channels (precluding some of the more regionally or diaspora-focused media networks), overseas broadcast centers, a minimal audience size, a minimal budget size, and the expansive capacity for multiple platform production and distribution (i.e., wire service,

⁶ The reason for the inclusion of print media in this definition is that while they are in decline, they both complement and remain heavily integrated with international broadcast media in multiple aspects of the newsgathering function and news value determination process. To varying degrees, multiple media organizations share or bundle resources, whether newsgathering or distributional presenting assets, and regularly mix-and-match their capacities. Together, the multiple manifestations and formal or informal combinations of national institutional media outlets comprise a significant portion of the complex and growing media ecologies of global news networks.

⁷ The categories in this typology are ideal types, not meant to correspond to reality perfectly. For instance, CCTV carries advertisements in addition to its primarily state funding, though the dominant advertising expenditures are indirect state subsidies as either state owned enterprises or state negotiated advertisers are the main contributors to the \$2.9 billion annual revenue stream (source: interview with CCTV America on 11/14/14).

radio, satellite television, Twitter, Facebook, website, email alerting, etc.). A GNN, further, must employ not merely nationals of the GNN home country, but also employ and deploy nationals of other countries in either the news collection or management structure of the institution.⁸

Although global news networks are traditionally only comprised of formalized news institutions and journalists who made up the dominant news collection and dissemination process in the 20th century, this dissertation extends the understanding of what makes up this information and news ecology to include and incorporate the non-traditional newsgathering and dissemination institutions that currently also feed into the larger media ecology, still dominated by formal journalistic institutions at the international level. The non-journalistic institutions this study includes are both international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and the academic research community (and, to a limited degree, corporate institutions, executives), where research and publication are the staples of the profession and complement—or even, at times, supplement—the journalistic institutions that are the focus of most media analysis and the academic literature’s attention when trying to understand media effects on foreign affairs. These non-journalistic institutions are unique in this sphere because, at times, they access privileged information.⁹

Further, the INGOs included, such as Internews Network, Human Rights Watch (HRW), Global Investigative Journalist Network (GIJN), IREX or even Save the Children, often are the

⁸ The GNN-framework developed here is, naturally, not the only possible way to analyze and categorize existing transnational/international media networks. Chalaby (2002; 2005a; 2005b; 2006) proposed an alternative typology in which the focus is more on the intended audience than on the state-network nexus. A well-researched comparative analysis of Al-Jazeera English and the Venezuelan Telesur channel by Painter (2008) categorizes international broadcasters by their relation to the dominant “Western” worldview as hegemonic or counter-hegemonic and analyses, among other things, whether they follow the “Western” journalistic value of impartiality or whether they are openly ideological. There is also a wealth of literature studying media networks from the perspective of the/a European public sphere (see, for example, Brüggerman and Schulz-Forberg 2009). For the purposes of this study, however, the typology based on ownership, managerial, and editorial structure proposed here seems to be the most useful.

⁹ On the flip side, this information gathering also means INGOs are regularly accused of spying activities or of fomenting dissent and aiming to destabilize governments. In his study of NGO relationships to the state, DeMars (2001, 194) writes that “most relevant academic and policy literature fails to address the real issues in this hazardous relationship.” For example, Russian President Vladimir Putin and leaders of both democratically and non-democratically elected governments in Asia have taken a hardline approach to INGOs, restricting their formal activities and freedom to operate via punitive and controlling legislation (on Putin’s attitude to non-Russian NGOs, see Carothers 2006; Evans, 2006).

only organizations reporting on the countries in which they operate. These news and non-news NGOs have grown both to fill a vacuum for news and data collection and distribution overseas (Conrad 2013) and, in some cases, to supplant traditional news institutions as the only non-native organizations on the ground.¹⁰ As a Washington, DC-based director of a humanitarian and rights oriented NGO put it, “there aren’t any American reporters out in the bush. They show-up once in a while for the ‘bang-bang’—whenever there’s a terrorist attack or an American gets killed. Basically, if you’re going to get any news from the out there, it’s going to be from us. That’s it. Nobody else gives a shit” (personal communication, 2014).

Another reason to include NGOs into the GNN category is that they also often perform journalistic functions, producing what are sometimes generically referred to as white papers. These papers are, actually, now becoming more documentary types of works using various multimedia platforms in the pursuit of mass audience viewership, and readership. They also pursue multiple and broad distribution channels in their pursuit of policy impact and journalistic credibility. The NGO final product or press release often finds a direct distribution channel for entering in an unedited manner directly into the wider media landscape. That development has come as a direct result of distributed and digital production and publication tools and internet-enabled distribution channels that have confused and coalesced with more traditional journalistic institutions and mediations. (For a critical overview of NGO’s communication in the digital media age, see Cottle and Nolan 2007).

The information revolution has also played a crucial role in putting academia in the GNN ecology. Academic researchers living and working in foreign countries are now also understood to be part of the GNN world as defined in this study. While there has been a long history of academic research abroad carried out in a relationship with intelligence gathering institutions (D. Price

¹⁰ Conrad (2013) looks at two non-profit organizations, the Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting and the International Reporting Project (IRP) and notes the shift to and growing dependence upon nationally-based NGOs as “they have considerable authority over the changing field of US foreign correspondence” (Conrad 2013, par. 1).

2003),¹¹ it is primarily the intelligence gathering and disseminating capacities digital technologies have provided for academics that enable them to participate in GNN structures.

INGOs and academic researchers are professional practitioners who join traditional newsgatherers to make up today’s GNNs. However, practitioners of “citizen journalism”—those institutionally unaffiliated journalists who make up “a range of web-based practices whereby ‘ordinary’ users engage in journalistic practices” (Goode 2009, 2)—are not included. The role of citizen journalists is complementary to the institutional media ecology but, unlike some NGO work or academic research, is not considered in any of the literature currently as a supplanting force in global reporting or for institutional foreign work (Otto and Meyer 2012).¹²

	Non-state	State	Hybrid
Western	CNN, NYTimes, The Guardian, FAZ, INGOs (Medicins Sans Frontiers), Academia	INGOs, Academia, BBG (VOA, RFE/RL)	BBC, INGOs (Internews, IREX), Academia
Non-Western		RT, CCTV, Xinhua, INGOs, Academia	

Table 2: Typology of GNN-state relationships

¹¹ D. Price (2003) discusses how one of the most respected American anthropologists, Franz Boas in 1919 exposed that four of his colleagues had spied for the U.S. during World War I. What is more, although Boas clearly saw this as a “betray[al] [of] their science”(par. 1), according to much later declassified FBI documents, one of the scientists, Harvard archeologist Samuel Lothrop continued to work for U.S. intelligence agencies during World War II, using his scholarly work as cover.

¹² There has been a great deal of excitement and anti-institutional utopian projection regarding the rise of citizen journalism and the tools that enable it worldwide. “It has been argued that the importance of foreign correspondents has been overstated and that news agencies, social networks and citizen-journalism can fill the gap” Otto and Meyer (2013, 205). Otto and Meyer (2013) show this to be a false, and dangerous, expectation.

Table 2 refers to the multiple ideal types of GNNs and their relationship to the state.

GNNs can be one of three types of institutions: Non-state, state, or a hybrid of both state and non-state owned, operated, or controlled organizations. Further, the matrix bifurcates the world into Western and non-Western states and, as per the parameters of this research, the non-Western GNNs reviewed are Russian and Chinese. The Western GNNs are dominated by the native English-language GNNs, but incorporate others who make up parts of the Western trade, security, economic and political alliances. The non-Western GNNs populate only one of the matrix cells, that of the state controlled GNN, while the Western GNNs are dominated by non-state institutions, though they, too, have a GNN presence in state and hybrid institutions. While non-Western commercial media entertainment and sports enterprises are populating the domestic media landscape in China and Russia, the state broadcasters that are either directly owned by or heavily dependent upon the state for their operations remain the dominant GNN institutions.

The goal of this study is to investigate the current global news network landscape and to identify current trends in order to understand what geopolitical significance those trends may have.

The Changing GNN Landscape

GNNs have evolved both in practice and performance. Western transnational and traditional news networks had a near monopoly during the latter half of the 20th century, credited with helping catalyze the Cold War's end (M. Nelson 1997, Johnson and Parta 2010).

In the early part of the 21st century, however, Western media no longer dominate this global institutional and informational realm. The world's largest global news network (GNN) is no longer CNN or the BBC or any other western newspaper or magazine publisher or broadcast name brand network. As seen above, the previous global newsgathering and distribution dominance of these networks is rapidly diminishing while what constitutes today's GNN is made up of a broader and more complex set of institutions and individuals that are no longer strictly newsgathering operations.

Further, Western news organizations are increasingly turning away from foreign affairs. The trend and direction of the shift is clear—the diminution of the Western GNN (Otto and Meyer 2012, 205) and the global rise of the non-Western GNN. The disappearance of the American foreign correspondent and overseas bureau is now a hard fact, documented and narrated by the now also defunct *American Journalism Review* (AJR).¹³ In 2011, the *AJR* headlined a magazine article “Retreating from the World” that was the last of a series of pieces documenting the demise of Western foreign reporting. “Eighteen newspapers and two chains have shuttered every one of their overseas bureaus in the dozen years since *AJR* first surveyed foreign coverage. ... All but two of them eliminated their last bureau sometime after 2003, the year the United States invaded Iraq. ... Many other papers and chains reduced their coterie of foreign correspondents. ... What's more, an untold number of regional and local papers have dramatically decreased the amount of foreign news they publish. Television networks, meanwhile, slashed the time they devote to foreign news and narrowed their focus largely to war zones” (Enda 2011, par. 9). At the start of 2016, the McClatchy newspaper company, the third largest newspaper organization in the United States, announced it had shut down all of its remaining foreign bureaus. As noted by the media research Poynter Institute, “McClatchy is among the last of the regional newspaper companies to maintain foreign bureaus, and its de-emphasis of international coverage follows similar moves made by *The Baltimore Sun*, *The Boston Globe*, *Newsday* and others” (Mullin 2015, par. 6).

In the meantime, in the non-Western world, the opposite trend is taking place. The dominant shift in the current GNN ecology is with the recent nascence (2000), rise, and dramatic growth of China’s CCTV and Xinhua news agency. With the current rate of growth and level of investment, state-sponsored China Central Television together with its adjunct, the *Xinhua* news agency (CCTV/X) will soon be the world’s largest global broadcast news network (Mustafi 2012).¹⁴

¹³ The first report on the issue was put together by the Pulitzer Prize winning war correspondent, Peter Arnett in 1998. In the article entitled “Goodbye World”, Arnett writes, “I’ll put it simply: International news coverage in most of America’s mainstream papers has almost reached the vanishing point” (par. 12).

¹⁴ As Anne Nelson points out in a report to the Center for International Media Assistance, “China Central Television has come a long ways since its founding as a domestic party propaganda outlet in 1958...boasting three major global

Russia is also expanding its own state-sponsored GNN: RT, formerly Russia Today, is reportedly the world's most viewed news channel on YouTube, with more YouTube subscribers than what the YouTube channels of CNN and BBC News have together (Shuster 2015), leveraging Russian state resources for production and non-Russian private sector infrastructure for its vast distribution. Other state-controlled GNNs, such as Al Jazeera are also making a significant push to expand their network, programming, and distribution (Bullogh 2013). Yet the one broadcaster that stands alone for sheer size, ambition, and growth is the combined behemoth of China's CCTV/X (X. Zhang 2010). In fact, according to the *Columbia Journalism Review*, the Chinese government has already "built the world's largest news organization" with a well-funded effort estimated to be "19 times the annual budget of BBC" (Mustafi 2012, 19).¹⁵

Given the clear trend lines and shifts in the resource allocations amongst GNNs, and with the rise of CCTV/X¹⁶ in the GNN ecology—with China and Russia investing unprecedented amounts to develop their global news networks—the central research question that drives this study is: How consequential are GNNs for enhancing state soft and hard power?

In much of the academic literature to date, international state broadcasting is considered an aspect of public diplomacy and its role considered an extension of soft power (Nye 2011).¹⁷ However, as recognized by some leading scholars in media research and international broadcasting, the analysis to date has been either lacking nuance or operational understanding (Robinson 2001).

Add to this a dynamic and ever changing media landscape, where digital tools and internet-based distribution methods are challenging not just the concepts of censorship and control, altering

offices in Beijing, Washington, and Nairobi, and more than 70 additional international bureaus" (A. Nelson 2013, 6).

¹⁵ Official budget figures for CCTV/X are difficult to find, but not impossible to extrapolate with the known figures used for wages (approximately 20% above standard salaries in host countries), distribution (e.g., costs for satellite and cable distribution), and foreign bureau operations. More difficult to establish are domestic budgetary items and expenditures, though some official figures have been released.

¹⁶ In 2013, CCTV presented some early figures of its personnel and bureau structure: CCTV's "Europe bureau chief, Jianing Shen, reeled off a host of statistics, citing CCTV's 70 overseas bureaux, with their 446 staff (roughly the same as the [BBC] World Service), 157 of them local employees. Just three years ago, it had only 49 staff posted abroad" (Tryhorn 2013, par. 5). These numbers have steadily increased, though exact figures are not public.

¹⁷ Nye (2011), who identified and theorized Soft Power, recognizes that international broadcasting is more than just a form of public diplomacy and relies greatly on the currency of credibility in the 21st century, but he does not elaborate much beyond the need for media credibility.

the realm of information sovereignty, but also challenging the very business models and organizational structures of institutional and individual news collection and distribution networks that have dominated the industry during the last part of the twentieth century (Miel and Faris 2008). Further, much of the research and analysis on media and policy (B. Cohen 1963)¹⁸ has been concerned primarily with domestic effects on national, regional, or local electoral behavior and policy formation, often ignoring any non-domestic foreign policy, national security, or overall geopolitical effects (Naveh 2002).¹⁹

GNNs are generally understood and analyzed in the academic literature strictly as tools of public diplomacy intended as a means of manifesting “soft power.” Further, they are analyzed as a “softer” aspect within a broader “smart power” framework (Nye and Alterman 1990).²⁰

This dissertation challenges such understandings. Extant published research has focused on the limited and ideational effects of both state and non-state sponsored GNNs (the so called “CNN Effect” [Gilboa 2005a; 2005b])²¹ rather than on their *functional* roles—how GNNs are developed, deployed, and operated to serve the state as “hard” material power—and *systemic* roles—how GNNs interact with the state; informing and affecting foreign policy decision-making. In contrast, an extended Smart Power framework of analysis allows for not only a look at GNNs performing a soft power role, but also at both their potential and real performance as hard power tools. In particular, and amongst other overlooked functions, the literature is essentially bereft as to if and how GNNs strategically and dynamically operate and perform, both formally and informally, the hard power function of diplomacy and of a state intelligence-gathering and analysis

¹⁸ B. Cohen's seminal work (1963) on the role of the media in the American foreign policymaking establishment, like most of the consequent works on media and foreign policy, focuses on the previous preponderance of western foreign correspondents and GNNs.

¹⁹ Naveh (2002) is one of many academics recognizing the dearth of research in this field, writing that “past studies of foreign policy decision-making neglected to deal with [the] complex role of the media. They described the media (if at all) as one of the channels of informing leaders of international events, as input for the decision-making process” (Naveh 2002:1).

²⁰ Nye introduced the concept and coined the term Soft Power in this early work (Nye 1990a).

²¹ Gilboa (2005a) “investigates the decade long effort to construct and validate a communications theory of international relations that asserts that global television networks, such as CNN and BBC World, have become a decisive actor in determining policies and outcomes of significant events” (Gilboa 2005a, 27). Gilboa found that most studies failed to present conclusive evidence on the existence of the CNN effect and often exaggerated any potential effect the media has on policy making.

organization.

This dissertation focuses predominantly on uncovering these diplomatic and intelligence gathering functions in the context of a changing global media landscape, wherein state sponsored CCTV/X is a recent, dramatically growing, and now dominant presence in the current global news media ecology, if not yet globally in popular viewership. China's relatively new GNN news media entry arrives concomitant to that state's global economically and militarily rapid rising power status. Whether its GNN can be factored as a material part of China's power—and to what extent—might be a currently overlooked, yet consequentially weighted factor for measuring the state's overall achievement of parity with other status quo powers and what that implies in a geopolitical context. As a consequence, GNNs in general and CCTV/X specifically, are included as objects of this intensive case study that aims to answer the central research question asking how consequential GNNs are for enhancing state soft and hard power.

This raises a series of questions regarding dynamic and relative global power shifts. If, in fact, as this study and its empirical data indicate, GNNs do perform the hard power functions of intelligence gathering and diplomacy and can be seen as a source of state material power, then the question of why China and Russia are investing unprecedented amounts of financial resources to develop their global news networks becomes relevant.

Answering this research question requires in-depth study into how GNNs function; in particular, does CCTV/X function as a global extension of Chinese state soft and hard power? Does RT and other Russian global news products do the same for Russia? Beyond the scope of this dissertation's research and conclusions, however, are questions of a state's intention and effect: What might define a GNN's success and how might its impact be measured? And what might CCTV/X's rise mean for world order and the way evolutions therein are narrated and reported? While these questions were posed directly to representatives of CCTV/X in the course of this research, the answers to them will require future study with a deeper, longitudinal examination of China's nascent GNNs' performance and penetration.

Although China is an interesting case in and of itself, by looking at GNNs, and, to the degree possible, CCTV/X in specific, insight may be generated into a generalizable understanding of what motivates any state news and information broadcaster or institution to expend billions of dollars overseas annually—with little to no foreign revenue return—to achieve a marginal global viewership²² for programming that is often considered to be flat-out propaganda (Nichols 1984).²³ Even though the data on CCTV/X and RT are thin and the organizational history short, it was possible to draw a longitudinal historic overview of two hard power dimensions, diplomacy and intelligence gathering, of similar, Western GNN structures and their patterns for this dissertation. The role of GNNs as tools of international statecraft and how they constitute state material power begins to be revealed in the process.

The goal of this dissertation is to begin an investigation into the geopolitical implications of the recent GNN-shifts from West towards the non-West.

Approaching this question necessitates an examination into how GNNs function. In the research process, there were clear indications that GNNs can be understood as an integral part of states' material power. Whether that material power can be converted by the state from potential power²⁴ to deployable or perceptible power is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but the translation of GNN functions into material resources is found to be real and significant. This relationship between GNNs—via their material resource generation in intelligence gathering and

²² Real audience figures for CCTV and RT are hard to come by. RT especially has been accused of exaggerating its market share, deliberately confusing “the theoretical geographical scope of its audience” with real audience reach (Zavadski 2015, par. 7). An RT spokesperson claimed the channel reaches 700 million people worldwide, but this figure could not be verified by independent rating agencies (Zavadski 2015).

²³ Appearing in *Foreign Policy* during the Reagan administration, Nichols' article is reflective of a dominant strain of criticism of GNNs at the time, but is still a common criticism to date: “In 1984, Washington will spend more than three-quarters of a billion dollars on propaganda, much of it on overtly persuasive programming that, for the most part, will fall on deaf ears” (Nichols 1984, 129).

²⁴ In “The changing nature of world power” (Nye 1990b), the question of power conversion is key to understanding if material resources—whether it be economic or military, for example—can be effectively and efficiently converted. Nye (1990b) writes, “Power conversion is a basic problem that arises when we think of power in terms of resources. Some countries are better than others at converting their resources into effective influence, just as some skilled card players win despite being dealt weak hands. Power conversion is the capacity to convert potential power, as measured by resources, to realized power, as measured by the changed behavior of others. Thus, one has to know about a country's skill at power conversion as well as its possession of power resources to predict outcomes correctly” (178). In the case of this dissertation, the hard material resources garnered by GNNs are in diplomacy and intelligence gathering capacities.

diplomacy—and the state could indicate whether there is already a contemporary geopolitical effect as CCTV/X’s global exponential growth occurs concurrent to a dynamic of drastically reduced global resource allocation and presence of traditional and mostly Western GNNs, such as BBC World.

Global News Networks (GNNs) are part of a complex media ecology with myriad institutions and individuals performing soft power functions that include elite influence and agenda setting. But, as will be shown in the following chapters, these news networks also perform the more hard power functions of diplomacy and intelligence gathering. Each has formal and informal manifestations. The conflation of the soft power aspects of diplomacy, in specific public diplomacy, with the workaday and decidedly much harder aspects of active, conscious, and directed diplomacy, has evolved and given diplomatic actions a weaker, softer, and less effective patina, sometimes obscuring the path from diplomatic inputs to desired foreign policy outcomes.

As will be seen, GNNs have performed an active and significant diplomatic and intelligence gathering function in both the West and non-West, regardless of GNN- type. While the GNN relationship with the state varies according to GNN-type, all GNN-types have proven to have a direct impact on a state’s foreign policy outcomes.

There is a danger in discussing the existing relationship between GNNs and the state in that it reinforces the assumption and operating approach of nations and administrations hostile to any non-native news and information institutions operating and identifying trends, practices, people, and processes in those nations. Those institutions and individuals are regularly arrested for “spying” or other activities aimed at providing or demanding more transparency from purposely opaque systems or hidden activities. *Bloomberg News* and *The New York Times* recently found out that it was detrimental to the bottom line, to their employees, and to their previously less-constrained activities when they reported on the Chinese Communist Party leadership’s relatives and their amassed wealth, hidden properties, and enterprise ownerships—as editorialized in “Billionaire Princelings Ruin a Chinese Vision” (Pesek 2012). The result? “The Chinese government responded

by blocking all new journalist-visa applications from the *Times* and *Bloomberg*. Existing staff members could have their visas renewed (it makes bad headlines to expel reporters), but no new hires would be allowed to reside in the country” (Demick 2015, par. 3).

Relevance

There are more foreign correspondents in the world today than ever. As discussed above, they do not belong to the big media names of Western journalistic institutions, however. Nearly all of them have been dramatically cutting back the number of correspondents (Sambrook 2010)²⁵ and closing down foreign bureaus. The precipitous drop in foreign corresponding (Kumar 2011a)²⁶—the type grounded in the western tradition of fairness and accuracy and conducted by senior journalists with adversarial relationships to power—raises the question of how societies and elites will be informed about the world in the future and how that information will shape perceptions and policies within and between sovereign states.

Naturally, not everyone shares the pessimistic outlook. In their often cited analysis of changing practices in foreign correspondence, Hamilton and Jenner (2004) claim, “The alarm [about the end of quality foreign correspondence] ... is based on an anachronistic and static model of what foreign correspondence is and who foreign correspondents are. Foreign news will be delivered as long as a demand exists” (Hamilton and Jenner 2004, 302). Kumar (2011b) also elaborates on the concept of “backpack journalism overseas” as a new form of foreign correspondence. Others put high hopes into citizen journalism as a means of supplementing, if not replacing, foreign correspondents. Further, it might be argued that the Western values of fairness,

²⁵ As Sambrook (2010, 11) writes, “Although the impact of reducing budgets on Western news organisations, and on international coverage in particular, are much discussed, there is no single quantitative study which analyses the reduction in bureaux and coverage over the past decades. However, the general narrative is not in dispute.”

²⁶ Every few years, Kumar and the *American Journalism Review* (AJR) conducts a survey of foreign coverage and correspondents. In 2010 in the US alone, “twenty papers and companies have cut their foreign bureaus entirely since AJR conducted its first census of foreign correspondents in 1998” (Kumar 2011a, par. 3). He further reports on the non-state broadcast status and finds that “NBC distinguished between full-fledged bureaus and editorial presence, listing 14 bureaus and an editorial presence in four other countries”(par. 5). CNN is healthier in terms of number of foreign bureaus with a total of 26 internationally.

accuracy and impartiality are not absolute; news openly giving voice to one side or the other might, some argue, also have its place in the market (see Painter 2008). In today's media-rich environment everyone can find their news (Iyengar and Hahn 2009; Arceneaux and Johnson 2013).²⁷

However, this study contends that something is irrevocably lost when a GNN closes down a foreign bureau for good. As Wu and Hamilton (2004, 529) put it, “[e]pisodic coverage of foreign affairs will not alert Americans to the growing reality that foreign affairs are, in truth, local affairs.” In addition, to the issue of American or Western perception, perspective, or policy; this is a question of material capacities, the dynamic relative shifts of those capacities, and the geopolitical effect as they move from a near Western monopoly on those capacities to one of globally shared—and potentially far outstripped—capacities by non-Western powers.

As GNNs produce and project both soft and hard power thanks to the integral role of GNNs in intelligence flow, there is potentially a new aspect to the geopolitical shift in material power underway. The main contribution of this dissertation is a discussion of the hard power aspects of GNNs, hitherto neglected by scholarly literature. The findings of this research show that international media can indeed play very tangible diplomatic and information gathering roles. When Western GNNs close down their foreign bureaus, their home states, as the later chapters will elaborate, also diminish or lose the benefits of those roles and capacities.

As a result of Chinese and Russian state policies to grow the print, broadcast, internet, and mobile networks of state controlled CCTV/X and Russia's RT, China, in particular, is fueling a dramatic increase in foreign corresponding bureaus, reporters, editors, broadcast stations, and information gathering and dissemination infrastructure around the world (Mustafi 2012).²⁸ The investment is leading to exponential growth of presence and production. “While our media empires

²⁷ The consequences of selective news exposure have been studied primarily in a domestic setting in the U.S. Researchers confirmed the existence of the phenomena (e.g. Coe et al. 2008), and concluded that it leads to a polarization of the audience (for example, Iyengar and Hahn 2009).

²⁸ “To some degree, whoever owns the commanding heights of cultural development, and soft power, will enjoy a competitive edge internationally,” declared a communiqué that came out of the October 2011 plenary of the Communist Party's Central Committee. Toward that end, the Chinese government allocated \$8.7 billion in 2009-2010 alone to “external publicity work” (Mustafi 2012, par. 3).

are melting away like the Himalayan glaciers, China's are expanding," said Orville Schell, director of the Center on U.S.-China Relations at the Asia Society in New York and former dean at UC Berkeley's Graduate School of Journalism (qtd. in Barboza 2010, par. 7). As the dissertation will show later, an expansion of state-sponsored Russian media, comparable in many ways to that of CCTV/X, is also taking place globally.

United States former secretary of state Hillary Clinton went so far as to say that the US is currently engaged in "an information war." She concluded that analysis to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2011 by saying, starkly, that in the information fight against emerging international broadcasters "we are losing that war" (qtd. in Crovitz 2011, par. 3).

Methodology

This project is based on qualitative research into a small number of cases; that is, the methodology utilized is the intensive case study. Bennett and Elman (2006, 259) summarize the advantages of the method, including being "... suited to the study of rare events, they can facilitate the search for omitted variables that might lie behind contingent events, and they allow for the study of interaction effects within one or a few cases."

The drawbacks are also clear, with the main one being that the results of case studies are rather hard to generalize; that is, "[t]he case study researcher gains leverage on internal validity, but only at the expense of external validity" (Levy 2002, 445). Scholars also emphasize that case selection bias and confirmation bias are a real problem.²⁹

The case study approach allows for an in-depth look at "complex and relatively ... infrequent" phenomena (Bennett and Elman 2007, 171), which "are more amenable to labeling by words rather than numbers" (Thies 2002, 352). GNNs fit the description. Using the case study approach, the research was able to gain an insight into the vertical and horizontal functions of

²⁹ Positivist scholars also tend to question the scientific nature of the case study approach. Maoz (2002), for example, claims that case study approaches often mean an "anything goes" attitude on the behalf of the researcher. King, Keohane and Verba (1994, 5) also call for case study approaches to be more "systematic and scientific."

GNNs. The exploratory case study of GNN institutions and individuals, including RT and CCTV, looked at GNNs' organizational, editorial, and technological developments. For the CCTV research, two sites were examined: the Washington, DC center and the Nairobi center—the only two full production and distribution centers outside of the CCTV headquarters in Beijing. A site visit to both centers, one by this author in Washington, DC and the other by Ugandan research assistant, Kennedy Jawoko, to the Nairobi center, both in 2014, engaged with the administration and employees of CCTV, as well as colleagues outside the CCTV network, but who had either direct knowledge or a consulting relationship with the network.

Apart from the CCTV visits, research and observation during the course of this dissertation took place in Prague, Czech Republic at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) in 2012, with a visit to the facility, group discussion with the entire editorial management staff, private meetings with lead administrators, and a walk through the physical plant to observe the reportorial and editorial process. Prior to this dissertation-driven research visit, an extended interest and professional life in the field of international broadcasting put this author in an actively employed role with Radio Sweden International, Deutsche Welle, Radio New Zealand, the National Broadcasting Company (NBC)-Mutual News Radio Network, National Public Radio (NPR), the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), Hellenic Radio and Television (ERT), the Christian Science Monitor's "Monitor Radio" and interacting with reporters for the Voice of America (VOA). Herein lie one of the concerns for conformational bias, given the years of exposure to and employment within the broadcasting arms of multiple Western nations, which make up today's Western GNNs. Carrying out part of the research outside of the Western GNN structures was key to assuring diverse and divergent points of view regarding GNNs and their relationship to the state and state power. The author, first, maintained an active pursuit and successful entry into the non-Western GNNs, both for observation and interviews and, second, found access to those who worked within the non-Western GNNs who were willing to share background and unattributable insight and data into their organizations' operations, missions, and personnel as well as their larger strategic goals.

The research also borrowed a method from ethnography: participant observation of the creative process of the news production took place. Attendance at editorial meetings, program budgets, and interviews with personnel regarding attitudes, goals, and metrics of success were important elements of this research. In the course of the research, this author was engaged with an individual who operated as a senior consultant at the highest levels of CCTV/X both globally and in the United States and who made available previously confidential data regarding CCTV operations and structural features.

The comparative method

Many scholars refer to single-case studies as case studies, and anything with more than one cases is categorized as comparative analysis (see Gerring 2004). Yet as Levy (2002) observes, case studies always involve comparison: either within the case (if it is a single-case study) or across cases. This study is explicitly comparative. In line with the literature requiring a clear answer to what the case to be studied is an instance of, or “what is this a case of?” (Levy 2002, 434), three major examples of GNN activities were selected. In addition to the case of CCTV/X, the study also incorporated an analysis of Russian and American GNNs.³⁰ Further, for purposes of typology development and historical understanding, a study amongst three types of international broadcasters were also carried out: 1) State (Broadcast Board of Governors BBG/Voice of America VOA, China Central Television CCTV, Russia Today RT, Al Jazeera, Deutsche Welle); 2) Non-state (Cable News Network CNN, The New York Times, Associated Press, Bloomberg), and 3) Hybrid (British Broadcasting Corporation BBC World, Internews Network, Human Rights Watch). The historical background, funding, management and editorial system of these GNNs, as well as individual actions, professional comportment, and ethical considerations of those who make up GNNs, were explored within a hard power context focusing on diplomacy and intelligence

³⁰ This follows the much-discussed IR tradition to think of cases as spatially bound units such as nation states (Gerring 2004, 342). The interesting point here is that GNNs, while taken as connected to spatially bound nation states, are also, per definitionem, global in nature.

gathering.³¹ While a comparative content analysis of GNNs would have undoubtedly been interesting, it could not be carried out within the limits of this dissertation.³² The content of the GNNs' output is well documented; here the study makes use of existing literature.

Earlier the introductory chapter presented a matrix of the three an ideal-type GNNs, namely state, non-state, and hybrid. This study follows this formulation to identify structural characteristics and organizational behaviors of each type as well as individuals who are associated with these institutional GNN types and their respective relationships and behaviors both with GNN institutional structures and independent of them.

It is clear from the research that the non-state and hybrid organizations adhere to Western conventions and traditions of news and information gathering and dissemination and are the organizations mostly subject to market forces and under siege by market exigencies in the 21st century. Non-Western state GNNs mostly operate independently of the commercial marketplace with their operational survival exclusive of their revenue generation potential, though in some cases state GNNs are able to leverage and exploit capital markets and commercial opportunities, mostly within closed state systems and in relation to state enterprises, but also with underwriting and support to expand into markets interested in exploiting GNNs' domestic structural and distributional advantages.³³

Elite interviewing

Although interviewing, and by extension, elite interviewing can be viewed as to be part of the case study approach, it has played such an important role in the research work for this paper

³¹ This study did not examine GNNs' domestic newsgathering or distribution systems to any extent other than to the degree that the structure and finance between the domestic and international work are interwoven and inseparable.

³² A discourse and content analysis case study of Chinese media (M. Kounalakis 2015a) was conducted in order to explore, and ultimately, given the findings, reinforce GNNs' active role in the soft power aspects of agenda setting and elite influence.

³³ While this study is focused on the global nature of GNNs, it needs to also recognize that state GNNs are inextricably linked to their domestic operations and share administrative, editorial, and distributional resources. In the case of China and Russia, CCTV and RT share structures with the near monopoly broadcasting organizations in their domestic market, making them the dominant institution for international commercial interests who wish to reach those large audiences. This market position often creates the necessity of non-state players to adhere to the market rules and social and political coda of the domestic GNNs' structures.

that it deserves separate treatment. This is in line with Tansey's observation (2007) that "When interviewees have been significant players, when their memories are strong, and when they are willing to disclose their knowledge ..., elite interviews will arguably be the most important instrument in the process tracer's data collection toolkit" (Tansey 2007, 767)³⁴.

The secrecy of political processes entails that the only way to find this kind of information is via interviewing the participants. The fact that some of the research as regards the intelligence or strategic function of GNNs is highly confidential also called for elite interviewing, as, one of the only ways to get information on these issues (Beamer 2002).

The interview method is utilized for two different purposes in research, generally and in this particular study as well. First, it is used to gather facts and data that are impossible to uncover by different methods. For this goal, in a sort of triangulation (Davies 2001), it was necessary to interview a number of participants of the same event or to gain independent confirmation via other means of the data collected (Lilleker 2013). Second, the interviews are very useful to gain an insight into the opinions, values, and interpretations of events of the interviewees. For these purposes, semi-structured interviews were conducted.³⁵

As discussed above, confirmatory bias is a great danger of any research, but is particularly frequent with qualitative research methods. In order to avoid it, care was taken to select a wide range of interviewees. A firmly Western perspective, one reinforced by a close relationship with U.S. government politics and policies, has been fundamental to this author's approach towards writing a syndicated foreign affairs' newspaper column. This approach, if unchecked, would expectedly warrant suspicion on the part of the reader regarding a Western bias and the author has gone to extra lengths to employ and engage with non-Western readers and critics of this specific

³⁴ Although Tansey (2007) discusses the role of elite interviewing for process tracing in particular, his observation is arguably valid for the broader case study approach as well.

³⁵ While Tansey (2007) elaborates on these goals by stating that elite interviews are useful to "[c]orroborate what has been established from other sources", to "[e]stablish what a set of people think", to "[m]ake inferences about a larger population's characteristics/decision" and to "[r]econstruct an event or a set of events" (766,) George and Bennett (2005) add two further, more theoretical goals of certain types of data collection, including interviewing: uncovering variables and hypotheses that were previously ignored as well as revealing causal processes.

work. Those approached worked in both non-Western diplomatic and journalistic organizations as well as at non-Western academic institutions. The non-Western participants were not drawn from dissident ranks (although some, like Russian Yuri Yarim-Agaev were), but from the active Russian diplomatic corps, management and employees of CCTV/X, employees of Sina Weibo, and those on the financial receiving end of both the Russian and Chinese GNN systems. A conscious approach by this author, applying journalistic values and a pre-opinion writing career professional history in fact-based reporting and fair and accurate writing and publishing, was ever in the fore of this project.

The author's unique position provided access to a number of interviewees that are generally out of reach for academic researchers. In line with the goals of this paper, the interviewees were not selected at random;³⁶ rather, the goal was to include as many of the important actors as possible (Tansey 2007, 769). This was achieved via purposive or criterion-based sampling (Ritchie et al. 2014). This kind of sampling entails that "the purpose of the study and the researcher's knowledge guide the [interviewee selection] process" (Tansey 2007, 770). Along with snowball sampling, this sampling method is often used to study hard to reach populations.

The interview subjects came from a wide-range of professions related to the subject, though the largest segment of 40 interviewees came from the ranks of reporters, editors, producers, and publishers from mostly Western media, from the United States, Germany, the UK, Sweden, Mexico, Uganda, South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Canada, Spain, Italy, Greece, Hungary, Austria, Poland, Denmark. In every case but two, Terry Phillips and Peter Laufer, the interview subjects asked for confidentiality due to the sensitivity of the subject matter and both the ethical and legal challenges to the practices they described or in which they directly participated. Most were concerned about their livelihoods, some feared for their lives and the lives of colleagues who are currently still working in the field. A contemporarily charged environment made the sensitivity of

³⁶ Ritchie et al. (2014, 107) state that qualitative studies rarely do; instead, they rely on non-probability samples. See also Tansey (2007).

the information and data sharing even more important: currently, journalists are being held in foreign lands accused of being spies, while others have been followed with the threat of expulsion in either state tit-for-tat moves where expulsions and arrests have occurred in adversarial states. In many cases, the interview subjects were willing to share data, information, professional experiences, institutional relationships, structural insights and processes with this author either on the basis of a long personal or professional relationship; in some cases, they were introduced to this author and his project through a third-party acquaintance or trusted intermediary. In yet others, the interviews were conducted with individuals or institutions with which this author had no prior contact or relationship. In two instances, an interview subject contacted the author following the newspaper publication and syndication of a work on the topic of GNNs (M. Kounalakis 2014a) and once following an academic publication on soft power (Kounalakis and Simonyi 2011).

While the majority of the interviews in the media were with those previously mentioned, Chinese and Russian individuals made up the two dominant non-Western GNN personnel who were interviewed. The Russian interviewees totaled three individuals while those involved with China totaled 15. The Chinese were particularly difficult to interview because of their legally binding, signed non-disclosure forms and fear of personal reprisal—either with their remunerative realities, visa and work considerations, or where their families still resided in the People’s Republic of China. The non-disclosure agreement, while less effective in this author’s experience in the field of technology and within the Silicon Valley, for example, was, in comparison, iron clad as regards the sharing of CCTV data. Only one confidential and high-level source was willing to share crucial structural data regarding the workings of CCTV.

As GNNs are comprised of more than just journalistic institutions per this work’s broader definition, individual employees, freelance personnel, administrators, and governing board members of eight NGO organizations were interviewed, data sharing, or, in some instances, engaged in less formal conversations regarding their activities and practices overseas. A total of 18 people in this field were part of the field research. Only one was willing, with the caveat of only

within a close academic circle in the course of an academic panel and only if necessary, to share his name and position.

The interviewees for this study also include Thomas Fingar, the former deputy director of national intelligence, former Secretary of State George P. Schultz, and a number of other senior former administration and foreign government officials, members of the diplomatic corps, public diplomacy specialists, and academics, all of whom, other than Fingar and Schultz, asked to remain anonymous due to the sensitive nature of this study. Most recently, in 2016, two former U.S. undersecretaries of state were also interviewed to test against the conclusions and observations of both Schultz and Fingar.

In most instances, the recording method used was handwritten note taking, though in a few instances where the subjects were willing to go on the record, an audio recording device was utilized.

This study also extended its research to Nairobi, Kenya, where a research assistant, Kennedy Jawoko, was engaged and directed by this author to conduct interviews and collect data on the work of CCTV Africa and Xinhua.

In all cases, and as per an agreement with some of the subjects and the PhD advisor, a private academic meeting can be the setting for sharing of more detail regarding the identities, organizations, and individuals as necessary.

The Structure of this Dissertation

This introduction has focused on the issue of whether GNNs possess hard power characteristics, manifest in the presence of both diplomatic functions and intelligence gathering performance. Prior to the discussion of these empirically identifiable traits, Chapter 1 will present a theoretical framework for the interpretation of the data.

Chapter 2 will look at the varied manifestations of Western GNN institutional and individual diplomatic acts, both in a formal and informal sense, and draw on both historic

precedent and contemporary cases where GNNs are extended, usually privately, often secretly, into this realm, despite a general public perception of non-participation in such activity. The chapter contains original data and a previously unreported case of direct engagement both with a news network and individuals in GNN mediated conflict prevention in Haiti in the early 1990s. (A full transcript of the interview on the case is presented in the Appendix.)

Chapter 3 follows in the same vein with Western GNNs' institutional and individual engagement in intelligence gathering, both formally and informally. This chapter reveals multiple previously undocumented cases where individuals and institutions performed intelligence gathering functions in conscious collaboration with states.

Chapter 4 reviews the relevance of the previous two chapters and contextualizes how GNNs' material power, which had been dominated by Western GNNs for the duration of the 20th century, is now challenged and, in some ways, exceeded by rising powers, China and Russia. Non-Western GNNs' practice and performance of both diplomatic and intelligence gathering functions is explored in depth in this chapter. Further, confidential information attained by this study establishes direct intelligence linkages between CCTV/X and both the Chinese ruling party and the governing structure of the People's Republic of China, with an established practice of intelligence reporting as the main conduit up the chain of command. As such, this study concludes that not only are globally growing and spreading GNNs capable to continually propagate their national perspective, culture, ideology, policy preferences, and system via their soft power resources, but are also pursuing and adding to their material resource base via their successful leveraging of both GNNs' diplomatic and intelligence gathering capabilities.

Chapter 5 concludes with a summary of the manifestations of GNNs' heretofore either unacknowledged or unidentified material power. GNNs' material power resource and the hard power they possess via the performance of diplomatic and intelligence gathering functions is contextualized in a broader geopolitical framework and the challenge to status quo Western powers

is posited. Further, this work concludes that insofar as the perception and practices of GNNs are limited to a realm of public diplomacy and soft power—dominantly the power of persuasion—non-Western GNN presence and power is considered minimal and limited in geopolitical effect. The greater and truer value of GNNs is hidden in their material power and its sweep.

In other words, all GNNs are already understood by the non-West to be extensions of a state's material capacities. The non-West both understands and confronts other nation's GNNs as if they are intelligence gathering institutions—at times arresting reporters and charging them with espionage, for example—and deploys its own non-Western GNNs to perform the functions of an intelligence organization or as an extension of the state to perform whatever tasks are required by the state. The West, on the other hand and as reflected both in the interviews conducted with members of the GNN professional class and in the academic literature, continues to both perceive and approach, with few exceptions, GNNs as if their value is entirely rooted in their public diplomacy practice and performance. Any reckoning of relative power shifts needs to take into account not only the quantitative shift in material GNN resources expended by the non-West (and in particular China), but also the efficacy or targeted abilities of those GNNs to perform intelligence gathering and diplomatic functions for the Western state sponsors and non-sponsors alike.

CHAPTER 1: GNNs AND STATE POWER

The complex relationship between GNNs, power, and policy is difficult to penetrate. Transnational media compose a significant part of GNNs, certainly the most public and prevalent media institutions on the world stage, but the majority of empirical studies of the media fail to reveal the totality of how GNN constituent institutions and individuals function and the extended roles they perform both independently and in association and alignment with states. Further, studies of their geopolitical effect seems limited to soft power aspects or epiphenomenal effects not directly ascribed to GNNs or the totality of their effective performance in both soft and hard power roles.

This study leverages unique access and elite interviews to uncover and synthesize practices that are atypically assigned to or professionally acknowledged as traditional GNN performance. The actively obscured, often surreptitious, and generally dismissed nature and professional stigma attached to some of this performance, while not entirely overcome, is empirically established in this study. GNN institutions and individuals who work for GNNs reveal the means and methods of their systematic participation in two specific, hard power aspects of GNN performance: 1) an active participation and production of diplomacy, both informally and formally, and 2) the GNN manifestation of both formal and informal intelligence gathering activity. Establishing these acts as an inherent and intrinsic GNN behavior is the primary contribution of this work. Providing a structure of analysis, this work hopes to further research into the implications and effect of this phenomenon as the dominance of Western GNNs gives way to non-Western GNNs in the 21st century.

The past 25 years have witnessed a boom in scholarly literature regarding the media's potential role in policy-making. As Kalb wrote in 1991, “academics are now coming to appreciate what successful politicians have known for decades—that the press is a key player in the process of governance” (qtd in Gilboa 2001, 3). A similar exponential rise in interest can be observed

specifically for issues related to media and foreign affairs. As political scientist Bernard C. Cohen, author of one of the field's seminal texts (1963) put it in 1994, “[t]he study of the media and foreign policy, a cottage industry thirty years ago, has become big business today” (8). Living in the information age, or (new) media age have caught up with non-Media Studies scholars.

At the same time, international relations as a discipline remained partly unaffected by the rise of interest in communication. Many of the important works on media and foreign policy come from outside of the discipline; the best ones offer a truly multidisciplinary approach, called for, among others, by Gilboa (2008). IR-based theories seem to have difficulties assessing the operations of the media. Some of the limitations and structural boundaries where international relations and political science appear confined to conceptual understanding of GNNs include: 1) GNNs are primarily viewed from a lens of soft power, where a focus is placed on the passive aspects of media—often as a conveyor belt—and at media effects in a framing, indexing, or priming framework and where media have limited geopolitical agency; 2) GNNs are studied to a high degree within a national framework, looking at media effect and domestic policy and politics (for example, recent studies on “The Fox Effect” [Morris 2005] show how exposure to the Fox network has an effect on citizen polarization [Levendusky 2013] and voting patterns [DellaVigna and Kaplan 2006]), but both studies are conceptually bereft when it comes to assigning a media effect to foreign policy and international relations outcomes other than in and around the margins of policy or in cases where policies are ambiguous and where media are seen as an exogenous catalyst leveraged by a stronger elite framing actor to voice a perspective or policy preference to garner either elite sympathy or popular support for that preference; 3) when recognizing media as an agential actor, studies do not ascribe hard power or material value to any geopolitical media effect; and, finally, 4) GNNs have not received broad academic scrutiny, other than for their soft power, public diplomacy roles—their global strategic effects have been mostly neglected, in part likely due to the 20th monopoly of Western GNNs and a preponderance of Western media and communication scholarship.

1.1 GNNs and soft power

As discussed in the Introduction, the IR theory that attributes the most importance to the media is Nye's Soft Power/Smart Power framework. "Fully defined, soft power is the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes" (Nye 2011, 20-21).³⁷ Nye sees this as directly linked to Lukes' third face of power, and he names the media as one of the important resources for soft power/smart power:³⁸ "[I]f the United States is involved in more communication networks, it has a greater opportunity to shape preferences³⁹ in terms of the third face of power" (Nye 2011, 18).⁴⁰

In the media/IR literature, this "shaping of preferences" has been analyzed in a large number of studies as the media effects of agenda setting and framing. Perhaps the most important argument used in the study of these effects in foreign news coverage is that "for many, the sole source of information about world events is the press" (Wanta et al. 2004, 367).⁴¹ Further, Entman (1989) contends that media effects can be particularly significant in issues where "there are no old attitudes to defend," where audiences "lack detailed, expert knowledge or strong opinion" (Entman 1989, 351). At the same time, others argue that it is exactly because the media (particularly the US media) provides no background knowledge about news events (particularly foreign news events),

³⁷ Elsewhere, Nye formulates soft power this way: "If I am persuaded to go along with your purposes without any explicit threat or exchange taking place—in short, if my behavior is determined by an observable but intangible attraction—soft power is at work. Soft power uses a different type of currency (not force, not money) to engender cooperation—an attraction to shared values and the justness and duty of contributing to the achievement of those values" (Nye 2009, 7). However, it must be noted that Nye has been criticized, among other things, for not theorizing attraction (Bially Mattern 2005).

³⁸ Since soft power is a part of smart power, the descriptive statements about the media's importance as a soft power resource are valid for smart power as well.

³⁹ However, Lukes calls for a more nuanced understanding of the shaping of preferences and argues for a distinction to be made between the conditions under which, and the mechanism through which, the "influencing" takes place; he also finds the lack of differentiation between different kinds of "influencing" problematic (Lukes 2005, 490-491).

⁴⁰ Later on, Nye provides a more concrete example: "Smart strategies must have an information and communications component. States struggle over the power to define norms, and framing issues grows in importance. For instance, CNN and the BBC framed the issues of the First Gulf War in 1991, but by 2003, Al Jazeera was playing a large role in shaping the narrative of the Iraq War" (Nye 2011, 20).

⁴¹ A similar claim was made by Baum and Groeling (2010). It can be argued that, with the emergence of web 2.0, the mass media are losing some of their sway. Exploring the debates around this argument is, however, beyond the scope of this dissertation. Nonetheless, it could be ventured here that very few scholars would deny that the mass media are still important to informing the public.

“most citizens remain dependent on news and infotainment (Baum 2003) media and the cues they offer for making sense of war and other aspects of foreign policy” (Aday et al. 2012, 327). Thus, the media are expected to have a particularly strong effect on the audience in foreign policy issues.

While agenda setting in Communication Studies means, simply, “the idea that there is a strong correlation between the emphasis that mass media place on certain issues ... and the importance attributed to these issues by mass audiences” (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007, 11), in Political Science, research has focused on agenda setting as intrinsically linked to the question of power. It was Dahl (1956; 1961), and even more prominently Schattschneider (1960), and following him, Bachrach and Baratz (1962) who first recognized the importance of the political agenda for understanding power. In an often cited passage, Schattschneider (1960) put agenda-setting at the center of his power concept: “The definition of alternatives is the supreme instrument of power ... He who determines what politics is about runs the country” (68). Bachrach and Baratz (1962) developed Schattschneider's work further. Their concept of nondecision-making can be understood as control over the agenda.⁴²

The IR theory that attributes the most importance to the media is Nye's Soft Power/Smart Power framework. While there have been a number of historical works exploring the development of soft power from Wilsonian times (for instance, Axelrod 2009), Nye argues that it is in today's new media age that soft power/smart power is of primary importance. “Politics has become a contest of competitive credibility. The world of traditional power politics is typically about whose military or economy wins. Politics in an information age ‘may ultimately be about whose story wins’ (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1999)” (Nye 2008, 100). Further, although soft power has been criticized as a fundamentally American concept, scholars have studied its application in a variety of national contexts, including Japan (Leheny 2006; Otmazgin 2008; Watanabe and McConnell 2008), Turkey

⁴² Agenda setting in the two disciplines developed separately and remained distinct until the mid-1980s. Interestingly, empirical studies in the two fields have lead to different results. While “hundreds of studies worldwide” have proven the existence of agenda setting effects in media studies (McCombs 2005, 543), the studies carried out by political scientists have produced contradictory findings.

(Oğuzlu, 2007; Altunisik 2008), and, most importantly, both in terms of the size of the literature and for the purposes of this project, China (Gill and Huang 2006; Kurlantzik 2007; Price and Dayan 2006; Paradise 2009; Shambaugh 2013) as well as Russia (Tsygankov 2006; Popescu 2006). Importantly for the present project, in addition to the interest in China's soft power in the English-language academic world, as Nye (2011) points out, “hundreds of essays and scholarly articles have been published in the People's Republic of China on soft power” (88).⁴³

As discussed in the introduction, the impressive number of studies nonetheless, critics still argue that the analysis to date has been lacking in distinction or operational understanding. “IR-based approaches have rarely had a strong empirical handle on the actual role and influence of news media. More often than not, the role and function of media have been assumed” (Robinson 2011, 5). Nye himself has seldom provided case studies; his conceptual development of soft power has a dominant role for media, but he does not elaborate on the function or efficacy of media, creating the skeletal framework for the future development of media models appropriate to his soft power conceptual structure.⁴⁴ The soft power framework of understanding transnational GNNs is used to measure popular and elite effects on foreign policymaking, but inapplicable when it comes to measuring GNNs’ hard power diplomatic and intelligence gathering aspects and effects, the central focus of this study.

Yet within international relations, the dominance of soft power theories’ applicability to GNNs’ media effects provide the background against which this research project was carried out in order to allow for extending the theoretical framework and establish the presence and performance of GNNs’ non-soft power diplomatic and intelligence gathering characteristics uncovered and presented in this work. The prevalence of understanding and analysis of GNNs

⁴³ For a thorough analysis of how the concept has been used in China, see Shambaugh (2013). Another important study is Wilson (2015), analysing how the fundamentally Western concept of soft power is interpreted and adapted in China and Russia.

⁴⁴As Robinson puts it, “when Joseph Nye wrote in 1996 that ‘America’s increasing ability to communicate with the public in foreign countries literally over the heads of their rulers via satellite, provides a great opportunity to foster democracy’ (Nye and Owens 1996), he did so with little evidence of both how, and to what extent, this was actually occurring” (Robinson 2011, 5).

within a soft power context and through soft power theories is not disputed in this work, nor is the reason for this: within the IR literature, international state broadcasting is the dominant traditional GNN manifestation; the traditional performance of such institutions is mostly considered an aspect of public diplomacy and its role considered an extension of soft power.

Soft power can be wielded through a variety of means; one of them is public diplomacy, “a long-term foreign policy asset” (Adelman 1981, 927); “an instrument that governments use to mobilize these [soft power] resources to communicate with and attract the publics of other countries, rather than merely their governments”⁴⁵ (Nye 2008, 95). Many of the writings in IR that account for the media on some level can be filed under the rubric of public diplomacy studies. These range from historical overviews (Dizard 2004; Cull 2008) to insiders’ memoirs and analysis (Tuch 1990) and to case studies (e.g. Nisbet et al. 2004; Burns and Eltham 2009, Khatib et al. 2012). Yet as soft power theories were criticized for lack of nuance, the literature focused on public diplomacy has been argued to suffer from a lack of engagement with non-historical issues, a too US-centric approach, and oversimplification⁴⁶ (Gilboa 2008, 56). To rectify this, in a series of papers, communications studies expert Gilboa (2000; 2001; 2002; 2008) developed a system of conceptual models on how the mass media are utilized in foreign policy in general (Gilboa 2001; 2002) and in public diplomacy in particular (Gilboa 2000; 2008). Viewing the media as “as an instrument of foreign policy and international negotiations” (Gilboa 2001, 4), Gilboa makes an analytical distinction between, on the first level, diplomatic efforts that impose limitations on the media (secret diplomacy, closed-door diplomacy and open diplomacy) and those where officials make use of the media (Gilboa 2000). The latter category includes public diplomacy, media diplomacy (“officials’ uses of the media to communicate with state and non-state actors, to build

⁴⁵While this kind of definitions remains dominant in both the academic and the lay literature, Gilboa (2008) argues that they are too limiting. He embraces the definition put forward by Signitzer and Coombs, who see public diplomacy as “the way in which both government and private individuals and groups influence directly or indirectly those public attitudes and opinions which bear directly on another government’s foreign policy decisions” (Signitzer and Coombs 1992, quoted. in Gilboa 2008, 57). This definition allows for the inclusion of non-state actors, effectively abolishing the difference between public diplomacy and PR.

⁴⁶This last problem is also repeatedly brought up by Nye, who painstakingly tries to refute the conflation of public diplomacy with propaganda (for instance, Nye 2009, 83).

confidence and advance negotiations, and to mobilize public support for agreements”, Gilboa 2001, 10⁴⁷) and media-broker diplomacy (“journalists turning mediators”, Gilboa 2001, 15), this last notion being his own conceptual invention. Of the three, only public diplomacy has been subject to much IR discussion; the concepts of media diplomacy⁴⁸ and media-broker diplomacy have, unfortunately, been not taken to use by other scholars. The notion of media-broker diplomacy, where “international mediation [is] conducted and sometimes initiated by journalists” (Le 2006, 2) is of high importance to this research; the concept of Informal Diplomacy deployed in this study is closely related to Gilboa's concept. This connects back to the soft power/smart power framework: when journalists are employed to carry out these non-journalistic missions, they can be interpreted as resources bringing about hard power. This is a highly under-researched yet highly interesting phenomenon, and one for which the present study aims to be an exploration.

As will be shown in the following chapter, one of the prevalent practices of institutional journalists, as well as of some INGO employees and academics, has been these GNN players' engagement in diplomatic discourse, intermediation, and negotiation, and, in their least direct involvement, as couriers of fact and position. GNNs and their constituent members are often agential, private actors rather than performing their strictly and publicly perceived role of observers and reporters of fact. The following chapter will review this multigenerational and long-standing behavior and performative role in greater depth and the later chapters will reveal that this role is endemic to both West and non-Western GNNs, though the relationship to the state will be seen

⁴⁷ An example of the official use of the media for transmitting messages to “the other side” is recounted by Livingston (1997), who describes that in 1962, “government-to-government communication between Moscow and Washington was so primitive, according to Beschloss, it took six to eight hours to send and translate messages. In an attempt to overcome this barrier, and to side-step the KGB and Soviet military, Khrushchev began sending messages to the Americans via Radio Moscow, which he knew was constantly monitored by the United States” (Livingstone 1997, 3). This further exemplifies the use of media as a hard power asset (though whether this is an act of public diplomacy depends on one's interpretation of whether Khrushchev targeted the American public or the White House only).

⁴⁸ The term “media diplomacy” has been used but often to describe different notions (and often simply as synonymous with public diplomacy). In the only book-length treatise on the subject, which, interestingly, covers British, rather than American diplomatic efforts, Y. Cohen (1986) defines it as part of public diplomacy, yet as somehow different from it: “Media diplomacy is thus to be distinguished from ‘public diplomacy’ in that the latter encompasses not only information work and cultural activities, where the media are involved, but all public aspects of foreign policy... Media diplomacy includes all those aspects of public diplomacy where the media are involved as well as others not associated with public diplomacy including the sending of signals by governments through the media, and the use of the media as a source of information” (7).

differently as Western GNNs are predominantly non-state or hybrid institutions. These hard power diplomatic functions have not garnered as much attention in scholarly literature as the soft power aspect of GNNs.

In his work of hard vs soft power, Nye put a great emphasis on soft power being an ability/capability, since many of his critics mistake it for a type of behavior or, more commonly, for a resource. He also tries to avoid an overly simplistic identification of tangible resources with hard power and intangibles with soft power (although he does claim that it is often the case) by bringing up a number of counterexamples, such as patriotism, an intangible sentiment affecting military (hard power) outcomes. Typically hard power resources can also produce soft power; he says with Osama bin Laden that “people are attracted to a strong horse rather than a weak horse” (Nye 2011, 86). Another example, very relevant to the present study, of a hard power resource, wealth producing soft power is that of CNN and the first Iraq war: “When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the fact that CNN was an American company helped to frame the issue, worldwide, as aggression. Had an Arab company been the world's dominant TV channel, perhaps the issue would have been framed as a justified attempt to reverse colonial humiliation” (Keohane and Nye 1998, 90). In his later work, Nye (2011) completes the picture by pointing to the difference between the first and the second Gulf wars: “CNN and the BBC framed the issues of the First Gulf War in 1991, but by 2003 Al Jazeera was playing a larger role in shaping the narrative in the Iraq War” (Nye 2011, 20).

When discussing soft power media effects in the contemporary world, the fundamental changes the media landscape has undergone must be taken into consideration. Bringing about a dramatic reduction of communication costs, and thus “exponentially increasing the number of channels of communication in world politics” the information revolution has had a major effect on “the patterns of complex interdependence” (Keohane and Nye 1998, 85) between states. At the same time, Keohane and Nye are careful to emphasize that the information revolution did not occur in a vacuum but in an already existing political system that did and does shape it (and is being

shaped by it).⁴⁹

A further effect of the information revolution explored by Nye (2008) is the “paradox of plenty” (99). In today's world of information overload, it is attention rather than information that has become the scarce resource. Gate-keepers who can filter relevant information from the noise are of high demand, and their “crucial resource and an important source of soft power” is their credibility (100). Credibility is an undefined and untheorized but nonetheless central concept in Nye's argument. Not only is it a decisive soft power resource for the media, but, as discussed above, it has become crucially important for governments, too, who are also implicated in a “contest of competitive credibility” (Nye 2008, 100).

GNNs perform this gatekeeper role at a very high level. They are, if nothing else, built as reporting and analysis mechanisms with extraordinary access to political actors and other social leaders. The GNNs' professional, institutional role is to use omission and commission of fact to draw comprehensible and, at times, actionable narratives for both mass audiences and narrower state actors, as will be seen in the following chapters. The credibility and track-record of these GNN institutions also gives them greater credence in policy-oriented, epistemic communities as well as in analytical institutions that turn to reliable open-source data and information for policy formation and prescription. These functions allow for GNNs to perform both in the hard power tasks of providing the data used in policy formation, but also fulfill the soft power aspects by helping to set agendas from a limited and perspective-driven reportorial and analysis stance. A Western GNN will note different points of interest and delve deeper into policies that reflect their own institutional biases rather than those of a non-Western GNN.

The development of the information society has certainly piqued the interest of Communication Studies scholars. As McCombs (2005, 544-545) notes, many scholars predicted

⁴⁹An element of this they claim not to have foreseen is the dramatic increase in importance of “loosely structured network organizations”, which are now, thanks to a significant drop in the cost of communication, in a situation to better than even to “penetrat[e] states without regard to border”. While globalization is not a new phenomenon, as they point out, “[e]arlier transnational flows were heavily controlled by large bureaucracies like multinational corporations or the Catholic Church” (Keohane and Nye 1998, 83).

that the spread of new media would lead to the end of the media's effects on the public, and maybe on policy as well. The spread of new communication technologies have lead and will lead to a diversification of news sources; there has been arguments stating that with everyone having their own customized, idiosyncratic news, mass audiences will cease to exist. The fragmentation of the audience, the argument goes, will lead to the fragmentation of the public agenda. However, there are now studies showing that the changes are limited and far less overarching in this respect than scholars had expected. McCombs (2005) compare the situation to cable television: you have access to a hundred channels, but you only watch a few of them (545). He cites evidence to the effect that “[a]ttention on the web is even more concentrated than in the print word (545; see also Takeshita 2006).

In addition to the question of access or exposure, a further issue is whether new media are independent from traditional mass media. It has been noted (for example, by McCombs 2005; Takeshita 2006) that some of the more popular online new sites are often connected to traditional media by their ownership structure. For example, *cnn.com* is an extension of CNN, or *New York Times* online is a different manifestation of *the New York Times*.⁵⁰ Further, a phenomenon termed intermedia agenda setting effect, that is, elite media influencing the agenda of smaller, non-elite news outlets has been demonstrated earlier (for example, Reese and Danielian 1989; Danielian and Reese 1989; Roberts and McCombs 1994; Golan 2006). Now, since the 00s, demonstrating the existence or the lack of existence, or the existence of the opposite of this effect with regards to online media has become one of the popular topics of agenda setting researchers. The findings, however, have been mixed. Sweetser et al. (2008) found evidence of traditional media transferring their agenda to blogs, thus confirming the intermedia agenda setting from elite to non-elite media. In contrast, Meraz (2011) found that in her sample, “traditional media were unable to set political blog agendas” (176). Others, such as Wallsten (2007) and Messner and Distasto (2008) found a

⁵⁰Although it needs to be noted, Althaus and Tewksbury (2002) found in an experimental, microlevel study that the print and the online version of *the New York Times* led to different issue agendas among their respective audiences.

bidirectional relationship between the blogosphere and traditional media. The source of the contradiction is likely to be similar to what Walgreve and Van Aelst (2006) found with regards to policy agenda setting: different scholars conceive of their studies differently, using different samples, operationalizing variables differently, analyzing different time frames and focusing on different issues. While this is a very intriguing topic, its exploration is, unfortunately, outside the scope of this dissertation.

With respect to GNNs and the new media age, what this study has found is the inability of non-institutional journalists, who are not part of the larger GNN institutional system, are not feeding into a valuable or valued policymaker system and, therefore, not anywhere near a substitute for the larger GNN institutional structures and their journalists, researchers, and academics. Non-institutional players lack two specific things that devalue and detach their information from a GNNs' hard power performance. The first is the lack of access afforded to these smaller and more independent players. A reporter or researcher with institutional relationships is granted higher level access to elites and the policymaking community, as this study found in its interviews with multiple impressive and growing blogger and news websites. In multiple cases, non-institutional players were asked if they could conceivably get interviews with foreign heads of state or their cabinet level ministers. The answer, with one exception in one case where the journalist had a personal and long-term relationship with a leader (this journalist was also formerly an institutional GNN reporter), was that it "was near impossible" for the non-GNN personnel to get "anywhere near the presidential palace" (personal communication 2015).

The second is their lack of attention to strategic issues and a greater emphasis on the ephemeral and sensational. While some of the West's leading institutional GNNs have cut back their resources, new information organizations and individuals are more driven by ephemera in their "hunt for clicks and impressions" (personal communication with internet news editor). The long-form and analytical piece is disappearing in direct correlation to the disappearance of resources from the profession and the "news hole" is being filled with more sensational. "Henry

Kissinger is not my audience,” said one website manager who also relies on cats and short funny videos to populate part of the rolling front page of his product (personal communication with internet news editor). Foreign affairs is not on his radar.

The third is non-institutional GNNs’ lack of reach to a policymaking or party institution that values and knows how to properly credit and weigh editorial choices, newspaper or magazine story placement (is a particular story on the front page or buried in the business section?). This may be a demographic shift and transition that is occurring, but one member of the U.S. Congress said that she does not “look at the internet.” When asked how information could be conveyed, she said to this author, “this may sound funny, but can you fax me?” (personal communication 2014). This same lawmaker relies on files full of newspaper and magazine clips, as well as other in-house briefing materials, for her committee meetings. While GNNs and their output are well-represented in this stack of published materials, there is no room in her information diet for raw or unprocessed fodder of unfamiliar provenance.

The second media effect that has come to dominate media studies since the mid-1990s (Weaver 2007)⁵¹ is framing, or “the process of selecting and highlighting some aspects of a perceived reality, and enhancing the salience of an interpretation and evaluation of that reality” (Entman 2004, 26). Some of the studies on framing try to connect media framing and public opinion (Brewer 2006), or, media framing and policy (Auerbach and Bloch-Elkon 2005). As for issue framing in GNNs, an in-depth study on Chinese agenda-setting narratives of intervention in the conflicts of both Libya and Syria (M. Kounalakis 2015a, 44) draws a direct relationship between the media framing of a Type 3 state non-Western GNN (total alignment with a Chinese state policy privileging sovereignty) and a Type 1 non-state Western GNN (close alignment, but with dissent

⁵¹ Weaver (2007, 144) produces a fascinating chart of the number of studies on agenda setting, framing, and priming published in communication studies journals between 1971 and 2005. It shows that agenda-setting was the dominant of the three up until 1995 when it was overtaken by studies on framing. In the period 2001-2005, there were almost three times as many papers published on framing as on agenda-setting and priming together.

and contradiction to the expressed state policy of the United States promoting the primacy of R2P—responsibility to protect).⁵²

Studies on framing and public opinion as well as on framing and policy have brought the discussion back to the question tackled in this chapter: how do media, particularly GNNs, influence policy? First off, it can be argued that the media influence (foreign) policy through influencing foreign policy makers. Policy makers, it is argued, are members of the audience; thus, they are subject to media effects on the audience. While this is undoubtedly true to an extent, Walgrave and Van Aelst (2006, 99) warn against simply extending audience effects on politicians by stating that “political agenda setting is a macroprocess and not a micropocess.”

Further, policy makers often see the media agenda as a proxy for the public agenda; the media content as their best insight into public opinion (Pritchard 1992). From this perspective, it does not even matter whether the media reflect public opinion; neither does whether the media influence public opinion. What matters is that policy makers believe they do (Schudson (1996) quoted in Walgrave and Van Aelst 2006, 100).

From the perspective of the GNN-state power relation, with regards to framing, it is highly important that research has repeatedly found that, “[a]s a practical matter, news organizations routinely leave policy framing and issue emphasis to political elites (generally, government officials)” (Bennett and Manheim quoted. in Livingston 1997, 5).

⁵² An earlier study published by this author (M. Kounalakis 2015a) shows that while the US and Russia staked-out opposing positions on Syria on the basis of either material or national security reasoning, the Chinese interest in the dispute outcome was—and remains—less obvious or easily understood. In a previous UN-sanctioned action enabling intervention on Libya to oust Muammar Gaddafi, China did not veto the Security Council action—despite its significant material interests in that country. A short while later, at the outset of the Syrian stirrings and talk of UN action, China made clear both through its official state channels and its aligned media that it would not enable a Security Council approach that could lead to intervention, either unilaterally by a third country or via a military coalition of state actors. This study uses a critical discourse analysis (CDA) approach to understand the official Chinese position in the case of Syria—a position that stands in contrast to its recent and prior intervention-tolerant foreign policy position on Libya at the end of the Gaddafi-era. One conclusion of this study is that China is still formulating its dynamic and seemingly disjointed foreign policy position in the Middle East at present and that the promotion of the narratives of “Sovereignty” over “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) is the current trump card in its now. The study found dominant anti-interventionist foreign policy posture propagated and promoted by China’s dominant GNN transnational media channels.

One influential media influence theory that appreciates the role of the elites is Entman's cascading activation model (2004; 2008). The model's starting point is the observation that different parts of the elite "peddle their messages to the press" (Entman 2004, 4) (or to use a more scientific jargon, engage in frame contestation), and in some cases, the administration's framing of the event remains dominant, while in others, "counterframes" prevail. The model, suggesting that "the media's political influence arises from how they respond—from the ability to frame the news in ways that favor one side over another" (Entman 2004, 4) aims to account for both cases; it aims to explain why "the media have varied from lapdog to watchdog" (Baum and Potter 2008, 54). In the expanded version, Entman (2008) hopes to define the necessary circumstances under which pro-American counterframes can be successfully deployed in the anti-US media environment of a target country. His model takes into account the different power positions of the actors⁵³—it is a hierarchical framework with the dominant frames "cascading" down from the top—and can include differences between the influence of various media outlets as well as the display positions of particular news pieces. It also contains several feedback loops and interactions. The model shows that the success of counterframes is a function of cultural congruence⁵⁴ (Entman 2008, 94), and is in an inverse relationship with media freedom: "Those countries where the mainstream political culture favors the United States and elites exert tight control over media provide the most hospitable environments for pro-American frames to penetrate" (Entman 2008, 96)⁵⁵.

The elite function of foreign policymaking is further reinforced by the elite role played by institutional GNN performers. "We go to the same parties" said one journalist living and working in Europe, "I see the embassy people all the time" (personal communication 2014). Individuals

⁵³ As Aday et al. (2012, 328) put it, "cascading activation allows for other actors and institutions ranging from Congress to media to the public, and perhaps global advocacy networks, to shape issue definitions and other aspects of policy discourse. But ... these secondary players are themselves often responding to the initial frame promoted by the White House."

⁵⁴ This was recently empirically verified by, for example, Sheaffer et al. (2014), who analyzed the framing of the war in Gaza in the winter of 2008-09 in the English-language media in 26 countries and found that "[t]he closer the relative proximity between Israel and a foreign country, the greater the acceptance of Israel's views" (149).

⁵⁵ Some of the empirical works that utilised Entman's cascading activation theory include Canel 2012; Chaban and Holland 2015; Rowling et al. 2015.

working within elite structures, in particular GNNs, are granted unique access and privilege—and reciprocate that access and privilege to political and social elites (Lichter et al. 1990; Nesbitt-Larking 2007). In the international sphere, this elite structure is even smaller than it is in a nation's capital. In many instances, as will be seen in the following chapter, diplomatic missions overseas look to their nationals working within GNNs as extensions of their diplomatic corps, relying on them for fresh reporting data, analysis, networks, contacts, and even policy suggestions. While this is done for the most part on an informal basis by Western GNNs, there is often a formal structure in non-Western GNNs, replete with direct reporting functions and hierarchical state run systems of reward and punishment. Chinese GNNs, as will be seen, have formalized the reporting process from the field up the chain of command to the highest levels of the government and the party, depending on the value of the information and whether it is timely and actionable. While this system is not friction-free, it is structurally reliable to deliver as much information and data as is possible to formulate a state policy or promote a state plan.

1.2 GNNs and hard power

As this overview of the literature indicates, there is substantial extant work on GNNs soft power effects, with some of the most significant causal relations established in the agenda setting realm. With limited exception, GNNs, in their broadest sense and encompassing media and other global and transnational newsgathering and disseminating institutions and individuals, lack systematic study of their hard power aspects and effects.⁵⁶ Yet as Gilboa, quoted above, (2001, 15) points out, journalists are sometimes utilized to carry out decidedly non-journalistic missions such as mediating between opposing parties. Sometimes they are also directly implicated in information/intelligence gathering. This is a less well-known aspect of the media used by the state

⁵⁶ However, digital media as such (and not GNNs) have been subject to exploration as hard power assets (although not necessarily using this terminology). Howard (2015), for example, lists a number of countries such as China, Russia, Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine that have hackers on government payroll. Howard also describes incidents of “cyberwars” (295) in which states use viruses, a paid army of pro-regime contributors such as China’s “fifty-cent army” (186) as well as bots on social networks to achieve particular goals.

as a hard power asset; it is one of the aims of the present study to contribute to the scholarship on this issue. Apart from Dover and Goodman's (2009) excellent work, IR literature on this topic is almost nonexistent. While a few scholars, such as Gilboa and Robinson, either allude or directly venture into this field, they posit questions for future research and promote potential research agendas that otherwise go unattended, if not entirely unnoticed. The study of these GNNs' hard power performance is inaccessible for the most part and unattainable without guarantees of anonymity, background assurances, and off-the-record interviews with guarded individuals protective both of their individual roles and professional journalistic and NGO standards and ethics. The media literature review finds many entry points for the formal and informal performance of both diplomacy and intelligence gathering roles, at an institutional and individual level, and leaves open the popularly misperceived, literature overlooked, publicly denied, and privately revealed hard power roles performed by GNNs.

The theoretical contribution of this dissertation is to posit that GNNs, a conceptually new, broader category of newsgathering and data analysis structure with political intermediating potential and practice, possess both inherently and through active promotion and development, deployable hard material power capacities available to states. These capacities are exploited, via both the formal and informal relationships between the state and GNNs, and are consequential to enhancing a state's potential hard and soft power.

The following Figure 1 depicts the intelligence flow between states and GNNs. As depicted, the state engages in strategies of smart power deployment (via a combination of interacting soft and hard power). State soft power is expressed institutionally via its public diplomacy institutions and functions, one of which is the development of state media news networks. These state media news networks are a part of a larger GNN ecology that include both non-state networks (such as CNN or The New York Times) and hybrid state/non-state networks (such as the BBC), but also partially state supported NGOs. This GNN ecology is a semi-closed system that interacts with itself, sharing sources, framing and priming for each other, and setting

various conventions for collection, presentation, production, and distribution of a final product manifesting itself most visibly as a mass media product. That product is then one of the consumables used by the intelligence gathering and analysis functions of a state to develop and produce their products. This formal relationship develops familiar products such as media briefs and reviews, as well as news synopses. This is only one aspect of the intelligence gathering and analysis relationship. The other one is between the GNN ecology and the intelligence gathering and analysis state systems and involves exclusive interactions, relationships, and information.




Figure 1: GNNs and intelligence flow

To date, GNNs are mostly seen as only state-sponsored news organizations (such as VOA in the West, and Russia's RT or China's CCTV in the non-West), rather than the growingly complex and varied institutional structures that contemporarily perform multiple GNN functions. The literature, consequently, reviews these narrower international broadcasters nearly exclusively as

institutions extending a state's soft power. Hard material power assigned to these structures and institutions is neither generally perceived nor broadly academically validated. Despite this lack of theoretical understanding, states recognize—mostly stealthily—that GNNs possess and generate hard material power outputs. How states interact with GNN institutions depends on the type of GNN structure, whether a Type 1 non-state-sponsored structure, Type II Hybrid GNN or Type III, State-sponsored institutions. GNN-type does not determine, however, if the constituent institutions of a GNN have or can develop potential material hard power nor their efficacy; it does determine structures and defines the formal or informal relationship to the state, party, and policymaking elites.

CHAPTER 2 – WESTERN GNNs AND STATE POWER 1: DIPLOMACY

This chapter examines the role of global media institutions and foreign correspondents in diplomacy and reviews traditional and historic performances of diplomatic functions of GNNs. At times an integral part of their professional role and at others an ancillary by-product of their status and structure, institutional journalists and media organizations that dominate GNN structures engage in activities that are not strictly the publicly received and widely perceived functions of reporting, writing, and broadcasting. In the course of their professional performance, they interact directly and as agential actors with states and their representatives and often participate and precipitate—actively or passively, formally and informally—in the iterative and communicative diplomatic processes between states and policymakers. As will be documented in this chapter, state foreign policy outcomes are often a direct result of GNN intervention and interaction, with significant and historically recognized outcomes that would not likely have been achieved without this class and category of mediating professionals acting outside their dominant roles⁵⁷ as observers, reporters, researchers, and public analysts.

One of the first and more comprehensive studies to incorporate the diplomatic functions of a GNN, in this instance Al-Jazeera, is the doctoral dissertation of Powers (2009). Powers creates a matrix of seven geopolitical effects of international media. He states that of these seven, of which most fall into the realm of agenda setting and elite influence, two are directly related to the diplomatic function defining the roles as a) diplomacy and b) media-brokered diplomacy. He found that these seven identified functions “are commonplace consequences of international media that can be observed as influencing international politics” (13).

Global News Networks (GNNs) are part of a complex media ecology with myriad institutions and individuals performing soft power functions that include elite influence and agenda

⁵⁷ For an ethical discussion on the professional role of journalism, see Arant and Meyer's *Public and Traditional Journalism* (1998). This dissertation focuses on conscious activities that go beyond the traditional roles of news capture and dissemination and reach into the self-perception and responsibility felt by journalism professionals to engage in non-traditional roles.

setting, as discussed in greater detail earlier in this dissertation, but also perform the hard power functions of diplomacy and intelligence gathering, both formally and informally. Conflating public diplomacy—the rubric under which most scholars and professionals place the work of GNNs, in particular Type III state-sponsored GNNs—with other strategic aspects of diplomacy, such as negotiations and two-track diplomatic participation, has given GNNs a weaker, more passive role in the literature and the practice of diplomacy. Diplomacy, in general and popularly, is sometimes understood as a soft power practice.⁵⁸

Diplomacy, however, has always had a much harder edge than the current perceptions and discussions attribute it (Clausewitz and Scherff 1883).⁵⁹ *Démarches* have been a standard diplomatic practice and the tough negotiations that precede an outbreak of violent military hostility between nations are often the result of heated diplomatic dialogue, threat, or walkout.⁶⁰ To be sure, a credible diplomatic action needs to have the material resources to back it up, but even in cases where a nation's material resources are limited, diplomacy can assert the use of tactics like naming and shaming or the effective marshalling of allies, a regional body, or a world community to support a diplomatic cause backed by military might. All this to suggest that diplomacy comes in both soft

⁵⁸ This general perception and approach is reinforced in the academy as well as in the act of statecraft, as during Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's presentation of a three-legged stool of power (the "3Ds"), where hard power refers to defense, soft power to diplomacy and development, and all together make up an equation of "smart power" (Nye 2009).

⁵⁹ Diplomacy, in von Clausewitz, is a definitive and identifiable expression of power, one of a spectral set of tools available to states. Political practitioners have interpreted and applied Clausewitz's oft-cited aphorism "war is an expression of politics by other means" to express the spectrum of diplomatic state options. In the pre-nuclear age, Lenin was a keen follower of Clausewitz's work. Kissinger used the aphorism to reinforce forward leaning diplomacy and invalidate total war in the nuclear age in his book *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (1957). The conundrum in Kissinger's analysis is that diplomacy, too, becomes a weaker tool in the face of nuclear proliferation and where sovereign states no longer need to align or balance when they possess nuclear weaponry, as with contemporary North Korea.

⁶⁰ The range of diplomatic practice has been observed and noted during the author's work as a foreign correspondent, as a diplomatic spouse, and in interactions with former U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz, former Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns, and many others during the course of the last thirty years. While the classic 1917 book *Diplomatic Practice* by Sir Ernest Mason Satow (2009), recently updated, is still used as a popular reference, it is focused on the legal aspects of diplomacy with less attention paid to the personal and unconventional practices diplomats' leverage. This author has been in the presence of Richard Holbrooke as he berated a harsh German critique of America's racial inequality and moral authority; personally experienced the adept nature of Nicholas Burns as he appealed to a broader Greek public over the heads of his official Athens interlocutors; and saw how George Schultz brought economic and business interests to bear to the policy preferences of the diplomatic corps. The multiplicity of available tools and tactics are broad and often a reflection of personality traits and proclivities, but in all cases give the diplomat both a wide attractive and coercive diplomatic range. While the classic description of the range of measures at diplomats' disposal is Satow's *Diplomatic Practice* (2009), a more contemporary look at diplomatic practice and its multiple manifestations can be found in the book *Madam Ambassador* (E. Kounalakis 2015).

(Leonard 2002)⁶¹ and hard manifestations, and sometimes the hard and soft characteristics find seemingly dissonant combinatorial expressions.⁶² The diplomatic spectrum of tools range from the attractive (soft) to the coercive (hard).⁶³ The perceived firmness of diplomacy is contextually contingent.

Larson (2004, 35) identifies the media as participating in foreign policy in at least three ways: “They provide the view of reality most frequently and heavily relied upon by diplomats in making policy. They also receive and widely disseminate official accounts. The third role involves journalists directly in the diplomatic dialogue, as exemplified by ABC's 'Nightline', on which Ted Koppel frequently interviews heads of state or senior diplomats.” Expanding on Larson, this chapter reviews three forms of diplomacy in which GNNs are engaged: Formal Diplomacy, Informal Diplomacy, and an all-encompassing manifestation where GNNs intersect or parallel diplomatic practice and forums.

This section will focus on Western GNNs and diplomacy, establishing and demonstrating the practice and performance of diplomacy by GNNs. Chapter 6 will review non-Western GNNs’ use of and reliance upon the diplomatic function given their predominantly state-sponsored structures.

⁶¹ The title of Leonard's essay (2002), *Diplomacy by Other Means*, is a play on the Clausewitzian derived aphorism and the author, Leonard, bridges some of the dissonance and distance between the hard and soft power tools, recognizing that soft power is not always perceived or performed as soft: referring to the contradictions as sometimes “a velvet fist inside an iron glove” (56).

⁶² For a comprehensive sweep of the empirical manifestations of diplomacy's many forms as practiced by a former U.S. Secretary of State, see Henry Kissinger's *Diplomacy* ([1994] 2012). Kissinger's volume is a solid primer into the topic. His book refers regularly to historic and contemporary diplomatic actions where “tough” diplomacy, ultimatums, and walkouts are exerted and practiced. While these practices are the most visible exertion of diplomacy's hard power, it would be a mistake to understand milder appearing diplomatic acts as lacking either an enforcement or coercive edge as the tip of a sword is sometimes delivered by a silver tongue.

⁶³ This was discussed in more detail in M. Kounalakis and Simonyi (2010), a more complete treatise on diplomatic tools and the diplomatic power spectrum.

2.1 Formal Diplomacy

GNNs and their practitioners have long performed formal diplomatic functions, either despite of or because of their roles and journalistic capacities. This formal diplomacy has been conducted both by individuals working for GNNs and GNN institutions themselves.

Correspondents and other individuals working within pre-GNN institutional journalism have been documented as performing formal diplomatic functions. As early as the 19th century, people such as the U.K.'s Valentine Chirol performed diplomatic functions while also working as a journalist. As described in Fritzinger's (2006) *Diplomat Without Portfolio*, this peripatetic journalist for Britain's *The Times* was regularly used as a backchannel diplomat between the English and Germans. "Thanks to his almost unique position—part diplomatist, part information conduit, part expert on the East, Near and Far, and on Europe—Chirol had played a major part in the working out of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, had gone to Berlin to discuss Anglo-German relations. ... All these quasi-official assignments took place under Lansdowne, [the British Foreign Secretary]" (Fritzinger 2006, 277). Chirol's split loyalties and successful dual role as a diplomat and journalist were only possible due to the prestige and prominence of *The Times*, which gave him high-level access, resources, editorial support, and cover, while the Foreign Ministry was able to leverage and profit from his activities, while maintaining plausible deniability in diplomatic engagement or proposed solutions. Chirol, however, always saw himself as a journalist first and his expertise grew out of his journalistic activities and professional experiences. These were identified by the Britain's Foreign Minister and put to direct use without Chirol needing to sacrifice his professional standing or position.⁶⁴

⁶⁴ After two decades as a foreign reporter and war correspondent, Chirol retired from *The Times* in 1911. One year later he was knighted for his advisory role to the Foreign Ministry and shortly thereafter, joined the British diplomatic corps. "At the tenth annual meeting of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Major General Sir Neill Malcolm called him 'The friend of viceroys, the intimate of ambassadors, one might almost say the counsellor of ministers, he was [also] one of the noblest characters that ever adorned British journalism'" (Fritzinger 2006, 481).

Another example is Stephen Bonsal, who was working directly for the American foreign policy apparatus at the same time that he was a foreign correspondent for the *New York Herald*, his reporting going directly to policymakers in the U.S. government and that of the United Kingdom. Interestingly, in an 1892 newspaper column in the literary magazine *Athenaeum* where Bonsal's reporting is questioned, the reassurance for his accuracy is legitimated by a British diplomat Sir Charles Euan-Smith by stating, "Mr. Bonsal nevertheless affirms that he sent nothing which was not official. He not only acted at Sir Charles's request, but his dispatches were read to several members of the embassy staff, and the contents made known to the minister himself" (*Athenaeum* 1892, 735). Bonsal's case was one where his official diplomatic performance was deemed his primary activity to the ministry with which he corresponded, but to his prominent pre-GNN journalistic institution and to himself, his reporting responsibilities came first; reporting for his publication and the citizenry it served.⁶⁵

As will be seen later in the non-Western GNN chapter, the Chinese practice a more direct form of diplomatic representation via their state-sponsored institutions, using their news agency Xinhua, for example, to perform as a de facto embassy. The Chinese, however, are not alone in the use of representatives who do not perform full diplomatic functions in countries that they either do not recognize or where diplomatic relations have been severed.

While the concept that a GNN—whether a journalistic organization or an INGO—performs a de facto or de jure diplomatic representation is exceptional in states with Type I (non-state) GNNs, the practice is not unheard of in states with predominantly Type III (state) GNNs. A corollary to this practice of statecraft by an entity not the state itself is found in the realm of international diplomacy, where foreign states are imbued with the power to perform diplomatic functions for other states in their stead. Often this role is played by a "Protecting Power" (Levie 1961), a third country that represents the interests of the protected country. Greece, Turkey, and

⁶⁵ Bonsal covered the major global events of the late 19th and early 20th century for *The New York Herald* (1895-1907) before becoming U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's private translator and advisor at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference (Bonsal 1944). In 1945, he received a Pulitzer Prize in History for his book, *Unfinished Business*.

the United Kingdom have performed as protecting powers on the island republic of Cyprus since decolonization in the 1960s. Hungary briefly performed this role for many countries—including the United States—in Libya during the kinetic activity that overthrew Col. Gaddafi. This representational act is sometimes done unofficially through third-party representation (as the United States did with the Swiss embassy in Iran), or via the downgrading of diplomatic missions (as with the U.S. Interest Section that has been operating in Havana during the years leading up to the current normalization process).⁶⁶ However, in no other case than the Chinese one do nations use news agencies or news organizations as official representation to other countries (Hamilton and Langhorne 2011). China and the news agency Xinhua are unique in such bald use of a news operation for the direct performance of diplomatic and official functions, though Russia, too, openly expresses and reflects a direct relationship between its GNNs and the state's diplomatic corps.

As will be seen later, Russian and Chinese GNNs can be publicly viewed either as diplomatic missions in their own right, or, at the very least, as diplomatic outposts. This is *sui generis* for news organizations worldwide, with non-state and hybrid GNNs often distancing themselves from and maintaining a publicly adversarial relationship to the state (Hallin 1989).⁶⁷

However, there are many cases in which individuals within GNN institutions and GNNs systemically are formally leveraged in a more ad hoc fashion, surreptitiously, or with plausible deniability for their formal state-inducted or state-imposed diplomatic roles. During the author's time as a diplomatic spouse in Hungary, the use of his journalism network, credibility, and authority was leveraged during official diplomatic functions—in particular, as a bridge to the embattled

⁶⁶ These cases are interjected in this dissertation to express the practice of proxy diplomacy that sometimes empowers GNNs with the power to represent or negotiate on behalf of a state. The reasons for the state's absence can be multiple. In Iran, for example, the United States did not have a diplomatic presence following the hostage taking of U.S. diplomats in 1979. This proxy power is sometimes relegated to GNNs and the need to explain a state's formal practice is inserted so that there is an understanding of precedent for a state's informal practice.

⁶⁷ The public perception of objectivity and an adversarial relationship to the state was early on recognized as an incomplete picture of journalism's relationship to the state: "Simultaneous with the rise of the ethic of objectivity and the growing autonomy of the journalist within the news organization was another fundamental change in the nature of American journalism: a tightening of the bonds between journalism and the state" (Hallin 1989, 69).

national journalism community subjected to the new Hungarian government's restrictive media laws—but not in the course of his performing his professional and traditional journalistic duties (restricted by the U.S. State Department); rather, as a course of his spousal relationship with the U.S. Ambassador to Hungary (E. Kounalakis 2015).⁶⁸

One of the more illustrative cases of a pre-GNN Western journalist being used for official diplomatic functions was that of Ray Stannard Baker. At the end of World War I, this well-regarded muckraking journalist who worked for *The New Republic* and the *New York World*, was enlisted by Woodrow Wilson to use his foreign correspondent cover to report directly to the White House and to the State Department (Baker et al. 2012).⁶⁹ His book, *A Journalist's Diplomatic Mission*, details the post-war Paris Peace conference where he not only observed, but participated actively in promoting America's interests in diplomatic negotiated approaches, while helping to formulate or proscribe dictated terms so that they would align with President Wilson's interests and desired outcomes. Baker later wrote a biography of President Wilson. Baker, like Chiron and Bonsal before him, was active in a non-diplomatic professional journalistic role, but performing diplomatic functions at the highest level, whether as an analyst or a go-between in negotiations. This practice was a precursor to a GNN practice that continues to this day. While the informal and formal non-professional diplomatic GNN functions were predominantly limited to those within the journalistic enterprise during the 19th and 20th century, when the West had a near monopoly of journalistic institutions reporting overseas, the 21st century GNNs has its own players performing similar roles, only with a broader base of institutions and a greater number of non-Western actors in the game.

⁶⁸ While some of this author's professional activities are elaborated upon in this volume by his diplomat spouse, the perspective and unofficial diplomatic performance of this author is not presented in any detail. As this author was considered a specialist in media laws, having chaired the first multinational conference that drafted Iraq's media laws in the post-invasion period in 2003, this author's expertise was drawn upon broadly by the U.S. embassy community, as was the credibility and connections brought from a long career in journalism. None of these acts were public or publicized. There were regular meetings with editorial staff of the country's leading media organizations, from Népszabadság to Magyar Rádió to online news sources. Many editors and reporters regularly conveyed private concerns and observations regarding a multitude of issues to this author, in part due to his diplomatic relationship, but just as often on a collegial and professional basis. Some of this author's journalistic findings during the course of the Kounalakis diplomatic mission to Hungary were also actively relayed to the embassy, though the actionable nature of the information—if any—is not a part of the public record.

⁶⁹ Baker later became President Wilson's press secretary and participated in diplomatic negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference.

In a contemporary Western GNN context, President Obama's Ambassador to the United Nations, Samantha Power, performed diplomatic actions prior to her current appointment as a government official, while she was working as a journalist and author, though the formality of the relationship is unclear. Certainly, she was regularly consulted on her human rights work and the conditions she observed and solutions she conceived (Zengerle 2013). All this while she was working within institutional GNN structures, significantly *The Economist*, *The Boston Globe*, *U.S. News and World Report*, and *The New Republic*. These noteworthy and, at the time, important and respected journalism organizations gave her the credibility and access necessary to be able to stretch her work from strictly reportorial to one of active advocacy and, informally, state representation.

Despite her engagement with the Western states on an informal diplomatic level, it was only at the end of her formal institutional journalistic role that she began publicly to perform her official diplomatic duties. Power's Pulitzer Prize for her book *A Problem from Hell* (2003) about genocide, as well as her foreign policy insights and human rights activities, garnered her great attention. As a result, her diplomatic advice was sought by both policymakers and politicians. As Zengerle (2013) writes, "[n]ot long after Obama was elected to the Senate in 2004, he invited Power, whom he'd never met, to lunch so he could pick her brain about foreign policy" (par. 5). She is one of a number of international journalists and GNN personnel who turned long diplomatic relationships into formalized diplomatic careers.⁷⁰

The list of journalists turned diplomats is long and includes 2016 United States presidential candidate Rand Paul's adviser Richard R. Burt, once a *New York Times* correspondent who covered deeply and engaged actively in arms control issues and later became the chief negotiator for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I). Another high profile diplomat, former U.S. special

⁷⁰ This author also worked closely and remains collegially close with former *TIME* Moscow correspondent, Jay Carney, who eventually took a policy advisor role with U.S. Vice President Joe Biden before moving to the role of presidential spokesman for U.S. President Barack Obama. As was true for most other Western institutional GNN reporters, Carney's time in Moscow included regular meetings and interactions with members of the U.S. Embassy political and economic counselors as well as the ambassador. Samantha Powers may be one of the higher profile GNN individuals in government today, but her practice and participation in diplomatic functions is not unique.

envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, went in and out of diplomatic service, working at one point as an editor at *Foreign Policy* magazine and contributing editor to *Newsweek International*. He later married journalist and author Kati Marton, who herself also formally intervened in diplomatic engagement during his lifetime. Marton discusses this issue in an op-ed piece for *the New York Times* entitled *The Weapons of Diplomacy, and the Human Factor* (2011). Here she notes, “[s]ince Richard believed in using all available tools in diplomacy... he seated me between Milosevic and Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic and instructed me to make the two deadly foes talk to each other” (par.4). The newspaper where Marton recounted this story, *The New York Times*, given its reputational status and industry respected role as “the newspaper of record” (Okrent 2004), is the quintessential Western Type I non-state institution that exemplifies that access, status and impact nearly unmatched in the West. While Marton,⁷¹ a second-generation journalist in her family, was not in the employ of *The New York Times*, she and others recognize the importance and visibility of a *Times* op-ed. Richard Holbrooke often used his journalism background and network to make sure that his policy perspectives and diplomatic overtures were given additional weight, most often by placing the work in the *Times* (personal communication with Holbrooke family member).

An ideal type breakdown of functions and diplomatic performances can be seen in Table 3 below. The detailed features and functions of informal and formal diplomacy, as well as institutional and individual performance within these roles, is the subject of this section in this work. As with most ideal types, the clear distinction and hard drawn lines of activities are subject to crossover and, arguably, the placement of individuals and institutions in either different or multiple cells of the chart below is possible.

⁷¹ Inserting Kati Marton in this dissertation brings up a difficult chapter in the history of journalists who worked for Western GNNs, in particular, Marton’s parents, who were Hungarian journalists working for the American United Press (later UPI) and Associated Press (AP). Both parents maintained a close working relationship with the United States Embassy in Budapest and the U.S. Ambassador. Their activities behind the Iron Curtain earned them the official title of “enemies of the people,” leading to jail and worse as documented in Marton’s book (2009).

The following matrix categorizes the formal and informal roles played by GNNs, at both an institutional Individual level and Institutional organizational level. This chart is a framework of GNN ideal types engaged in diplomacy, with specific individuals and institutions in this work identified within their category. The matrix does not recognize, however, the overlap of those engaged both in formal and informal categories.

Diplomacy Ideal Types (West)	Informal	Formal
Individual	Phillips, Marton	Scali, Burt, Holbrooke, Baker, Powers
Institutional	CBS, New York Times, Washington Post	State-sponsored GNNs: BBG (VOA, RFE/RL), BBC World Service

Table 3: GNN ideal types engaged in diplomacy

The first cell recognizes individuals engaged in informal diplomatic work and includes Kati Marton (whose role was discussed above), Terry Phillips, and the author of this study (both of whom will be elaborated upon in the latter part of this chapter for their roles in a diplomatic engagement between the United States and Haiti). In cell two, the individuals previously identified as performing a formal diplomatic role are grouped.

The third cell shows the institutions identified in this chapter as having performed a diplomatic role on an informal basis and on behalf of their host nation. The fourth and final cell identifies state-sponsored GNNs that de facto (and in the case of Xinhua, de jure) perform diplomatic functions. The BBG is the United States' Broadcast Board of Governors and is the

official government agency that oversees and directs the individual broadcast news networks that comprise it. They include the Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Radio Free Asia (RFA), Radio Marti and TV Marti, and the Middle East Broadcasting Network (MBN).

2.2 Informal Diplomacy

As a logical extension of a GNN individual employee or related entity engaging in direct formal diplomacy, the diplomatic function is often performed by entire established GNN institutions—often news bureaus—and individuals in an informal fashion. Kati Marton crosses over from her formal role (as at the dinner party) and the informal role she played during her career and performed a crossover or multiple GNN diplomatic function. The informal GNN diplomatic role sometimes crosses over into the formal. Further, there is a two-fold informality to this type of diplomacy: how individuals related to GNNs are perceived and how those same individuals and institutions perceive themselves.

2.2.1 External Perception

How GNNs are perceived is key to their primary performance and the legal frameworks in which they are allowed to function. Much of the external perception of GNNs is formulated by how the structures are funded (whether state, non-state, or hybrid) and which nation hosts the organization (where it is headquartered and which citizenship is held by a GNN-employed individual). Geniets (2013) finds that even where GNNs are dominantly state-owned, their funding models vary, as does their financial (and, in part, their legal and political) dependence on their benefactors: “These international broadcasters are either state-funded or commercial, or (as in the case of the BBC and Al Jazeera), a hybrid of both funding models. That said, only one of these broadcasters, namely CNN International, is primarily focused on revenue generation” (60). Of the international broadcasters, only CNN International is not state-owned or operated, either wholly

or in part. This funding structure rightly creates the external perception for these GNNs—otherwise professionally self-proclaimed independence-oriented organizations⁷²—of a direct link to the policy preferences and goals of their financial funders – the state. “Mission Impossible” (Thomas 2013) provides an analysis and understanding of the inherent perception conflict within Western state-sponsored GNNs and their mission to promote state policy preferences, but where non-administrative, rank-and-file employees perceive their roles as that of independent journalists within a government agency. Thomas is a 27-year Voice of America veteran who argues that the self-perception and performance challenge hinges on disparate views and mission interpretations: “Policymakers have long viewed US international broadcasting as part of the public-diplomacy effort...the journalistic coherence that Central News brings to VOA has been rendered impotent” (par. 5). Thomas recognizes that contemporary political pressure and legislative interest are creating state-sponsored GNNs that are even more focused on “advocacy, not journalism” (par. 20) in an environment with growing adversarial global relations and in times of war.

It is not only state-sponsored GNNs that face the perception problem of having direct state relations or being state-directed in their content or viewpoints. Despite the structural and financial independence of various organizations, the accusation seems to stick and is viewed as credible (Shotwell 1991). CNN and Fox News Channel are regularly singled-out as organizations that seem to represent and reflect U.S. policy preferences and, further, promote American state desired outcomes.⁷³

This perception holds true globally. Foreign sovereigns usually look to any agent or flag bearer,⁷⁴ whether an industry or a news organization, as representing the interests of the nation in

⁷² The BBC, for example, has its purposes spelled out in the Royal Charter and Agreement that allow for its operation and are the constitutional basis for the organization. The BBC states as its primary value that “Trust is the foundation of the BBC: we are independent, impartial and honest.” The claim of independence has always been in question as, for example, “The IRD [U.K. Information Research Department] maintained a strong relationship with the BBC” (Dorril 2002, 78).

⁷³ Jaramillo (2009, 138) writes that in stark contrast to their U.S. domestic political postures and agendas, these two American networks presented a telling and more unified nationalist narrative and perspective of non-American GNNs: “The overwhelming description of Arab television on CNN and Fox News Channel, then, was that it was a vehicle for pro-Hussein propaganda.”

⁷⁴ Just as ships and other materiel can be requisitioned by a state, so, too, journalists in the pursuit of national interests

which it is incorporated or where it has its headquarters, regardless of whether or not a formal or financial relationship exists. GNNs are no exception. A most extreme example of this is the Russian Duma-enacted law, which primarily focused on foreign NGOs and their activities within Russia, officially equating registered foreign NGOs as foreign agents.⁷⁵ Russia and Turkey are two recent cases where this perception was legally formalized and where both NGOs and journalists for foreign state news organizations are required to register as foreign agents. A similar law in the United States is the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938. However, the U.S. act is limited to requiring foreign agents and lobbyists to register, but these individuals and institutions are well outside of the journalism and NGO world.

The most popular case of flag bearing industries representing a nation or national interests is with national airlines⁷⁶ (Yglesias 2013) or shipping lines (Whitehurst 1965) that by law can be impressed into national service depending on the real or perceived national emergency that allows a legislature or administration to execute on this operational clause. In cases where a GNN is a state enterprise, that very same logic and legal structure applies, as state owned enterprises in other countries could not function without the direct state support and state dependence (Geniets 2013). Whether a GNN and its representatives protest (or protests too much) their independence, the perception is that GNNs represent the interests of their headquartered states.

2.2.2 Self Perception

or during wartime. A legal example of how materiel is acquisitioned is via The United States Merchant Marine Act is also commonly referred to as The Jones Act. According to the Merchant Marine website: “The Merchant Marine is the fleet of ships which carries imports and exports during peacetime and becomes a naval auxiliary during wartime to deliver troops and war materiel. According to the Merchant Marine Act of 1936: ‘It is necessary for the national defense... that the United States shall have a merchant marine of the best equipped and most suitable types of vessels sufficient to carry the greater portion of its commerce and serve as a naval or military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency...’” During World War II the fleet was in effect nationalized” (U.S. Merchant Marine,, n.d., par. 1).

⁷⁵ See “Russian Political Parties Banned from Making Deals with Foreigners or ‘agents.’ ” 2014. RT. November 11. <http://rt.com/politics/204399-russian-foreign-agent-political/>.

⁷⁶ As Matt Yglesias points out, there exists in the United States a cabotage act, although it is seldom used: “[I]n practice, despite fighting two wars simultaneously for a decade, CRAF [the Civil Air Reserve Fleet] seems to have been activated just once at the very beginning of the Iraq War when the Pentagon activated 47 passenger aircraft and 31 wide-body cargo planes” (Yglesias 2013, par. 10).

This logic extends to state GNNs, where news organizations are actually both perceived and deployed (Famularo 2015) as foreign agents.⁷⁷ As an article in *The Diplomat* writes, both China and Russia extend the practice of characterizing foreign NGOs as foreign agents to include news agencies, de facto if not entirely de jure. This article cites former White House National Security Advisor Steven Hadley, who “expressed his fear that Vladimir Putin is privately arguing to Xi Jinping that the United States and its Western allies are ‘seeking to destabilize and change both governments; that it is this effort that is responsible for the instability and demonstrations in both Ukraine and Hong Kong; that the agents of this Western effort are civil society groups, NGOs, free media, and dissidents; that these “agents of foreign influence” must be stamped out in both Russia and China; and that the United States and its allies need to be confronted at nearly every turn’ ” (Famularo 2015, par. 18).

For non-state run GNNs where individuals and institutions lack a formal relationship to the state, there is an informal relationship, in part developed as a function of assured access and sovereign protection. A reporter for CNN or *The New York Times* in a particular area, for example, can have unique access to American policy makers or analysts, and as a host of studies prove, they often do, directly or indirectly (e.g. A. Davis 2009; Carpenter 2007).⁷⁸ It is also often assumed, further, that journalists can pass information from their area of expertise or foreign country from which they are reporting to those who are representatives of their home country’s national interests. In the course of this research and in the experience of this author’s practice, the findings have shown regular, if fettered, access and availability to policymakers. One interviewee stated that he usually “check[s] in with an embassy when [he] arrive[s] in a country...[and] usually get[s] some sort of briefing. Then [he] circle[s] back and debrief[s] before getting out of town” (personal

⁷⁷ As Painter (2008) writes in his *Counter-Hegemonic News*, “There seems little doubt that many of the state-funded channels are a means of augmenting national prestige in the way that a national airline might” (5).

⁷⁸ An operating premise of this study, supported by its findings and reinforced by studies such as Carpenter (2007) is that elite news organizations and GNN institutional structures have greater access to elite sources, while non-elite or “citizen journalist” organizations have limited access. The Carpenter study (2007) was exceptional in that it showed non-differentiation when it came to access of military sources. Otherwise, elite source assumptions were reinforced across government and regarding industry access.

interview with American newspaper journalist, October 2013). Sometimes a background briefing is arranged before departure for another country, with foreign ministries obliging, even encouraging and initiating, such briefings with higher profile journalists and columnists. “You get a full overview and they give you an idea of what they are most concerned about” is how another American journalist characterized an official pre-departure briefing; “they want you to also test a few things when you meet with certain people when you get there” (personal interview with American network broadcast producer in Washington, D.C., November 2014).

The practice of give-and-take, information exchange and diplomatic direction is done on a regular basis, even though it is seldom discussed in public. Organizations such as the Overseas Press Club recognize the practice and try to help professionals weigh the ethical pros and cons of this generally recognized informal diplomatic relationship in a non-state owned GNN context. On November 11, 2014, the Overseas Press Club in New York City arranged a panel discussion titled: “Useful Sources: What should be the relationships of reporters to diplomats, especially in times of crisis?” The program guide offered a summary of the common foreign corresponding issues up for discussion: “The program is designed to provide newly assigned foreign correspondents tips on how to handle day-to-day basic working relationships with diplomats, both American and foreign. Topics to be discussed include: Embassy briefings, confidentiality, how to deal with CIA staff and military attaches.”⁷⁹

GNN personnel rarely write about these relationships or discuss them publicly in their broadcasts. At a panel meeting organized by the Overseas Press Club of America in November 2014, State Department historian Lindsay Krasnoff talked about the traditionally close relationship between diplomats and foreign correspondents, saying, “There was certain trust on the part of U.S. diplomats that the information that they gave the journalists who visited them, and on the other side there was certain restraint and self-censorship on the side of journalists to maintain the

⁷⁹ Overseas Press Club America. 2014. Useful Sources: What Should Be the Relationships of Reporters to Diplomats, Especially in Times Of crisis? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M_7OS4M7HrE&feature=youtu.be.

diplomat's trust in terms of not publishing all that they witnessed" (par. 14), until a later time when the information was not as time-sensitive or actionable.⁸⁰

On occasion, when a public reckoning of non-state operated GNN relationships with a state are revealed or somehow become transparent, journalists often apologize or explain that they participate in diplomatic intervention or humanitarian activity only under extreme emergency conditions.

When about 50,000 Yazidis, members of a religious community in the Middle East, were being overrun and trapped on a mountaintop in 2014, a CNN reporter helped some of the refugees onto the rescue helicopter (Taibi 2014). This was seen as an exceptional (and commendable) act because he was working with aid workers and as a result directly engaging in a humanitarian effort for what is seen as being outside the core role for someone who is otherwise strictly an observer. The moral aspects of media workers interfering or refraining from interfering with what they observe have been intensely debated. For example, in an article for the *American Journalism Review*, Smolkin (2006) reviewed the ethical responsibility of engaging in humanitarian aid efforts during crises and concluded with a cautionary note: "Remember, though, that your primary—and unique—role as a journalist is to bear witness. If you decide to act, do so quickly, then get out of the way. Leave the rescue work to first responders and relief workers whenever possible" (par. 69).

On the other hand, journalism as a profession is frequently criticized for reporters not participating in such activities. Occasionally, however, journalists' engagement goes beyond the Good Samaritan scenario that requires journalists to act in extreme cases. The defusing of nuclear tensions and confrontation during the Cuban Missile crisis and the informal, yet effective, diplomatic role played by a journalist is one such high profile case. GNNs' engagement, too, in humanitarian relief, while not directly a diplomatic function, help to augment state power under

⁸⁰ Overseas Press Club of America. 2014. "OPC Expert Panelists Discuss Reporter-Embassy Relations." November 11. <https://www.opcofamerica.org/Eventposts/expert-panelists-discuss-reporter-embassy-relations/>.

the rubric of “humanitarian diplomacy” (Lund 2001, 17). What follows are instances of GNNs directly engaged in more traditional diplomatic functions.

	Informal	Formal
Passive	Reports, editor & publisher conversation + cocktail party talk	“Pass this to your government”
Active	Backgrounded Editorial positions & Placed Op-Eds + Transom Intermediate	Active Intermediary Work & Negotiation as State Mission + State-Drafted Edit Stance

Table 4: GNN diplomacy, institutional level

Table 4 is a framework of GNN ideal types engaged in diplomacy, with individuals and institutions in this work identified within their category. The overlap of some individuals who are in both formal and informal categories is not represented in this chart.

The graphic matrix chart above displays the varieties of Institutional Diplomacy in both their Informal and Formal manifestations and charts them against the means by which GNNs perform those diplomatic functions, looking at both the Passive and Active. The matrix charts diplomatic performances and highlights instances and circumstances wherein these performances are expressed. In the first cell, passive-informal diplomacy incorporates the administrative and editorial layer of GNN institutions and their informal relations with government representatives and policymakers, informing them and intermediating for them on an ad hoc and opportunistic level. This is the most public relational expression between GNNs and the state. It is depicted in

cinema and experienced in most state capitals around the world. Exchanges occurring in these contexts are informal and exploratory, though the venues themselves and the participants can be targeted for exploration prior to an event.

The second cell involves a formal-passive relationship where GNN institutions receive diplomatically relevant or critical information or instructions and are actively used as passive intermediaries. This is often the case when institutions receive letters or email traffic “over the transom” (or unsolicited) and without the GNN institution seeking to perform the role into which they are thrust. It is often the case for a GNN overseas that unique information or dissident calls arrive at these institutions unexpectedly and uninvited.

Cell three, informal-active, is where the intermediary role is sought through a GNN institution’s normal course of operation and along the lines of its mission. The placement of opinion pieces, advocacy of a position or policy, or the leveraging of unique “over the transom”⁸¹ received exclusive information to perform a diplomatic function are typical examples of this behavior.

The fourth and final cell, active-formal, is one previously discussed in some detail and involves the engagement of a GNN institution to perform direct, active, and outcome-oriented diplomatic functions. The unique aspect of the GNN institution is usually the access available and cover allowable both for plausible deniability of the act and to perform the function outside usual and formal channels. GNNs are used by state leaders and foreign offices both targetedly and as a matter of course in this manner, leveraging GNNs’ strengths, access, insights, and analytical skills on behalf of the state, and in pursuit of enhancing state power.

⁸¹ A Pro Publica investigation into Chinese espionage represents the questionable, but useful, nature of “over the transom” information: Paul Moore, a former top FBI Chinese counterintelligence analyst, said cultural differences between the West and East pose challenges for investigators trying to determine if Chinese are involved in intelligence operations. “Was this a Chinese intelligence operation, or just something that came in over the transom?” he said. “It sounds like Chinese people acting like Chinese people. It looks foreign to us — and suspect” (Gabrielson 2014, par. 94).

2.2.3 Informal Diplomacy: Individuals

Perhaps the case with the greatest impact in a diplomatic performative function was the role played by John Scali, the ABC News reporter who carried messages between Soviet and American officials during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Scali's role was detailed in his obituary in the *New York Times* by L. Gelder (1995): "Mr. Scali acted as courier, Government spokesman and negotiator for the Kennedy Administration before the crisis was peacefully resolved" (par. 11). When Scali was asked if he would do it again? "'The answer is yes,' he said. 'At times like that, a reporter has no choice. Because whatever he can do to save humanity from destruction, even just an ounce worth, he must do—and that's not just patriotic flag waving'" (Gelder 1995, par. 13).

He was essentially a negotiator, even taking policy positions in the process. Scali played an active diplomatic role (Garthoff 1989).⁸² Scali's official GNN role at CBS gave him the unique access required for him to perform this act. It also provided the perfect cover for his actions so that external questions regarding his interactions with the Soviets could be attributed to his professional role as a journalist.

Another profound and well-documented example is the hand that CBS Evening News anchor Walter Cronkite had in setting up negotiations between Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. As recounted by Cronkite and affirmed by others, the Begin-Sadat on-air discussion eventually led to the Camp David accord ending hostilities between those two states (Cronkite 2007). As Cronkite discussed his diplomatic performance for NPR, "The terms of a settlement seem simple and clear. It was the human factors that complicated things—pride, politics and power. What was needed was for someone to drop a handkerchief, a moment of opportunity that would permit the parties both movement and cover. In 1977, I found myself playing that role in what would become the first direct exchange between Egypt and Israel" (par. 4-5).

⁸² Before Garthoff's (1989) recounting of the Cuban Missile Crisis negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union and the central mediating role played by John Scali, Scali himself published a full narrative of the events in an article titled: "I Was the Secret Go-Between in the Cuban Crisis" in *Family Weekly* (1964).

Cronkite's role was extraordinary and his public admission of his intermediation a rarity. Cronkite was self-deprecating and downplayed the important role he played: "As for Cronkite diplomacy, I'm sure that it initiated nothing the two principals were not already prepared to undertake. If I dropped the strategic handkerchief, they chose the time and manner of picking it up. But the openness of television offered a powerful incentive that secret diplomacy did not. The political consequences of a public failure improved the ultimate chances of diplomatic success, and statesmen willing to fail publicly are a courageous lot" (Cronkite 2007, par. 41-42). What Walter Cronkite points out is how a GNN, in this case a Western Type I non-state broadcasting organization and its employee, brought a unique contribution to the enhancement of state power. While Cronkite speaks to his particular case, and the case of television, he is providing a clear template for how Western GNNs use their public role, their popularity, and their stature to achieve unique abilities to perform diplomatic functions otherwise reserved exclusively for the state. Further, the unique access and power, the hallmarks of institutional GNN structures, are reinforced by this Cronkite example, where his argument extends to the relative insignificance of those non-institutional journalistic players, such as bloggers or citizen journalists, who lack the stature and the structure to effect such large scale diplomatic events and outcomes.

This dissertation argues that journalists and GNN personnel also engage in diplomacy even without urgent humanitarian or global existential crises. One case involves this author and Terry Phillips, who was in 1994 acting bureau chief for CBS News ("The Tiffany Network"⁸³) in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. This is a previously unpublished case of journalists actively engaging in a direct diplomatic action. As with myriad other diplomatic actions taken by other GNN professionals, this one has been kept secret for over the last twenty years, in part because of professional journalistic concerns by the participants, as they remained active in their careers. Ethical questions regarding professional conduct and journalistic roles entered into the decision-making process prior to the

⁸³ CBS was referred to as "The Tiffany Network" because of the perceived high-quality of its news organization and popularly respected newsmen during the tenure of CBS founder William S. Paley.

intervention and remained a concern after the fact, keeping this specific instance out of the public eye to avoid collegial judgment. A full recounting of this event is in the interview in this work's Addendum.

In the summer of 1994 there was a threat of a military conflict on the island nation of Haiti, which was avoided partly through the participation of Phillips and this author. The diplomatic act engaged this author and Phillips, who was in Haiti at the time of the crisis, in a series of actions that made them intermediaries between the governments of Haiti and the United States and, ultimately, aided in the achievement of a peaceful resolution.⁸⁴

It is clear from the interview carried out with Phillips that though he shares some of the ethical concerns discussed by Smolkin (2006), he firmly believes that journalists should engage in non-journalistic functions if they “can do good”: “We are often in a position to know things that other people don't know, to have connections with people that other people don't have, and I think we oftentimes either ignore or deliberately avoid serving in other capacities, and I think it's unfortunate. We can clearly do some good when these opportunities arise. ... I wish we would do this more deliberately and more often” (Phillips, personal interview, 2014).

Other cases, both American and non-American, where journalists interviewed for this study have intervened in the diplomatic process directly, if informally, have been kept confidential as per an understanding between the interview subjects and this author. The instances include a case in Chechnya (1992), one in Georgia (1992), one in Armenia, two in Afghanistan (1991 and 2004), one in Yugoslavia and, later, Croatia (1991), and one in Poland (1989).⁸⁵

2.2.4 Legal Obligations to Engage in Informal Diplomacy

⁸⁴ In the interview included in the Addendum, Phillips describes two further cases of diplomatic interventions.

⁸⁵ This confidentiality is in holding with general ethical concerns and as per an understanding with the academic panel at Central European University, where protection of sources and information was agreed upon during the research phase of this work. As per email accord with Prof. Matteo Fumagalli and in compliance with the American Educational Research Association (AERA) Code of Ethics section 12.06 b, regarding “Anonymity of Sources”: “When confidential information is used in scientific, scholarly, and professional presentations, education researchers disguise the identity of research participants, students, individual or organizational clients, or other recipients of their service.”

Of course, in wartime, a journalist, as well as all citizens, often have a legal responsibility to protect—and at times support—the efforts of their own government. For journalists, regardless of their nationality, this usually takes the negative form of restrictions placed on reporting and dissemination of information, primarily by partaking in activities that would be construed or judicially interpreted as being aiding or abetting an enemy (Loane 1965;⁸⁶ Sarbin et al. 1994). These restrictions include adhering to rules of engagement, not reporting troop movements, and following other strictures as determined by law and custom to be off-limits. In the United States, the principles were laid down in the oft-cited Minnesota Supreme Court decision *Near v. Minnesota*, 683 U.S. 697 (1931) regarding prior restraint. The court ruled that certain restrictions can be imposed on the press.⁸⁷ These practices apply to journalists and to their employers who have obligations to publish or not publish. Such was clearly the case during World War II when military censorship was in full force. American journalists covering combat wore uniforms, held nominal ranks and were subject to direct commands by superior officers. *Washington Post* journalist Sam Staviskey heard in 1942 that the U.S. Marine Corps was forming a special unit for journalists called the Combat Correspondent Corps. The Marine Corps was planning on transforming a few selected civilian reporters into Marines to be assigned to the Pacific (Staviskey 1999).

The relationship with media and the military has always been complex. Going back as far as the great historian Thucydides, his field reporting and analysis was borne of action he both witnessed and participated in as an army general. Since those ancient days, the relationship between reporters and the military have always been intensive.

However, in recent years, the relationship has become somewhat more complicated as reporters and defense departments have implemented a formal embedding structure as, for example, with U.S. forces. As noted in “A Comparison of Embedded and Nonembedded Print

⁸⁶ Most nations have a form of treason law. Its application and interpretation varies widely.

⁸⁷ “**Legal Question:** Is censorship by prior restraint of a newspaper allowed under the First Amendment? **Decision:** **No**, except in crisis situations such as reports of troop movements, or incitement to violence or overthrow of government, or publication of obscene material” (JEM First Amendment Project, n.d., par. 3-4).

Coverage of the U.S. Invasion and Occupation of Iraq” (Haigh et al. 2006), the voluntary embedding of reporters during times of war—and where access to one side’s military personnel would be restricted—resulted in a greater association with the embedded military. In particular, this study found a distinctly different “overall tone toward the military, trust in military personnel, framing, and authoritativeness between embedded and nonembedded articles” (139).

Legal principles of reporting during wartime remain the same today as they were during World War II, but the nature and immediacy of reporting—as well as the immediacy of news distribution in the Internet era—create dynamics hitherto unknown (D. Bennett 2013). The Russian RT-military relationship is a strong one, and has gained greater attention following the recent Russian military engagement in Ukraine (M. Kounalakis 2014b).⁸⁸ More on the Russian-RT military connection will follow in the non-Western GNN chapter.

The following chart is a framework of GNN ideal types engaged in diplomacy at an individual level. While GNNs institutions operate at both their organizational institution level and at an organizations’ individual level, the overlap of some individuals who work both at the higher institutional level (administrators and managers) are in both formal and informal categories are not represented in this chart.

⁸⁸As pointed out in this newspaper article, “Tune in to Russia Today and you can watch conventional programs like ‘Larry King Now’ or ‘Venture Capital.’ On some recent programming, however, Russia Today’s party line bias was so heavy-handed that it prompted one anchor to resign on-air in protest over the Kremlin’s Ukraine policy. D.C.-based Liz Wahl went off script on the RT-America program, saying, ‘I cannot be part of a network funded by the Russian government that whitewashes the actions of Putin. I’m proud to be an American and believe in disseminating the truth, and that is why, after this newscast, I’m resigning.’ Another RT host, Abby Martin, strayed from the party line, going rogue on-air by saying, ‘Russian intervention in the Crimea is wrong’” (par. 23).

	Informal	Formal
Passive	Reporting, informal conversation, notebook dump	"Pass this to your government"
Active	Briefed Reporting & Questions	Active Intermediary Work & Negotiation

Table 5: GNN diplomacy, individual level

Table 5 plots the varieties of GNN individuals who are engaged in informal and formal diplomacy in either a passive or active manner. It further elaborates on the practices and patterns uncovered in the interview process revealing the witting and unwitting performance of those practices. In the first cell, where individuals were engaged in passive-informal diplomatic activity, the practice of innocent sharing beyond the open source distributional methods involves person-to-person engagements where notebooks are opened up and data shared that is unavailable to a broader public or sponsoring institution. The activity is a friendly, passive and informal act that yields insight and access to people and circumstances that can and have shaped diplomatic actions, according to policymakers surveyed in this study’s interview process.

The second cell involves a passive-formal relationship between GNN individuals and state agencies or individuals. This is best represented by directed diplomatic action or information gathering that is understood by the GNN individual as being outside the professional and ethical, but, according to GNN individuals interviewed, mostly acceptable realm of an otherwise strict reporting or analysis performance. This is represented by a state official in the course of

engagement requesting that the GNN individual intermediate with specific information or data transferal to achieve a diplomatic outcome otherwise unavailable to the state agent and outside the realm of competence or available information for the GNN actor. “Pass this on to your government” is how one interview subject described this action and illustrated it by saying that in a specific circumstance during the course of news reporting with a high-level source where his nation was bereft of national diplomatic representation, the government official who was the subject of his interview asked that the GNN individual deliver a specific diplomatic negotiating point to his country of citizenship (personal interview with a GNN individual, Berkley, California, 2015). It is remarkable to note that GNN institutional players have unique opportunities when representing themselves as such as opposed to acting as independent, unaffiliated, non-institutional journalist. Without the institutional support and structure that give them access and more than a modicum of credibility via their internationally branded news organizations (which often appear in foreign editions overseas and in international newsstands and at airports), the likelihood of being asked to perform even a minor diplomatic courier role is minimized and unlikely. *Newsweek* and *TIME* correspondents during the 1980s and 1990s, for example, were highly visible journalists in their overseas bureaus and were regularly approached by state representatives in order to discuss, sometimes on background and sometimes off-the-record, issues of state strategy and diplomatic sensitivity.

The third cell concerns active-informal individual diplomacy and comes as a result of individuals seeking or attending briefings where sensitive but unclassified (SBU) information is imparted and interactively exchanged. These circumstances yield engagements that raise specific questions or are intended to garner pointed interactions between GNN individuals and otherwise inaccessible foreign individuals and institutions. The GNN individuals are actively seeking the interaction with their native governments and presenting their governments’ position and perspective to their interview and research subjects. Specific negotiating points are directed and specific diplomatic data sought by the state agency via the GNN individual, who is actively aware

of the process and wittingly performing it, but maintaining an informal relationship to the state. In a number of instances, for example, following informal interactions with the American embassy, a *Newsweek* correspondent was prompted and guided to ask specific questions regarding a foreign nation's policies concerning its stance towards a third nation. The questions were pointed and consequential, including issues regarding nuclear weaponry and a state's position on the third nation's approach and policy. The questions were natively interesting to this particular journalist, but ones he likely would not have asked himself because he lacked the background and policy context prior to his interactions with the American state representative (personal interview with an American journalist, 2015).

The fourth and final cell, active-formal, is more transactional and involves the GNN individual, regardless of the institution to which he is assigned or employed, taking a forward and witting action of direct diplomacy, as with John Scali. The GNN individual need not be a direct employee of the state, but, rather, acting on behalf of the state while also maintaining a primary professional identity with a GNN institution or unaffiliated GNN distributional institution. While there is a theoretical possibility that a non-GNN individual could perform this role, research for this study showed a near exclusive reliance on individuals working within institutional GNNs. The reasons given included a published track record, time spent together during GNN coverage of state activities (often as "State Department beat" reporters or because "I knew her when she covered the Pentagon"). The general attitude of state representatives was that bloggers (with a few named exceptions of individuals who moved to blogging from institutional GNNs) and citizen journalists were "cowboys" and too independent or "untethered" to be reliable partners in this activity (personal communications with state representatives, 2014, 2015).

2.3 Formal and Informal Intersectional Diplomatic Functions

Within the realm of individual passive-informal diplomacy, there are functions that GNN employees naturally perform. These can be generally categorized as cocktail party conversations.

These casual chats typically occur at foreign embassy receptions or might take place over coffee between an industry executive or NGO administrator and a government official.⁸⁹ In such encounters, individuals are essentially exchanging rather than proffering information. Journalists often test the margins, perhaps to get a second source on a story without the source wittingly knowing that she or he is confirming facts, whether or not they have a suspicion or sense that this might be the case. In the course of the informal shooting for information, the journalist also gives up some of the information he or she has collected as a show of goodwill, an enticement, or, at times, a bluff, as reported by a majority of this study's interviewed subjects. In the case highlighted in the next chapter on intelligence gathering, where information on potential terrorist activities was flagged by a correspondent for the U.S. Embassy's military attaché in Prague, the information exchange was preceded with information that was less valuable in order to test the limits of sharing. The *Newsweek* reporter noted an exchange with a former Communist party arms dealer who shared information regarding members of the new, interim non-Communist government of Václav Havel and how they were also involved in questionable arms sales to the Middle East. "I had to give up a piece of information he likely already had, or should have had. It was a test. I wanted to see if he would give me something in return. And it was probably a test for him, too. How reliable am I? Am I just BS-ing him? Trying to get something for nothing?" (Personal interview with an American journalist, 2015). The exchange ended in detailed and important information regarding the Soviet activities in the early days of post-Communist Czechoslovakia.

With regards to this mutually beneficial information exchange—an important act of informal diplomacy—most reporters interviewed for this study discussed the fact that journalist reports typically comprise five to ten percent of what are in their notebooks.⁹⁰ That is especially

⁸⁹ The South China Morning Post reports that recognizing the high value of journalist-generated information, in 2014 the PRC has made it illegal for journalists to share unpublished work. "According to the directive, the rules cover information, material and news that journalists may deal with during their work, 'including state secrets, commercial secrets and information that has not been publicly disclosed. Reporters, editors and anchormen should not disseminate state secrets in any form via any media and they should not mention such information in their private exchanges or letters,' the new rules stipulate" (9 July, 2014, par. 6-7).

⁹⁰ Some newspapers, like The New York Times, have infrequent columns titled "Reporter's Notebook," wherein some of the valuable and interesting information that does not make it into a reporter's stories is able to see the light of day

true in broadcast news, where content is constrained and time limits and medium emphasis on imagery and sounds proscribe the level of detail and complexity of analysis (Lang 2000). This entails that journalists have a lot of names, numbers, peripheral data that might not even bolster the thesis of the story—but might be even more valuable as currency for collateral and subsequent use.

Articles, analyses, broadcast productions, and reports intended for U.S. audiences, for example, routinely require an American angle, perspective, and approach. It is not unusual for reporters to gather a large quantity of material that is of interest only to a domestic audience, but more than required for the final report. That leaves a surplus available for non-published, informal exchange. As one of the journalists interviewed for this study put it, “This is perfect for doing a ‘notebook dump’ with someone over lunch” (personal interview with an American journalist, June 2, 2013, Germany.). According to a diplomat based in Europe interviewed for the research, it is data that can lead to diplomatic openings and “the exchanges themselves are a part of the [diplomatic] process” (personal interview with a diplomat, December 2012, Prague). As seen both below and in the following chapter, there is also an intelligence gathering aspect to this practice, though the focus in this chapter is on the diplomatic value of this practice. The crossover of formal or informal diplomatic activity and formal or informal intelligence gathering functions is not uncommon.

Thus, as a foreign correspondent who has worked in multiple countries of Africa, Europe, Asia, and the former U.S.S.R, explained during the interview, in a conversation with a diplomat, something in the reporter’s informal chatter could strike a particular chord. The source might offhandedly verify a fact. The subsequent quid pro quo for him might be to add, “I’d be curious to know what that person would say if you were to ask...” (personal interview with an American journalist, June, 2013, Budapest). In such a case, what journalists share is material in the form of an analytical perspective and approach rather than secrets.

in mass publication and with alternate contextualizations. Most reporter notebooks remain unmined for their ancillary value, deep data, source contacts, and side notes—often making them invaluable to those who are able to cull specific data and information that is regularly exclusive.

Consequently, a journalist might have a follow-up debrief with that same person because of a curiosity to know what was uncovered. In this author's experience and in the majority of interviews conducted with GNN professionals for this study, reporters are regularly debriefed in such cases in order to allow for the triangulation of answers and information, because of other undisclosed but available open source or discovered information. The elements listed above help journalists shape an approach in dealing with a subject. This is truly a symbiotic relationship.⁹¹

Further, there is a level of judgment and perception that occurs based on the comportment, dress and seeming intelligence of journalists. It affects how they are perceived by the subjects of their work. This is as true in the political world as it is in financial circles (Baron and Markman 2000) and diplomatic rings (Kraut and Poe 1980).⁹² How big is a journalist's team? What does his/her infrastructure look like? Does he/she have the latest in equipment, or is he/she a lone wolf with an iPhone recording what is being said? All these things project the relative power of GNN institutions that are considered to be the most important ones, sometimes disproportionately understood in their power, in the host country where a foreign correspondent or bureau are located. The same is true for the academic and the INGO. Brand name institutions matter to the consumer if not to the capacity or quality of scholarship. But a Harvard or Stanford-related academic has an easier time at opening doors than the guy from Fresno State (unless the work being done is in Armenia, where Fresno holds unique and important institutional standing due to the number of Armenian-Americans at the university). INGOs also rely on the size of their institution and the brand identity of the organization to gain access and have impact. The Red Cross and Red Crescent have outsized reputations and budgets to enter into transitional regions or those countries under extreme stress or in need of humanitarian help. So, too, Médecins Sans Frontiers, the Nobel Prize

⁹¹ While this author was based in Moscow during the early 1990s working for two different American GNNs, together with Mark Bauman he also wrote together for a Russian newspaper, *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* (literally "Independent Newspaper"). The columns had the effect of being informal (or semi-formal) approaches to issues of the day and—infused with the authors' global analytical and field understanding—often included policy recommendations and insight.

⁹² Kraut and Poe's psychological study found that "Comportment mediated the effects of demographic characteristics and had direct effects on decisions" (Kraut and Poe 1980, 784).

winning organization that finds itself often in the midst of turmoil and areas that face political as well as medical difficulties. Perhaps there is a transition under way, where certain web-based humanitarian organizations are now able to build the size and impact of their organizations quickly and effectively, but those organizations have not as yet become institutional players within the GNN firmament, according to a few non-American, Western embassy representatives with familiarity in humanitarian undertakings. GNNs still rule, in this regard.

At the same time, states have recognized the value, value proposition, and the business model for journalism as a diplomatic extension, particularly given how inexpensive and nimble it is relative to all other forms of diplomatic and intelligence gathering institutions and performance. What states lacking GNN ownership give up in the process of leveraging or directly using journalists in the role of diplomatic interlocutors and analysts is a direct chain of command control, while strengthening their hand in diplomatic plausible deniability over the acts of the GNN institution or individual.

Two senior U.S. State Department officials affirmed the lack of command and control over Western Type I non-state GNNs and, notably, lamented the loss of the Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) and analysis that fed their own policy shops and country desks. “We get a lot of our information from foreign correspondents,” said one, who then continued to assert how these journalists are important sources of information and “help us take the temperature of a country.” Another senior American official said that the importance of GNNs and their personnel in the field was intensified as security concerns keep “our people behind the wire,” meaning that Western embassies are more and more resembling fortresses, where those official embassy personnel who would otherwise circulate around the country are now being required to stay within the safe confines of either cordoned off areas or places that are officially allowed and deemed secure. In this environment, “journalists are a lifeline” to the outside world, according to this one official. In the course of this study’s research, many of the officials who were interviewed also had specific questions about how this relatively diminishing GNN resource could, first, survive and, second,

return with a strong presence in the future (personal interviews with U.S. State Department officials).

Government officials interviewed for this dissertation were all dismissive of the current foreign affairs bloggers, with a few exceptions (one is University of Michigan History Professor Juan Cole and his “Informed Comment” blog on the Middle East that was referred to more than once). One of the critiques was that these blogging sites lack an editorial layer to check facts and hew to a more balanced analysis, but, rather, often took on an advocacy role in their approach to reporting a country or region. In contrast with their negative orientation towards the usefulness or reliability of the growing class of citizen journalist, the officials’ attitude was quite positive regarding institutional journalists. All of these senior officials admitted to having prominent journalists from leading institutions as friends with whom they regularly communicate.

One former U.S. congressman with relations to the intelligence and diplomatic community said that given the diminution of Western resources due to the business model collapse of Type I non-state GNNs there was even greater reliance on those resources that are still active and healthy. He mentioned one particular Western magazine with deep worldwide access and a particular program that allows for them to have a direct dialogue without infringing on journalistic integrity (personal communications with former U.S. congressman, 2013).

This loss of control (and policy deniability) extends further over the new and developing forms of web-enabled citizen journalism, where anyone with a mobile phone can perform parts of a journalistic function—in particular where breaking news and no analysis is required to create both a compelling and competitive news product (Reich 2008).⁹³ The rise of citizen journalism and the contemporaneous, if not consequent, loss of Western non-state institutional GNN resources is a

⁹³ The whole question of non-institutional journalism and non-institutionally related individuals performing journalistic functions is a broad and contemporary media and communications field of study of which the importance to this work is the question of credibility and access. Without mass or elite credibility or access, the non-institutional actors are not considered part of the otherwise tightly knit GNN network, though their performance may prove to be catalytic over time (as suggested by some scholars ascribing causal outcomes during the “Arab Spring”). But Reich (2008) speaks to the more common current analysis of “citizen journalism”, finding that “ordinary citizens can serve as a vital complement to mainstream journalism” (739).

relatively new phenomenon, but there are some changes and differences that are immediately identifiable, such as non-institutional GNNs' loss of access and questionable levels of credibility (Reich 2008, 739). It is too early to measure the change in effect of the move towards a more citizen and popular-based network of information gathering individuals and collectives, but non-institutional access to elites and foreign affairs policy and decision makers is clearly more limited and, hence, opportunities for formal or informal diplomatic engagement becomes markedly proscribed when compared to the extant, established, and dominant Western and non-Western GNNs. The rise of new organizations in foreign corresponding have thus far focused on the sensational and violent, as with Vice News, and eschewing the official and analytical served up by institutional GNNs to date and that serve states' diplomatic and intelligence needs.

In the case of NGO workers within the GNN framework, the informal diplomatic performance of individuals often takes on a more "on-the-ground, grassroots and local-level flavor" of engagement, according to one former NGO worker for Save the Children (personal interview with former Save the Children worker, September 22, 2014, Palo Alto, CA). This engagement, according to another NGO interviewee, gives states and policymakers an otherwise unavailable localized and systemic autonomous decision-making process conducted by NGO individuals at the local and regional level by individuals who are not formally engaged in seeking diplomatic outcomes (personal interview with an NGO worker, December 3, 2014, Los Angeles, CA). The resultant decentralization, diffusion, and, effectively, outsourcing of diplomatic activity to an autonomous field worker allows for "a more nimble action" that does not adhere to organizational chart peculiarities, said another NGO worker, or ministerial relationships and state nepotistic realities (personal interview with NGO worker, December 3, 2014, Los Angeles, CA). One NGO executive who was working on archaeological access and decisions in Colonel Gaddafi's Libya described in great detail the unique nature of a deal to turn parts of the Libyan coastline into a protected natural habitat and archaeologically protected sanctuary (personal interview with NGO executive, November 4, 2014, Washington, DC). His dealings directly with Gaddafi's son, Saif al

Islam al-Gaddafi, involved a direct diplomacy at a time when diplomatic representation of the Western NGO's home country was unavailable or ineffective.

Much as with an official embassy's personnel rank and national status and power, GNN institutions and individuals parallel state agencies and representatives regarding the efficacious nature of their institutions' and individuals' abilities to perform diplomatic functions. GNNs rely on their levels of access and credibility to perform effectively their informal or formal diplomatic functions. Just as it is more difficult for a chargé d'affaires from a small nation to get an appointment with a host nation prime minister than it would be for the ambassador (or secretary of state) of a much larger nation, so, too, is it much harder for a blogger than a staff correspondent for a major national daily newspaper (or the anchor of a major network nightly newscast). Sacrificing the heretofore dominance and presence of Western GNN news bureaus gives up throw weight as well as access (Tumber and Webster 2006).⁹⁴ This is a non-trivial point when assessing the geopolitics of GNNs, where access, credibility, elite influence, agenda setting, diplomatic functions, and, as the next section will demonstrate, intelligence gathering performance have been the hallmarks of Western GNNs during the 20th century.

2.4 Access

Access is limited not only to non-institutionally related GNNs, but also to preferred GNNs, as in Africa where only Chinese Central Television is granted access and interviews to African leadership (Wekesa and Yanqiu 2014, 20).⁹⁵ Since this power is relative, a potential formula is clear

⁹⁴ In their critical analysis of the work of war correspondents, Tumber and Webster (2006) summarize the importance of sources by stating, "[a]ccess to sources is paramount for all journalists" (80).

⁹⁵ One of the more dramatic developments as the relative presence and importance of Western GNNs weakens while non-Western GNNs, predominantly the world's largest foreign corresponding organization of CCTV/X, strengthens, the access opportunity has already shifted dynamically. "Most journalistic and academic analysts take cognizance of the fact that Western broadcasters (and to some extent Al Jazeera) are often too adversarial to the extent that they are seen as foes by the leaderships of many African countries. Of course, Western journalism celebrates this as watchdog journalism; seeking to ensure that authorities are held accountable to the people. Taking advantage of the fact that Western broadcasters have boxed themselves in by placing themselves in opposition to government, CCTV has become probably the only international broadcaster on which one can find exclusive presidential interviews" (Wekesa and Yanqiu 2014, 22).

and a question arises: When a non-Western GNN, such as *Xinhua* in Africa, is the predominant established international operation and a Western GNN, such as *The New York Times*, is absent, does China's material power and influence rise and America's drop? And even when Western GNNs are present to perform these multiple soft and hard power functions, given their informal relations to the state, are they as capable of performing the diplomatic functions they have performed successfully in the 20th century, where Western GNN resources are proscribed, access diminished, credibility diluted, competition expanded, power diffused, and voices cacophonous? Wekesa and Yanqiu found in their study that in Africa, "commentators saw the entry of CCTV as replacing the then downsizing, retrenching and shrinking Western media such as BBC, France 24 and that, increasingly, Kenyans were consuming 'global perambulations' of Chinese media" (2014, 11).

This author also researched in Africa, with a ten-day research visit by his Ugandan assistant, Kennedy Jawoko, who was directed and engaged in wide-ranging interviews and on-site visits with CCTV personnel, government officials, and varied media audiences. The findings of this work correlated closely with the findings of Wekesa and Yanqiu (2014). In all cases of data collected from CCTV, the interviews were done under an agreement of confidentiality (both in the United States and in Africa) as all CCTV employees are required to sign a non-disclosure agreement with their employer. As importantly, CCTV employees felt the real threat of job loss or reprisal if their identities were to be revealed and their comments or criticism was to be conveyed. A tight rein of information disclosure pervaded all these interviews, with palpable paranoia expressed by all CCTV parties save for one, CCTV consultant Jim Laurie, who had express permission to represent and externally discuss CCTV. A more detailed review of the work that Chinese GNNs are undertaking in Africa is found in Chapter 4.

2.5 National Alignment and Attitudes

Presence and a preponderance of GNN personnel are part of the equation that make GNNs' diplomatic functions more effective, but there is also a stylistic aspect, traditional approach, and confrontational reality of Western news organization that run contrary to successful diplomacy. This is in no small part because of Western traditions of GNNs' historical independence and, perhaps more importantly, Western GNNs—especially American GNNs—traditionally adversarial relationship to governmental power (Louw 2010).⁹⁶ Interviews conducted for this study indicated overwhelmingly that this contemporary adversarial stance towards non-Western foreign governments by Western GNN personnel was heightened. At the same time, a more benevolent understanding and sympathetic reckoning of a Western journalist's homeland was also a theme in interviews conducted with all but one European war correspondent, who had a harsher, more aggressively dismissive understanding of his home government. This generally sympathetic psychological aspect of national support is aligned with previous studies (Garon 2012),⁹⁷ though some research also shows that over an extended period or on permanent assignment or with fully ex-patriot reporting, the possibility of cooption and alignment with the new, non-native host country is also a potential psychological effect (Kirkhorn 1999). The ability to build a patriotic empathy (if not outright patriotism) is easier for GNN personnel when abroad than at home, as the majority of this study's interviewees reflected. That sentiment varies between wartime and peacetime circumstance, as both revealed by interviewees for this work and the literature (Kovach 2002).

Additionally, perspective of journalists who parachute into a country to cover a particular event can be contrasted to the perspective of those who live there and operate in a bureau.

⁹⁶ Louw (2010, 52) cites Prof. Larry Sabato's historical understanding of the shift in American journalism: "American journalists abandoned lapdog journalism in favour of an adversarial watchdog approach as a result of the Chappaquiddick accident and Watergate."

⁹⁷ While the issues of diaspora, exile, refugee, expatriots, and foreign workers is complex and has a large literature, the whole concept of national affinities is undergoing a redefinition with technological evolutions. According to Garon (2012, 1), "In all political, economic and social spheres, the role of social media and non-mediated communication has systematically reduced the role of the state and empowered a new network dynamic that will define the coming decades of the Twenty-First Century."

Although being (semi-) permanently stationed in a foreign country also has its dangers,⁹⁸ not having staff on the ground can be more problematic both for newsgathering and any ancillary diplomatic performance. More than one interviewee noted the absence of Western GNNs from the deteriorating security environment in Syria, where there were, however, non-Western GNN representatives both from China and Russia.

The Chinese presence in Africa, and the CCTV broadcast center's base in Kenya, gave that network unique presence and access to some of the more dramatic stories of the last few years, including the Westgate shopping mall attack and the Garissa University attack. In both of these instances, footage shown on Western GNN news networks was often sourced from CCTV.⁹⁹

Ultimately, who collects facts and builds local relationships is crucial to building and maintaining both the access and credibility necessary both to perform the journalistic function and any diplomatic bridging or movement in bilateral or multilateral ways. All the interviewees asked in this study reinforced the importance of GNN institutional and individual presence.

Where Western GNN institutional presence is lacking, there is often a reliance on local “stringers” or “satellite bureaus,” where native employees are engaged (Sundaram 2014a).¹⁰⁰ Depending on overseas local talent, working in the blogosphere to perform the journalistic diplomatic functions discussed above for a Western domestic audience risks an important disconnect. Often, from a diplomatic perspective as well as a journalistic exigency, essential questions are not being asked, are not drawn out to contrast with the foreign policies of other nations, but are, rather, focused on the immediate, if sometimes parochial, and are often much

⁹⁸ Living in a country for a longer period of time can lead to what, in diplomatic circles, is referred to as “going native”—a pejorative term to be sure. That is a key reason for cycling embassy staff out of a country. As for journalists, in a collection of studies of professional ethical issues, Fakazis (2003) analyzes the equivalent of the “Stockholm Syndrome”. As she puts it, “[l]ike the early pioneers of participant-observation, journalists often worry that empathy can lead a journalist to ‘go native’” (49).

⁹⁹ Though it should be noted that The New York Times had a still photographer, Tyler Hicks, in situ at the time of the attack. He subsequently was awarded a Pulitzer Prize for his work. Globally distributed video footage of this story, however, was dominated by CCTV.

¹⁰⁰ Sundaram wrote a thorough account of the life of a stringer overseas. In addition, he also wrote a summary of his experiences for The New York Times, concluding, “Life as a stringer, even for those eager to report from abroad, is daunting. It’s dangerous, the pay is low and there is little support.” (25 July, 2014, par. 21)

more generalized in their approach (Sundaram 2014b).¹⁰¹ This may be due to unconscious sympathy for the host government, or by design to avoid undesirable consequences—where a local employee or a stringer’s family lives, where his livelihood depends on good relations with the powers that be in the home country. A cautionary approach can also be motivated not only by fear, but also by desire, as one CCTV employee in Washington, DC confided that a strategy of a particular Chinese national colleague was to extend her stay in the United States permanently, perhaps through a green card marriage. The colleague was actively maintaining good relations with the home office, but soft pedaling some of the stories as not to be too offensive, as she saw it, of the host nation where she wanted to permanently reside (personal interview with a CCTV employee, October 16, 2013, Palo Alto, CA). This may be a case where a state’s interest and the GNN are not aligned due to a potential personal desire to change patriotic allegiances. Whether this is endemic of those who are working for non-Western GNNs would be conjecture and unknowable, but it must be noted that this discrepancy between a GNNs potential intelligence and diplomatic capacity and the interest of the state is due to a separate and personal agenda.

Occasionally, the opposite can also occur: the most dissident orientation might characterize local journalists, where a local newsgatherer has an agenda or an adversarial approach towards the society and politics of the nation in which he permanently resides. Regardless of the standing or orientation of the GNN stringer or local hire, a perspective and approach that is directly reflective of a particular GNN’s national audience interest will still be missing; one of the reasons why stringers, or freelance journalists are seldom used as the main source of information for the US audience in countries with notoriously oppressive regimes (Larsen 2010). As per two North American editors who had also confided in their own diplomatic engagements and foreign ministry relations with their own countries, at the very least, the analysis needs to be filtered so that the final

¹⁰¹ The lament for the loss of media presence is expressed in this New York Times column by Sundaram: “THE Western news media are in crisis and are turning their back on the world. We hardly ever notice. Where correspondents were once assigned to a place for years or months, reporters now handle 20 countries each. Bureaus are in hub cities, far from many of the countries they cover.” (25 July, 2014, par. 1)

product is distilled for them through a Western point of view that is relevant, both to policymakers and to the public (personal interviews in 2013).

2.6 GNN Functions Paralleling Diplomatic Practice & Forums

In addition to the diplomatic functions discussed above, GNNs and individual journalists can also perform a publicly diplomatic (not to be confused with public diplomacy) function. In these cases, GNN personnel perform publicly, at times on live television or radio, a diplomatic function by interviewing policymakers, juxtaposing politicians, or pressing for express policy formation, response, or preference via their medium. A most prominent example is former CNN talk show host Larry King and his long-standing tradition of interviewing heads of state on the air.¹⁰² King's questions (and his guests' answers) had a wide-ranging diplomatic effect on state policy.¹⁰³ The discussions raised negotiating points for subsequent engagement.¹⁰⁴

Another example of a journalist carrying out publicly diplomatic work is former ABC News "Nightline" host Ted Koppel.¹⁰⁵ The program was launched shortly after the 1979 kidnapping of 52 American citizens at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. "Nightline" could be called the "People's State Department". Koppel would often have Middle East representatives such as Palestinian Hanan Ashrawi and Israeli Benjamin Netanyahu square off to debate their respective positions.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰² Indeed, you can call this very public diplomacy.

¹⁰³ In his memoir, a former congressman, John P. Murtha (2010) details media pressure on his Somalia policy approach and his initial troop deployment opposition; how it was formulated, articulated, and debated on the television program Larry King Live in 1992.

¹⁰⁴ "Larry King Now" is a relatively new, non-CNN program, currently produced and distributed by Russia's RT.

¹⁰⁵ Despite the popular and official understanding that Ted Koppel engaged in a form of diplomacy and that his program, "Nightline", was the venue for performing diplomatic public negotiations and the staking out of positions, Koppel abhors this characterization. He said in an interview on WNYC's "On the Media", "I hate the term 'television diplomacy' because it's an oxymoron. It doesn't exist" (October 6, 2001). Koppel vehemently rejected the notion that his journalistic institution was vulnerable to serving the state, in whatever capacity, and maintained that journalists are independent and that television programs such as his did not have a policy agenda.

¹⁰⁶ Phil Donahue and Vladimir Posner performed a similar function in their occasional space bridge programs, also bringing to ordinary American and Soviet audiences the opportunity to interact with one another. Neither man was part of a news network, though they worked with news broadcasting organizations. This is an example of broadcasting on the margins of journalism and, but for their celebrity, visibility, and success, a slight departure from the sort of journalistic public diplomacy function upon which this research focuses.

From time to time, the weekend U.S. network news talk programs have foreign leaders as guests. One notable case was the April 2009 interview between ABC's George Stephanopoulos (himself a former aide to President Bill Clinton) and then-Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The questions were so sharply crafted that one could mistake them for a diplomatic exchange. Stephanopoulos was so experienced, well trained, and attuned to the perspectives of the State Department and the White House that he does not need either formal or informal preparation (let alone debriefing). His Iran policy inquiries on nuclear talks a few years back, for example, were highly relevant and directly put, focusing on the issue of preconditions and establishing certain diplomatically negotiable parameters for any potential future formal diplomatic negotiations, whether directly or in a two-track framework.

Though the policy talk show format was developed by Western broadcasters and epitomized by American Sunday talk shows "This Week," "Meet the Press," and "Face the Nation," as well as various programs on BBC, CNN, Deutsche Welle, France 24, and others, the format has been copied and replicated by various non-Western news organizations—in particular Al Jazeera, RT, and CCTV. The unique aspect of these policy talk shows is that they are able to attract senior policymakers, giving the network access to those policymakers, on the one hand, but also allowing a format that at times can force policy pronouncements or allow for what could be called television diplomacy, however maligned or dismissed this programming format. CCTV, for example, has host Nathan King bringing high-level government officials to the conventional and professional-looking studio and putting the heat on them with challenging questions trying to move the policy needle. A recent program with former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's State Department advisor P.J. Crowley was actively reinforcing the line, for example, that the world has a vote in American foreign policy, and focusing on the Iran nuclear deal, where China is engaged and potentially a party in any final agreement (King 2015). The assertive diplomatic stance was directly reflected in the publicly televised production.

New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman (who regularly meets with U.S. President Barack Obama) has great access around the world. He is one of the few with the ability and with some authority to exchange messages at every level.¹⁰⁷ In fact, in February 2002, Friedman is credited (or blamed) with presenting and publishing a Middle East peace proposal via his column following a dinner party and direct talks with Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah—an “intriguing” idea that was followed up on by President George W. Bush in a phone call with the Saudi Crown Prince (Bebow 2002, par. 1).¹⁰⁸ Friedman enjoys high level access not only in Washington, DC, but in capitals around the world. His columns frequently lay out policy proposals and suggest policy solutions, regardless of how workable or blue-sky the idea. He has as many detractors as he has fans, but all of his readership recognize his and his institutional GNNs’ unique level of access to world leaders and the demand for him as a guest speaker at global conferences where he is a mainstay.¹⁰⁹ But for U.S. reporters, the farther one gets from the news centers of Washington DC and New York City, the fewer news resources are deployed in this diplomatic manner.

Some non-Western networks follow the American talk show example. Most notably, Al Jazeera America brings newsworthy American policymakers (and dissident voices) to their U.S. studios and uses well-known broadcasters and journalists in the studio and in the field. Al Jazeera America hired name brand talent like Chris Bury, David Shuster, Joie Chen, John Siegenthaler, Soledad O’Brien, or Ali Veshi—all previously with American networks like CNN, Fox, CBS, ABC, and NBC. Russia Today (RT) performs a similar function. Al Jazeera America, however, has a slight disadvantage, with limited national distribution and an on-screen logo proclaiming its Arabic ownership, often making guests wary and deterring potential viewers.

¹⁰⁷ Even an otherwise very critical article makes the point that Friedman is “perhaps the single most influential newspaper columnist on the planet, reaches an audience of a few million people in a nation of 300 million” (Pareene 2013, par. 2).

¹⁰⁸ Bebow (2002, par. 7) cited growing criticism of Friedman’s diplomatic intercession: “Friedman came under fire for acting as much like a diplomat as a columnist. A *Boston Globe* editorial said it wasn’t a textbook way to conduct international relations.”

¹⁰⁹ Rolling Stone magazine took aim at the Friedman speechifying juggernaut, referring to his speech at “OligarchCon 2015 (i.e. the Davos World Economic Forum in Switzerland)” and offering a t-shirt to the best interpreter of Friedman’s speech at the “Thomas Friedman said something awesome at Davos” contest (Taibbi 2015).

By contrast, RT initially resembles any other American channel and Larry King's presence reinforces the mainstream nature of their productions. RT has approached and at times surpassed Al Jazeera's spectacular production values. One of the programs that resembles an evolved Nightline format—using advanced production features, music, graphics, clips, bumpers, breaks, and energetic performance—is “CrossTalk with Peter Lavelle,” a hard-charging program that, again, brings in mid-to-high level officials, think tank analysts, journalists, academics, and policymakers of varied stripes to discuss and formulate positions and responses led by the host.¹¹⁰

2.7 Diplomacy and Intelligence Gathering

To summarize, the formal diplomatic functions of international journalism include (a) a news bureau serving as a de facto embassy, (b) a correspondent serving as a de facto ambassador, and (c) reporters being used to perform in an intermediary role as an envoy. The success and ability of GNN personnel to perform diplomatic functions often hinges on credibility and access. In some cases, journalists were, in fact, engaging in acts of intelligence gathering and outright espionage. Some of those individuals operated under official diplomatic cover. The following section will delve further into the formal and informal performance of GNNs' intelligence gathering individuals and institutions.

On the informal diplomatic side, GNN personnel and journalists perform an uninitiated diplomatic function as intermediaries and envoys. They are asked, for example, to serve as private messengers of information that will not enter the public realm. They sometimes take the initiative to suggest policy approaches during interviews or off-the-record conversations. Raising certain points or issues that have never been considered is a diplomatic function; it is not a feature of newsgathering or reporting. It is leading the witness and can help to shape an outcome. This

¹¹⁰ This self-referential programming asks questions about its own existence and role in policy: “Media wars have entered new territory: Secretary of State John Kerry, EU officials and the NATO military alliance all have singled out this television station, RT, as some kind of security threat. Since when is holding and broadcasting a different opinion or narrative a threat to global media freedom?” (introduction to the program on 27 March, 2015).

collection of informal diplomatic GNN processes can further serve to inject new perspectives, shape an agenda, or influence elites within a policymaking framework.

This chapter has outlined historic and previously unexamined or publicized formal and informal cases of an established GNN institutional and individual practice and the wider, most inclusive professional media ecology.

As explained in the Introduction, in stark contrast to the rapid and steady growth of non-Western GNN resources, there has been an equally steady and rapid decimation of the Western journalistic presence on the world stage. The diminishing of that cadre and corps, while designed to improve the corporate bottom line, also has unintended consequences for American and European power. In short, with the diminution of Western GNNs, the West may essentially be losing a tool of diplomacy.

While this chapter has concentrated on the formal and informal institutional and individual diplomatic functions performed by GNNs, these diplomatic engagements and debriefings often elide with and, at times, become nearly indistinguishable from the performance of intelligence gathering interviews or interrogations, whether conducted formally or informally as a part of an intelligence gathering network. This parallel GNN function of intelligence gathering shall be investigated and demonstrated in the following chapter.

CHAPTER 3 – WESTERN GNNs AND STATE POWER 2: INTELLIGENCE GATHERING

A normative or performative study of intelligence and security is beyond the scope of this work, but has a rich literature that engages and elaborates on the value of intelligence gathering for states. In any overview of intelligence, the first authoritative work and ur-text is *The Art of War* by Sun Tzu (2002), explicating the rationale and value for intelligence gathering and outlining the methods and structure for intelligence gathering networks.¹¹¹ Sun Tzu's work is included in *Craft of Intelligence* by Allen Dulles (2006), the first and the longest serving civilian director of the CIA, who pays homage to Sun Tzu in its historical overview. Later on Dulles extends the early work into analysis of the contemporary justification and structural enhancements to the craft of intelligence within a post-Westphalian global nation-state system.

The more contemporary literature locates intelligence gathering within security studies (K.L. Johnson 2007),¹¹² presenting it as both a method and an expression of material power within the frameworks and structures of defense and diplomatic functions.¹¹³

This chapter focuses instead on the historic and extant roles GNNs play within intelligence-gathering writ large, with a focus both on the formal and informal functions that have not been exclusive to the Western GNNs, but have, during the 20th century, been dominated by them (Nelson 1997).¹¹⁴

¹¹¹ Any work in political science would seem remiss without reference to Thucydides and Ancient Greece and so it is appropriate that intelligence gathering was a key aspect of classical societies' military and political statecraft strategy (Russell 1999). Russell's study recognizes at the outset Thucydides's understanding of a state's reliance on intelligence gathering as a strategic tool and survival tactic, quoting the ancient: "Without fail, a man harms his foes thus: those things that they most dread he discovers, carefully investigates, then inflicts on them" (Thucydides 6.91.6, quoted in Russell 1999, Front Matter).

¹¹² Intelligence, despite the tendency to silo it academically within the military and security field of intelligence studies, is recognized as a broad practice that is intrinsically interdisciplinary. The handbook edited by K. L. Johnson (2007) is a collection of essays, predominantly from academics and practitioners in security studies, but who recognize the intersection of intelligence with other fields. Most relevant for this work and the importance of GNNs' informal intelligence gathering is the recognition of the unique value of "open source intelligence" (OSINT) (Steele 2007).

¹¹³ See, for example, Clinton (2010). Hillary Rodham Clinton embraced the concept of "smart power" during her tenure as U.S. Secretary of State and promoted, as she did in this piece, the three-legged stool of smart power as constituting strong defense, diplomacy, and development. In approaching the material nature of intelligence gathering, the role of development is generally not explored in the academic literature other than as an epiphenomenal attribute associated with INGOs (International Non-Governmental Organizations) that receive state underwriting or military backing.

¹¹⁴ Nelson shows that the Western radio broadcasts during the Cold War were globally unrivaled and that, despite the

Given this Western dominance, much of the GNN structural analysis in this chapter is based on intelligence gathering performed by Western organizations and individuals. The following chapters on non-Western Type III GNNs rely on a behavioral extension of this Western model and incorporate the new and rising GNN institutions in the 21st century, while identifying unique non-Western characteristics. Newer non-Western GNNs have been subject to less scrutiny and nearly no structural or behavioral transparency, with the exception of a few cases that will be elaborated on in following chapters and discovered during this study's data collection and interviews.

The research for this chapter brings about an examination of the role of global media institutions, foreign correspondents, International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), and other GNN institutions in intelligence gathering while reviewing pre-GNNs' and GNNs' traditional and historic performances of intelligence functions. The institutions, and individuals working within those institutions, examined are primarily within the traditional news generation field and mostly comprise journalistic and media organizations.

As examined in Chapter 2 on Diplomacy, where diplomacy is an integral part of both Western GNNs' formal and informal roles, intelligence gathering, too, is central to their function. As posited in this work, the functions of diplomacy and intelligence gathering stray from the realm of soft power or public diplomatic expressions of power and land firmly in the realm of hard power functions that supplement or complement the multiple hard power tools found in a tool box dominated by military and other material capacities.

GNNs participate in intelligence gathering. This and the following chapters will show that intelligence gathering by GNNs is at times done on a directly contractual basis, or based on a structural exigency. The research for this study indicates that, for Western news institutions, the role is most often performed as an ancillary by-product of their status, structure, and access as

presence of countering non-Western media, were predominant in terms of audience, credibility, and, ultimately, impact. The relevance of this domination was, quite simply, that the West had more boots on the ground, more presence, and greater intelligence gathering capacities overall and by overwhelmingly preponderant margins.

journalists and media organizations. It comes from these affordances that they engage in activities that are outside of their generally accepted functions of reporting, writing and broadcasting.

In the course of their professional performance, GNNs interact directly with the state and in certain circumstances, operate as active, independent agential actors. Further, this performance is, at times, an institutional extension of state structures, state power, and state representatives. GNNs often participate and precipitate – actively or passively, formally and informally – in the iterative, analytical, and communicative intelligence gathering processes within states and for policymakers and intelligence analysts. State foreign policy outcomes are often a direct result of media organization and journalist discovery and analysis, with significant and historically recognized outcomes that would not likely have been achieved without this class and category of media professionals acting outside their dominant roles as observers and public analysts, as exemplified by the historic Cuban Missile Crisis negotiations or the Haiti case first published in this work in the previous chapter.

While the popular perception of intelligence gathering is one of operatives working undercover for a sovereign nation's defense or state analytical forces, far more intelligence gathering is done in a more subtle, less formal, disengaged, and publicly justifiable manner—one in which Type I GNNs without a direct relationship to the state (unlike either Type II hybrid or Type III state-run GNNs that dominate and populate the non-Western GNN media ecology)—service the state's intelligence needs without often knowing or suspecting that they do so. The work product, publications, and broadcasts of this work—popularly referred to as “the news,” “reports,” “studies,” “white papers,” etc.—is known in intelligence circles as “Open Source” intelligence (OSINT) and discussed later in this chapter.

These two types of GNN intelligence gathering functions were earlier characterized as being either “witting or unwitting” as Wilford (2009) puts it in his important book, *The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America*. Wilford detailed how the Central Intelligence Agency's political warfare chief was able to manipulate journalists (and others) in the course of his work by

playing any propaganda tune he desired during the Cold War. Put differently, the spymaster played people and got them to do his bidding.

This current study differentiates further, parsing not only the concepts of witting and unwitting, but also extending the earlier framework to incorporate the understanding of formal and informal intelligence gathering. This work further recognizes that intelligence gathering can be done informally, yet wittingly, as well as formally and unwittingly. The following chart presents a matrix depicting the various combinations and cases that were made apparent during the research phase and represented in the data collection of this study.

	Informal	Formal
Witting	Operational reporting (e.g. military field reports)	Task-oriented, directed, or contracted reporting (IMV)
Unwitting	Institutional briefs, analytical, intelligence organizational uses of open source intelligence (PDB, INR,CIA, FBI, DIA)	Ostensible task-oriented, directed, or contracted reporting; Use of ancillary data or information

Table 6: Types of GNN intelligence gathering

In the first cell of Table 6, informal intelligence gathering is indicated as being done in the normal course of reporting, but the reporter is cognizant (witting) that the work has intelligence value as, for example, when a field report designates the coordinates or location of a hostile missile strike—data that can be used for ballistic forensics or targeting and calibrating. In the second cell,

formal reporting is done wittingly, as with the Defense Department's underwritten International Media Ventures (IMV) organization (presented below), to gather and report detailed operational intelligence on individuals, roles, locations, and targeting data. The third cell represents the informal collection of data and the open source reporting is then used by individuals and organizations in the course of their institutional practice, but the analytical work product is invisible to the originator, who often maintains either a willingly ignorant or active lack of concern about the use of the open source data used in the Presidential Daily Brief (PDB) or by multiple intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Finally, a contracted reporter may believe that his work is targeted, but the ancillary data delivered makes the individual ignorant to the true purpose of the reporting (often the case when reporters were dispatched to militarily significant zones to take photographs and report with non-military objectives).

This dissertation refers to both formal and informal intelligence gathering as an extension of Wilford's early identification and characterizations of intelligence gathering participants as being either witting or unwitting. In the course of the research, there was an early tendency for research participants to conflate informal intelligence gathering with unwitting and formal with witting. This work distinguishes and delineates between the two as GNN institutions—and individuals working within those institutions—can both be formally engaged in intelligence gathering and unwitting of the intelligence goals or value of the intelligence gathered. Equally, one can be informally engaged in intelligence gathering and be witting of its use, appropriation, and ultimate value to institutions and individuals.

The graphed GNN Intelligence Gathering matrix sets Informal and Formal relationships to the state against the Witting and Unwitting understanding of the intelligence products producer—whether or not the work product is intended or contracted for ultimate exclusive or open source consumption. In the first cell, where Informal relations exploit Wittingly employed institutions and individuals, the type of work exemplified is often the product of war correspondents and other field reporters and researchers who are delivering real-time or near real-

time data (as in a CNN report of Scud missile interceptions). These reports are not intended for intelligence use and were once either ignorantly or innocently broadcast for their sensational appeal and general human interest in matters of war and peace, but they are contemporaneously understood ultimately to have ballistic data embedded in them and, in real-time, allow for targeting calibration and psychological operations response. Some states either block or channel this data and, it is suspected, can sometimes manipulate or counter it, but the central point is that state non-contracted GNN institutions and individuals are performing—and are conscious of the consequences of such performance—an informal intelligence function performed by those institutional researchers and reporters without a formal state relationship.

Cell two juxtaposes a Formal state relationship with a Witting understanding of the use of reports. This is a more straightforward, direct, and often transactional relationship that has, but for its opaqueness, the capacity for metrics and milestones to measure the quality and quantity of outputs, performance, deliverables, and outcomes. It is the hardest cell to populate with examples given the clandestine nature of the activity. International Media Ventures (IMV), however, is a recent case active in the Iraqi and Afghan fields of battle and delivering directly to the Department of Defense, via an unaffiliated non-governmental intermediary, operationally actionable information. As will be apparent in another matrix graph, the Witting aspects of the operations were limited to IMV's administration, but not its frontline reporters and correspondents, who, IMV argued, were Unwitting of the uses and military value of their on-the-ground reporting. This Unwitting status was supported, maintained and reinforced by IMV's ability to place the work product into mass media products, giving both the data collection and collector the necessary cover both to argue and believe in the Open Source nature of the work product (Horton 2010 also Filkins and Mazzetti 2010).

The third cell of Table 6, under the Unwitting and Informal labels, juxtaposes the most widely used and popularly perceived understanding of Open Source intelligence gathering by GNNs. They are the news reports and broadcasts, NGO briefing papers, think tank White Papers,

academic research and publications, which, on a daily basis, depending on the topics, region, and focus of policymakers, make up either the bulk or, at the very least, a part of the collected and distributed data that is then processed, weighed, and acted upon as an integral part of the analytical process and operational decision making. This product is the most familiar to the general populace and is the reporting delivered in newspapers, on television and radio, or on major online news sites. It is also work that is found in the daily Presidential Daily Brief (PDB), clipped and used by intelligence, security, military, and policing forces, and relied upon by the diplomatic corps as well as policymaking agencies. While the purveyors of this work product may be aware that there are specialty uses for their data (Wall Street Journal reporters recognize the value of their market intelligence and political risk analysis to hedge fund managers, for example), foreign correspondents in this study believe that presenting their findings in reports to a wide, general, and unrestricted audience dilutes the strategic value of the Open Source data. “We feed the public; we’ve got a mass audience. What spooks do is feed a very small, very secretive, very exclusive group of people—that’s not us,” said one former American foreign correspondent who reported on the end of the Cold War from Moscow and was regularly accused of spying by both officials and suspect members of society who noted he was “always asking too many tough questions. But, basically, I was just reporting. It didn’t help that I regularly ate lunch at the [U.S.] embassy” (personal communication 2014). As with other GNN reporters, this correspondent said he “knew” his work was being “sifted” by American officials, but he always knew his work was not state directed, that it was unwitting.

That Unwitting understanding of his work—whether truly felt or willfully believed—was prevalent amongst GNN personnel, whether reporters, INGO workers, or the few academics who were interviewed for this study. Even when confronted with questions of how reports were used, this foreign correspondent interviewed justified his performance in the field as being free of intelligence value. He reported on the early stages of the war in Yugoslavia in 1991, a war that required GNN institutional resources to cover well and to get him unique access to President

Franjo Tudjman. His reports were followed up with a call from a political officer at the American embassy, and he easily shared exclusive insights and contacts with the official. When confronted with this case for this study, he responded by saying “we’re just committing journalism, that’s all,” (personal communication, January 2014, Palo Alto, CA).

Finally, the Unwitting nature of a Formal relationship involves subterfuge, opacity, and misleading management of the data collecting resource so that the work product that is contracted by the state is not the main data in which the contracting party is interested, but rather the ancillary data that is collected as a by-product or accident of the initial assignment. Photographers often fill this role by being assigned specific geographic, militarily strategic, urban, or unexplored rural areas in which to take pictures, but where the background, street scene, commerce, movement, or gender make-up is of more strategic value than the ostensible subject of the images. Photographs of the 70th anniversary of the Pyongyang regime yielded many images of military parades and precision drills, but those photographs are still being reviewed for useful data concerning military hardware, leadership personnel and their proximity to the Kim Jong-un, popular reactions to and performance of ideological presentations as described in a *Stratfor* article titled “China Flaunts its Missile Arsenal” (2015).¹¹⁵ While most of the intelligence-oriented useful North Korean imagery was provided by Pyongyang’s state media, this example is used to illustrate how visual and descriptive information can have dual use for both a public audience and a non-public audience. All GNNs use their resources to achieve imagery of otherwise unobservable locales, whether difficult to reach areas or conflict zones. Safe passage and security at such locales have traditionally been more assured to GNN personnel, as attested by Terry Phillips: “My cameraman and I would never have gone to cover the war in Mogadishu if CBS didn’t send me” (personal communication 2015). In certain conflict zones, such as the Iraq war, which provided embedded GNN personnel

¹¹⁵ Intelligence analysts wrote, “Military watchers around the world eagerly anticipated China’s Sept. 3 military parade to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the surrender of Japan and the end of World War II... keeping an especially attentive eye out for the potential display of new weaponry and equipment. China showed off a large number of cruise and ballistic missiles during the parade, highlighting the scale of its expanded missile arsenal.” (Stratfor 2015, par. 1).

safety and security during the conflict, the formality of the relationship was clear between an Unwitting participant and the state, represented by the military in this case, as the bonds built between units and reporters. While photographers are the most obvious of those within this category of Unwitting players involved in a Formal relationship, the same holds true for others engaged in reportage, where observations of ancillary information and data collection is the focus rather than the ostensible reason for the reporting trip.

	Formal Administrative & Managerial	Informal Administrative & Managerial
Formal Reportorial	CIA Op	Orwell
Informal Reportorial	IMV	Cocktail Party, Backgrounders, Open Source Reporting

Table 7: Types of GNN intelligence gathering by organizational level

Table 7 can be broken down into hierarchies: GNN Type I-III institutions are divided into a class of owners and administrators, referred to as Administrative & Managerial; whereas the individuals working within GNN Type I-III institutions, but not part of management, are referred to as Reportorial. Either or both Administrative and Reportorial levels of institutional representation can perform at either an informal or formal level.

As explained in the case of IMV, there are also layers of cognition and understanding regarding the use and value of data collection and reporting, as represented in Table 2, where a

reporter or operative may be unaware of the administrative or management layer's strategic use and value of a work product or where that use and value is opaque to the producer, whether for operational security reasons or as a matter of established protocol.

Journalists interviewed for this study admitted that they rarely privately speak about their role in intelligence gathering, and certainly never publicly and, as would be befitting, certainly not while actively engaged in such activities. That is, in part, because performing this function has legal ramifications, is a necessary requirement for secrecy and operational security and, further, can have political, diplomatic, military, judicial, and other severe consequences not only for individuals, but also institutions and states. GNN personnel engaged in this function also suffer from both a societal and professional stigma (Shafer 2010)¹¹⁶ attached to it, with ethical debates and scathing critique heaped upon those who actively profess or are discovered to engage in the act of espionage using a journalistic cover or in general levels of intelligence gathering that is consciously sympathetic to any side in a narrative battle or violent war.

In rare instances, and, as will be seen later in this section, usually after years of surreptitious action and behavior—sometimes in posthumously released documents—a journalist tells his or her story and, in the course of the confessional, sometimes goes on to name other names. On the formal side, there are multiple documented cases, some brought forth as a result of Congressional inquiry¹¹⁷ in the United States, others as a matter of judicial inquiry, arrest, or by defectors and double-agents who count on publicity for personal security and attention as a defensive posture to keep potential threats at bay due to a higher public profile.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁶ The parallels between spying and reporting and the ethical dilemmas are touched on by Shafer (2010, par. 12). “Both journalists and spies recruit sources, collect and annotate information, verify it, interpret it, write it up in reports, and disseminate it. There the similarity ends. Journalists are supposed to stay on this side of the law, this side of libel and invasion of privacy, and this side of turpitude.”

¹¹⁷ See, for example, Bernstein (1977). Much of the previously confidential information gathered by this well-known Watergate correspondent, came as a follow-up report after testimony and documentation presented to the so-called Church Committee in the United States Senate, chaired by Sen. Frank Church (D-ID) in 1975. This 25,000 word cover story for Rolling Stone remains one of the greatest exposes of the relationship between American journalism institutions, reporters, editors, and the CIA, as detailed in the formal intelligence gathering sections of this chapter.

¹¹⁸ Edward Snowden's case (see Greenwald, et. al. 2013) is a high-profile contemporary one that has been broadly publicized. Snowden continues to conduct high-visibility interviews (for example, on BBC), participate in free-speech conferences via Skype, and a documentary about him, *Citizen Four*, has won an Oscar. The case of Edward Snowden is complex and, while revealing GNN complicity in espionage, falls slightly outside the realm of journalist spy. The

On the informal side, the best known of these cases is a contemporary German journalist who wrote the book, *Gekaufte Journalisten*¹¹⁹ (Ulfkotte 2014). The book names Western individuals and GNN institutions actively engaged and co-dependent with the state and its multi-level functions, including—but not limited to—its intelligence gathering apparatus across secretariats and departments.

3.1. Intelligence: A material capacity

States need intelligence. History shows and the literary work of civilization reveals the long traditions of intelligence and its use of surreptitious and undercover work (Sun Tzu 2002) with the frequent exploitation of those operating or reporting under the guise of a false or hidden secondary activity (Shulsky and Schmitt 2002), the equivalent of modern day Non-Official Cover agents (NOCs) (Wilson 2012).¹²⁰ As early as the preparation for battle and invasion of Ancient Greece by the Persians, the Persian King Xerxes regularly used spies to understand his adversaries' strengths and weaknesses, often forcing or coercing turncoat natives to save themselves and their families by performing this function (Hale 2009).

In more contemporary times, specifically during the Cold War, both East and West actively engaged in this work, as detailed in Allen Dulles's definitive work (2006) on both practice and tradecraft.

Foreign intelligence gathering—unlike domestic spying on citizenry or subjects—while wide open to normative analysis and judgment, is a global practice, as much a means of preventing

strategy Snowden employs, however, for maintaining personal security and survival is by keeping himself visible in the public eye and a standard approach for vilified individuals and potential state security threats. "Yes, I could be rendered by the CIA. I could have people come after me. Or any of the third-party partners. They work closely with a number of other nations. Or they could pay off the Triads. Any of their agents or assets," he said (The Guardian, June 11, 2013, par. 21).

¹¹⁹ Udo Ulfkotte worked at the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung for 17 years and describes in great detail the methods, approaches, and relationships that evolved during that time and created an interdependency and alignment between journalists and Western state institutions and goals.

¹²⁰ Valerie Plame Wilson is one of the highest profile non-official cover (NOC) agents to be revealed publicly and her account of her outing by officials in the George W. Bush administration goes into detail regarding her path to becoming a NOC. During conversation with the author on February 5th, 2015, Ms. Plame was cautious about answering sensitive questions that could reveal or intimate confidential information, but confirmed details previously and publicly revealed.

war as it is a method by which to measure adversaries' intentions and capacities in assessing competence at resisting, combatting, or warding off assault and occupation. In fact, it is a time-honored, if highly misunderstood and criticized, profession with empirics to confirm both its successful (Elhassani 2011), and unsuccessful (Taylor 2013), performative function both in war and peace (Hinsley and Simkins 1990). It is as much a means towards action as it is to inaction; where credible foreign intelligence exists, not all of this intelligence is actionable.¹²¹

If there is a code of honor, respect, and reward within the intelligence community for its assets and systems, this is not the case for spying and formal intelligence gathering for those outside of the spy profession and, in particular, for those who gather intelligence for a wider public rather than a smaller subset of state analysts and policymakers. In fact, it is likely considered one of the most pernicious and reckless acts that can be taken by a journalist, both undermining the credibility, access, and reliability of the profession (Klein 2014), and, further, putting those who are performing their public function in grave danger of being accused of spying.¹²² In 2015, *The Washington Post* Tehran correspondent, Jason Rezaian was convicted of espionage and sentenced to a prison term in Iran, but released in January 2016. Unsurprisingly, Rezaian's newspaper emphatically denounced such allegations, calling the charges "absurd and despicable." (Baron 2015, par. 3).

While the case against Jason Rezaian is in all likelihood exaggerated and false, there is a tradition and history of state and hybrid GNNs and their personnel being in the direct employ of the intelligence agencies of foreign sovereigns (Dover and Goodman 2009.)¹²³ The United States has publicly stated that it no longer engages in this type of direct journalist engagement after years of directly funding specific GNNs, most notably Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL

¹²¹ This was dramatized in the film *The Imitation Game* (Tyldum 2014), where knowledge of troop movement or battle plans did not lead to countermeasures or lifesaving preventive actions so as that intelligence gathering abilities would not be compromised by an adversary's knowledge of an enemy's capacities.

¹²² This was explored in more detail in M. Kounalakis (2014a).

¹²³ Dover and Goodman's *Spinning Intelligence* (2009) is perhaps the most comprehensive overview of both the formal and informal relationship between journalism and intelligence agencies. This anthology of essays touch on both the historic relationships between the two enterprises and the contemporary need for news reports to complement and complete intelligence analyses, with the front matter of the book describing "the CIA's reliance on open sources for intelligence purposes."

History—Archives).¹²⁴ The CIA has said it no longer engages in the activity of using journalists as operatives, and this assertion is reinforced by security and intelligence scholar, Columbia University professor Robert Jervis (Ioffe 2015).¹²⁵ Domestically in the United States, the FBI, too, had made it an occasional practice to use journalists as a front for their investigations, though the practice has been officially restricted since 1992 (Upano 2003).¹²⁶

Unclassified documents from the RFE/RL CIA years yield a trove of operational data regarding the hand-in-glove relationship between this Western Type III state-sponsored pre-GNN broadcast organization and its intelligence activities. The United States Office of Policy Coordination worked through the American Committee for Liberation (AMCOMLIB) during these years to develop not only a plan for propagating information to the captive states of Eastern Europe and to the Soviet Union, but also to be intelligence gathering and analysis organizations. AMCOMLIB was established because, as Frank Wisner, the former southeastern European head of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and, later, the head of the Directorate of Plans at the CIA in the 1950s, wrote in a now-declassified CIA memorandum on August 21, 1951, there was a need for the “establishment of a cover committee” (“Office of Policy Coordination 1951, par 3.). Later, U.S. State Department documents reveal an analysis by those within AMCOMLIB on the issues of restraints on pre-GNN RFE/RL when West Germany regains its sovereignty (“State Department” 1953). Declassified documents from this era allow for an understanding of the broad-based underwriting, management, mission, and legacy of the current Western Type III state-sponsored GNN institutions and their established alignment with state policy and goals as well as their service at enhancing state power via their organized and underwritten policies and practice. The

¹²⁴ In this self-reported archival history, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty candidly acknowledge their previously clandestine relations: “Initially, both RFE and RL were funded principally by the U.S. Congress through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)” (RFE/RL History—Archives, n.d., par. 6).

¹²⁵ Jervis is quoted in this magazine article as arguing that journalists are not as actively engaged by the CIA, saying “For us, especially after the reforms in the wake of Watergate that reined in the C.I.A., there was a lot of pushback from journalists that this was putting them in danger, so we backed off,” (Ioffe 2015, par. 10).

¹²⁶ The restrictions are stringent, but there are allowed exceptions, as highlighted in this Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press article. “The 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act was signed into law by President Bill Clinton, allowing the ban on the use of journalists to be waived with notification to Congress and presidential approval” (Upano 2003, par. 19).

relationship between RFE/RL and CIA, a prime example of GNN engagement in state power, will be further elaborated on later in this chapter.

3.2 Cloak and Gown¹²⁷

It is not just the journalistic institutions and individuals who make up GNNs, but also the larger NGO world (Wright 2015) who continue to increase their engagement, both formally and informally, in the reporting, writing, editing, and other information gathering and dissemination processes, in particular as capacities of traditional Western news organizations diminishes (DeMars 2001).¹²⁸ As addressed in a NiemanLab study at Harvard University on “NGOs as Newsmakers,” the study’s authors note that “civil society actors such as NGOs and advocacy networks are becoming increasingly significant players as the traditional news media model is threatened by shrinking audiences, the availability of free content online, and the declining fortunes of mainstream media” (M. Price et al. 2009, par. 2).

Similarly, and as a result of the increased news, data, and information gathering and disseminating capacities of the academic world, researchers living and working in foreign countries also increasingly constitute members of the broader GNN constellation of newsgathering and dissemination structure of this study. Their work has often engaged historically, if not dominantly then distinctly and identifiably, within “cloak and gown” activity (Winks 1987), where archaeological, sociological, anthropological, economic, political, and non-humanitarian work done

¹²⁷ The phrase “cloak and gown” is a play on the popular spying phrase “cloak and dagger,” but in this case specific to the use of GNN institutional academics and researchers in the practice of intelligence. The “cloak and gown” phrase was popularized by the book *Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War 1939-1961* (Winks [1987] 1996). A *New York Times* review of the book noted the conflict between the formal and informal relationship between intelligence gathering and analysis done by scholars and the inherent problems therein: “The line between asking anthropologists about the cultures of the Pacific theater and using them as covers might be blurred, but it was a dangerous one that many American (and some other) universities crossed” (Hodgson 1987, par. 9).

¹²⁸ The relationship between intelligence agencies and NGOs is an intensely debated and controversial one, but whatever the intensity or proximity, according to DeMars, “most relevant academic and policy literature fails to address the real issues in this hazardous relationship” (DeMars 2001, 193). The author’s own experience as chairman of the Internews Network (2002-2004) has also informed this study and the insistence of NGOs inclusion within a comprehensive GNN framework and system.

overseas has been regularly done with a direct funding and/or reporting relationship to foreign intelligence gathering institutions (D. Price 2003; LeVine 2012).

There continue to be a wide variety of programs where defense and intelligence organizations continue to engage directly with scholars (Moos et al. 2005), as with the American Department of Defense's Minerva Initiative.¹²⁹ The importance of academics within Western GNN structures is increasing as the traditional newsgathering GNN resources diminish. While Western GNN Type I journalism structures have been mostly understood prior to this study as having an arm's length distance from state structures and capacities, NGOs and academics with direct funding ties to the state are open to more contemporary scrutiny for their support and relationship to the state and in the potential for enhancing its power. The Social Science Research Council looks at the Minerva Project and recognizes the potentially controversial nature of the state funding tied to the U.S. military and states that "the initiative indicates a renewal of interest in social science findings after a prolonged period of neglect, but it also prompts concerns about the appropriate relationship between university-based research programs and the state, especially when research might become a tool of not only governance but also military violence" ("The Minerva Controversy", n.d., par. 1)

Further, the legal protection of the reporter's privilege now recognizes institutional academics for their GNN role as newsgatherers, with legal precedent for their work and protections for their activities.¹³⁰ As noted throughout this study, all GNNs, both Western and non-Western, now make up a more complex institutional news, information and analysis ecology that include and harness the work of other institutional researchers and analysts. Academics are naturally a part of

¹²⁹ This program for scholars self-describes its mission as follows: "The Minerva Research Initiative, initiated by former Secretary Gates in 2008, seeks to build deeper understanding of the social, cultural, and political dynamics that shape regions of strategic interest around the world" ("Minerva Initiative", under "What is Minerva?").

¹³⁰ According to the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (2011, par. 1), "The reporter's privilege has been extended to include research analysts and academics. See, e.g., *Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp.*, 162 F.3d 708 (1st Cir. 1998) (extending the privilege to the pre-publication manuscripts of a distinguished academic); *Summit Tech., Inc. v. Healthcare Capital Group, Inc.*, 141 F.R.D. 381 (D. Mass. 1992) (holding that the reporter's privilege applied to the report of an independent researcher and analyst hired by an institutional investor); *U.S. v. Doe (In the matter of Falk)*, 332 F. Supp. 938 (D. Mass 1971) (finding that professors who publish books and articles are protected by the reporter's privilege)."

this and have become important in certain instances in feeding both the informal and formal GNN intelligence system. As noted in a report on “The Reconstruction of American Journalism”, the GNN ecology is opening itself more to non-traditional newsgathering institutions: “The Internet has greatly increased access to large quantities of ‘public information’ and news produced by government and a growing number of data-gathering, data-analyzing, research, academic, and special interest activist organizations” (Downie and Schudson 2009, par. 112).

3.3 Citizen Journalism

As seen earlier in this study, Western institutional GNNs are simultaneously losing both their capacities and resources while a concurrent rise in non-Western institutional GNNs are filling the void. Part of the contemporary debate in the newsgathering profession revolves around the rise of technology, increased transparency, low-barriers to entry for journalistic enterprise, and instantaneous access to wide distribution and audience potential. The rise of the citizen journalists is heralded by many as a possible substitute for the previously top-heavy institutional GNN structures, with nimble movement, speed, and freedom from institutional constraints heralded as positive change (Reich 2008).¹³¹

If this is the case, then why are contemporary human GNN capacities so important? What is it that they do or did that cannot be substituted by citizen journalism or the new aggregating systems and big data crunching automations, such as the GDELT project?¹³² In particular, there is a difference between citizen journalism’s performance and that of institutional GNNs when it comes to geopolitical and geostrategic issues. As the interviews for this dissertation as well as

¹³¹ This systemic study of citizen journalism “suggests that ordinary citizens can serve as a vital complement to mainstream journalism, however not as its substitute” (Reich 2008, 739).

¹³² “GDELT holds great promise at contextualizing the news media written data worldwide, creating the possibility of grander connections between seemingly disparate events and how they are described. “Much of the true insight captured in the world’s news media lies not in what it says, but the context of how it says it. The GDELT Global Knowledge Graph compiles a list of every person, organization, company, location, and over 230 themes and emotions from every news report, using some of the most sophisticated named entity and geocoding algorithms in existence, designed specifically for the noisy and ungrammatical world that is the world’s news media.” (The GDELT Project, GDELT Global Knowledge Graph, n.d. par. 1).

previous research found, decision-makers limit their information intake to traditional media and established GNNs, with their legacy means of information navigation (in newspapers, the importance of the front page; in broadcast, the urgency of the lead story) and pre-digested data and analysis via a layered and filtering editorial process. In this policymaking environment the GNN takes primacy and maintains credibility amongst this elite.¹³³ The promise and practice of institutional GNNs use of new technologies and tools are great, but many non-GNN players confuse the tools for the content and output for analysis. The multiplicity of sources and blogs, tweets and posts, creates a noise versus signal problem that institutional GNNs have cut through. “This only amplifies the noise. Thus, it’s hardly surprising that we are prone to see trends and developments that only exist in the minds of our local interlocutors. Learning from foreign blogs is a long and tedious process; it is largely useless in times of a crisis—who has time to read and translate blog posts when people are dying in the streets?” (Morozov 2009, 12).

Arising news institutions are entering the realm of foreign corresponding, but their products are more focused on the ephemeral and the sensational, rather than the analytical and strategic reporting that characterizes institutional GNN reporting. As one of the fastest growing news organizations online today, *Vice* has shown less of an interest in reporting on geopolitical issues and more of an affinity towards the sensational. A self-describing abstract for its product on the Google Play site states “The online den for nefarious activities, investigative journalism, and enlightening documentaries. *Vice* is a global media channel focusing on investigative journalism and enlightening videos about everything from world news, travel, art, drugs, politics, sports, fashion, sex, and super cute animals.”¹³⁴ World news makes the cut, but usually only when it also includes some or all of the other topics previously listed. The audience skews younger, as Al Brown, the head of content at *Vice News* in London put it, “It’s made by young people for young people.

¹³³ “Prior studies show that opinion leaders depend on mass media, particularly ‘elite media’ as well as ‘outside sources’” (Meraz 2007, 115).

¹³⁴ <https://play.google.com/store/newsstand/news/VICE?id=CAowis8w&hl=en>

If our journalists are scared, that makes it into the film. What our journalists are feeling is a huge part of our vernacular” (Martinson 2015, par. 23).

Vice is still a young institution and it is already showing ambitions of becoming a part of the GNN constellation as it gains funding,¹³⁵ reach, and seriousness of purpose and product, such as the recent documentaries it has developed on Libya, as well as Syria and ISIS.

GNNs service a spectrum of audiences, but their domestic and international foreign affairs policy formation and intelligence clientele are predominantly within an elite policymaking and policy-influencing circle. As such, GNNs’ intelligence gathering has not only a high potential degree of elite influence, but an equally high degree of exclusive, high-level access. GNNs systemic approaches to data collection is credible, and provides seasoned and informed analysis that goes through a conventional and established course of refining, prioritization, vetting of sources, follow-up on accuracy, confirmatory (and disconfirmatory) critical processes, pattern recognition, lateral linkage, scenario probability, editing, serendipity and gut instincts—as well as pre-publication alerting and second-sourcing prior to publication and distribution. This is a highly refined, multi-generational system that is proven, if not flawless.¹³⁶

3.4 Access and Credibility

There are unique institutional characteristics of GNNs that give them privileged access to popular sources, elites, institutions, governing bodies, industrial and communal leaders, regions, sites, and otherwise non-public venues where institutionally unaffiliated researchers and journalists are not admitted or welcome. Journalism scholars ask the question of whether blogger interest and/or citizen journalist access to decision-making elites is available or possible. The answer is usually in the negative: “Bloggers ... are still the relative upstarts. There is still an outsider quality

¹³⁵ At the end of 2015, Walt Disney Company invested \$400 million in Vice Media, bringing the current valuation of Vice at \$4 billion (Shaw and Palmieri 2015).

¹³⁶ In the course of conversation with Valerie Plame Wilson, she made clear to the author that one of the reporting strengths of institutional GNNs prior to and during the Iraq war was the accurate and fair work done by the McClatchy news organization. (NB, the author currently is contracted to deliver a bi-weekly foreign affairs column to McClatchy).

to their content and their approach to politics” (R. Davis 2012, 54). The general findings in this work are that unaffiliated or independent reporters or news sites are often excluded from gaining high level or elite access. One unaffiliated, independent blogger confided that he had tried and failed for years to get an interview with Germany’s Prime Minister Angela Merkel and felt he “was discriminated against because I don’t wear a tie” (personal communication, 2014).

Without a history of institutional relations or a body of work with longevity and elite demographic appeal or respect, the newer, less institutional, otherwise unaffiliated may have significant ability to move freely through the daily life of a foreign venue with occasional exclusive or opportunistic reporting moments, but the citizen journalist seldom if ever gains access to the highest levels of society or government. As interviews with both elite GNN institution staff and unaffiliated bloggers conducted for this dissertation show, the level of access afforded to non-institutional journalists is increasing, but primarily for those unaffiliated individuals who have regularly received the imprimatur of acceptance by the elite institutional media, i.e., those who have received institutional awards for their reporting, are regularly quoted or sourced in conventional and established press reports, or who also work for established and branded news institutions.¹³⁷ Regardless, even with institutional validation, all the interviewees in this study reported a gross disparity between access afforded institutional representatives and non-affiliated ones.

Institutional GNNs have comparatively unfettered access to a political and societal elite. For example, in the United States, multi-generational Sunday television programming (e.g., *Meet the Press* and *Face the Nation*) have their pick of the political litter, with opposition leaders, legislative lobbyists, and administration officials clamoring for exposure and access. The same is true of leading GNN print institutions, with even greater access due to the lower threshold for participation (no need for travel or early Sunday morning prep time prior to performance). A call

¹³⁷ An example of one former blogger whose website is now seen as an institutional player is the former employee at The Washington Monthly, Joshua Michael Marshall, who publishes the highly trafficked and recognized Talking Points Memo (TPM). Marshall won a Polk Award for his TPM work, but it should be noted that his rise in credibility and access came concurrent with his regular and recognized work within the institutional GNN framework.

from *The New York Times*, for example, is nearly always returned as quickly as possible, unless the subject is actively avoiding the press, knowing that the call will translate into a highly visible, widely distributed quote or, if the call goes unreturned, a line that reads that the subject was unavailable for comment.

As seen above, this is not the case for non-institutional journalistic outlets and individuals (Reich 2008).¹³⁸ They are rarely, if ever, a part of a journalist corps that is granted press passes or access to the highest levels and offices in government.

Western GNNs for the dominant part of the 20th century were granted a preponderance of access worldwide as their resource base and distribution networks were unrivaled in their size and breadth. As such, the access to a global elite was unparalleled and often invited, with only domestic newsgathering organizations, often state-run, able to match the level of access available to the larger Western GNNs, which also brought with them levels of elevated status, professional standards, constitutional protections, institutional training and editorial structures reinforcing fairness and accuracy, and an aura and accepted assumption of relative objectivity to their work (W.L. Bennett 1996), but also access to engage directly in both agenda setting and elite influence.

3.5 GNN Institutional: Formal Intelligence Gathering

The simplest and most straightforward definitional relationships between GNNs and the intelligence gathering and analysis community are those that are contractually established, financially dependent, and publicly disclosed. While the public disclosure may have been forced or revealed over time with the declassification of previously secret government documents, a significant amount of empirical evidence over long periods of time establishes the interconnectedness between GNNs and the intelligence community of Western (and, as shall be

¹³⁸ In this study, Reich (2008, 739) “develops a version of the “news access” theory, which sees citizen journalists as hindered by their inferior access to news sources, unlike mainstream journalism, where the problem is seen as the superior access.”

seen in following sections, non-Western) GNNs, with a more public record for those in liberal democracies, with their more publicly responsive and transparent states.

As pointed out previously, the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) directly funded, directed, and promoted (A.R. Johnson 2010) the work of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (RFE/RL History-Archives n.d).¹³⁹ The main work of this institution was to propagate and disseminate news into countries where information sovereignty prevented a domestic and state-run news organization from presenting views or news that created a dissonant understanding of ruling regimes. The broadcaster viewed itself as a surrogate domestic news agency and relied on being able to penetrate geographical borders and territory, circumvent authorities and censors, cut through electronic interference and jamming, and achieve a level of audience penetration so that the message—whose credibility was enhanced by its tabooed nature, scratchy and near unintelligible reception, subversive message, and surreptitious reception—was able to counter a regime’s narrative and both inspire opposition to a regime and form the basis for shared knowledge and action (Johnson 2013-2014, personal communication; Wimbush 2014, personal communication).¹⁴⁰ The organization did not strictly operate as an output-oriented institution, however, but also as an intelligence gathering and analysis institution that used native-speaking employees, often dissidents or oppressed natives who managed to escape from their captive nations, to collect, analyze, and deliver reports back to the CIA.

This history and tradition has created on-going suspicion in nations where RFE/RL continue to operate and where the organization’s reporters and staff engage in journalistic enterprise. Host nations where Prague-based RFE/RL employs journalists and stringers are often engaged in the harassment and shadowing of its personnel. In 2014, for example, there were a number of arrests of RFE/RL affiliated employees with charges of espionage being leveled at them

¹³⁹ "Initially, both RFE and RL were funded principally by the U.S. Congress through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)... In 1971, all CIA involvement ended" (RFE/RL History-Archives n.d).

¹⁴⁰A. Ross Johnson is a Hoover Institution colleague and this summary of goals was garnered from dialogue and interviews conducted in 2013 and 2014 and supplemented with detailed conversations held with another head of RFE/RL, S. Enders Wimbush.

in the course of what could just as easily be considered straightforward performance of journalistic duties.¹⁴¹

More formal still was the creation and incorporation of the British Broadcasting Company's World Service and its relationship to the MI6 foreign intelligence service (Dorril 2002).¹⁴² From establishment, to funding, execution and performance, the BBC World Service has had a storied relationship with its country's intelligence community and defense structure. It currently faces a dramatic funding challenge, moving its underwriting base from a long and reliable government funding source to the vagaries of the marketplace (Geniets 2013) and, further, underwriting by foreign states and their non-Western state broadcasters in exchange for participation in thematic and topical production decisions (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee 2011). In contemporary instances, the BBC (not the BBC World Service) is now in full partnership with Chinese production institutions and jointly developing documentary work, with critics charging the cooption of BBC journalistic standards and practices (Philipson 2013).¹⁴³ One interviewee for this study expressed direct knowledge of changes made by an American GNN in order not to offend the participating partners, while also asserting that a curbing of intelligence gathering was also at play.

In 2010, one of the more brazen uses of a journalistic organization was the U.S Pentagon contracting of a newly formed corporation, International Media Ventures (IMV), ostensibly to report on the situation in Afghanistan. IMV qualifies as an institutional Western GNN, with a

¹⁴¹ Azerbaijan's "Spy Network" Charge Escalates Pressure On RFE/RL Journalists, 2014. . Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.<http://www.rferl.org/content/azerbaijans-spy-network-charge-escalates-pressure-on-rferl-journalists/25268641.html> (Accessed 5 March 2015)

¹⁴² The long history of the relationship between British intelligence and the formal underwriting of the World Service by the state has provided many documented instances of the hierarchical workings, financial arrangements, and established agreements regarding both the collection and dissemination of intelligence material. Further, Dorril (2002) states that "[t]he IRD [Information Research Department] maintained a strong relationship with the BBC." (Dorril 2002, 78).

¹⁴³ The increased reliance upon production partners is reflected in this article, quoting Mark Reynolds, director of Factual at BBC Worldwide, saying "CCTV is really quite an important partner in terms of factual programming now. We are going to talk to them about other projects coming up in the future because with the cost of these big productions we are always looking to bring in new partners where it's the right editorial fit for them" (Philipson 2013, par. 5).

witting management and unwitting reportorial personnel. The U.S. Defense Department leader of this program, Michael D. Furlong, had extensive experience in the psychology operations (PSYOPS) world and used the subcontracting relationship with IMV to gather directly actionable intelligence in the field. As one of the IMV executives, Robert Young Pelton, explained in a *New York Times* article revealing the changing nature of the IMV-Pentagon relationship, “We were providing information so they could better understand the situation in Afghanistan, and it was being used to kill people.” (Filkins and Mazzetti 2010, par. 17).¹⁴⁴ The IMV story was independently corroborated by this author, but with an explicit explanation from the author’s source that this operation is atypical, if not rogue, and that, according to the source, it would never be officially or hierarchically condoned unlike in “countries like Russia or China” (personal communication with military personnel 2013; 2014).¹⁴⁵

3.5.1 GNN Institutional Formal Intelligence Gathering—Corporate Entities

Formal relations between news organizations and other institutions that make up GNNs have firmly entered into the digital age and spread into new media corporations that are still operationally undefined as to whether they are aggregators, media companies, advertising organizations, big data companies, or any other characteristic that would be singularly defining given their market dominance, global reach, market capitalization, and breadth of business. Suffice it to say that the business and information corporate juggernauts of Google, Yahoo!, Skype, Apple, Hotmail, AOL, Facebook, and sub-corporate entities such as YouTube and Gmail, which all make up part of contemporary GNNs, have all been found to have formally engaged with global

¹⁴⁴This revelation is perhaps the single most important contemporary story of not only the formal intelligence gathering relationship between an American-based news organization, but, going one step further, a collusion between both the organization and the state in the set-up and funding of IMV so that subcontracted journalists for IMV could operate primarily as unwitting intelligence gatherers. Along with Mr. Young, a high-ranking former CNN vice president, “Eason Jordan, a former television news executive, had been hired by the military to run a public Web site to help the government gain a better understanding of a region that bedeviled them” (Filkins and Mazzetti 2010, par. 18). IMV had journalistic legitimacy and access as a result of the credibility of the executive leadership and reporter corps, but was used primarily for situational awareness and actionable intelligence.

¹⁴⁵The source of this information is active duty U.S. military and the series of conversations were conducted in 2013 and 2014.

intelligence gathering and analysis directly for the state, regardless of GNN type, as revealed in documents and the accompanying graphics in the Top Secret PRISM program¹⁴⁶ that was made public as part of the Edward Snowden data dump and later confirmed by the U.S. government.¹⁴⁷

The contemporary and ubiquitous nature of these corporate entities and their dynamically changing roles within the GNN firmament make it difficult to assess the import of the signals intelligence (SIGINT) that they are able to gather efficiently and nearly instantaneously versus the more traditional, labor-intensive, and individual-focused GNN in-the-field and on-the-ground reporting and analysis of human intelligence (HUMINT). Any future study in the geopolitics of GNNs could use this subset of GNN structures as a focus to explore the independence and interdependence as well as the supplemental and complementary roles that the evolving SIGINT GNN capacities bring to, elide with, or overwhelm in their interactions with the traditional and, in the West, as noted earlier in this work, devolving and diminishing GNN HUMINT capacities and resources. The increasingly important role that aggregators, portals, ISPs, and other providers play in the information gathering and delivery system makes them a larger and more integrated part of the GNN structures, in particular as they increasingly develop their capacities for data collection, original content development, and, due to their financial heft, greater corporate throw-weight.

In the course of this research, the author interviewed Thomas Fingar, currently a Stanford University professor of international studies, but who previously held a series of U.S. government positions including first deputy director of national intelligence for analysis and, concurrently, as chairman of the National Intelligence Council (2005-2008). His recognition of the shifting global GNN resources and increasing capacities, though, he argues, not credibility, of non-Western GNNs was, he believed, a worrisome phenomenon during his time working with the intelligence

¹⁴⁶*The Guardian*. 2013. "NSA Prism Program Slides," November 1, sec. US news.

<http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/nov/01/prism-slides-nsa-document>.

¹⁴⁷ Wyatt, Charlie Savage, Edward, and Peter Baker. 2013. "U.S. Confirms That It Gathers Online Data Overseas." *The New York Times*, June 6. <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/07/us/nsa-verizon-calls.html>.

community. During his tenure in government, he advocated for the establishment of formal reportorial roles, both within an official governmental context--via embassies and other official missions—and outside official missions, with support for underwritten assignments of external newsgathering sources. “I proposed this, without success, years ago as print media was cutting back the information it was gathering around the world,” said Fingar (personal communication, 2014). The goal was to increase the amount of human intelligence for the United States from overseas and to make up for contemporary diminishing open source inputs and capacities. Fingar confirmed that the journalistic approach was an effective one and worth state support, something for which he advocated. One of the proposals was the creation of a “reporting officer” within these missions to achieve a goal of 235 officers. The other was external to these missions to make resources available to have journalists around the world, with “no more obligation than to be a journalist” (Fingar 2014, personal communication).

3.5.2 GNN Formal Intelligence Gathering—International Non-Governmental Organizations

The formal intelligence gathering relationship with GNNs in their broadest sense, as referred to earlier in this study, includes not only journalistic newsgathering organizations, but also academia, nationally identifiable corporate entities, and, increasingly, non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The increased importance of NGOs in the newsgathering and international reporting world is widely noted within the journalism profession, in particular as some formerly traditional news organizations are changing their structures to move from market-based systems to non-profit organizations with more defined relationships to their funders than the broader-based, church-state, and more anonymous relationship previously kept with advertisers and subscribers. In the contemporary Western world of reporting and news dissemination, the NGO role (Nieman Journalism Lab 2009-2010) is becoming dominant in certain areas where non-breaking news, remote locations, humanitarian crises, political stalemates, chronic economic challenge, and

perceived lack of mass audience interest is substituted by and dominated within the field of NGO concerns.

Certainly, the perception and categorization of Western NGOs as state agents by the leaders and legislatures of Russia and China have circumscribed their activities and relationships to native civil society organizations and made suspect those who work in collaboration with foreign NGOs, labeling their collaborative work as foreign agent performance (Famularo 2015).¹⁴⁸ Any acknowledgement or proof of NGO and other formal GNN collaboration with the state and intelligence gathering is made with the understanding that such a nexus is affirming of a highly controversial and potentially damaging set of established and protected relationships.¹⁴⁹

Non-Western powers have acted to proscribe Western NGO activity regardless of validating data on this issue and have increased their pressure on NGO practices and programs. In Russia¹⁵⁰ and China,¹⁵¹ the operating assumption is that NGOs are operating as active subversive and intelligence gathering organizations.¹⁵²

The sudden and rapid rise of NGOs within the GNN framework is cause for concern¹⁵³ by many who submit that NGOs, like industry and journalists, need to retain their impartiality and

¹⁴⁸A recent speech in Australia by former White House National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley warned that Vladimir Putin is personally warning China's Xi Jinping that the U.S. and its Western allies are actively using GNNs to destabilize their respective countries. According to *The Diplomat*, Hadley said the Russian argument is "that the agents of this Western effort are civil society groups, NGOs, free media, and dissidents; that these 'agents of foreign influence' must be stamped out in both Russia and China." (Famularo 2015, par. 18).

¹⁴⁹ Specific NGO relationships and their manifest formal relations are, again, maintained confidential by the author with the academic understanding and the ethical respect for their on-going nature and any security pressures that may arise from their divulgence.

¹⁵⁰ Reuters. 2012. "Russia's Putin Signs NGO Foreign Agents Law." Reuters, July 21. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/21/us-russia-putin-ngos-idUSBRE86K05M20120721>.

¹⁵¹ Wan, William. 2015. "China Raids NGO Offices in Latest Sign of Crackdown on Dissent." *The Washington Post*, March 26. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/china-raids-ngo-offices-in-latest-sign-of-crackdown-on-dissent/2015/03/26/4badeaac-d3b0-11e4-ab77-9646eea6a4c7_story.html.

¹⁵² In 2014, after Russia's parliamentary elections and the protests that followed, "Putin.... pointedly said that some foreign powers attempted—through their 'foreign agents' in Russia—to use NGOs to disrupt the elections. Putin said that some 'opposition politicians are just like jackals and scavengers, obtaining funding from foreign embassies and consulates.' He stated that these anti-Russian people want to turn Russia into a destabilized problem country." (As reported in *The People's Daily*) (Famularo 2015, par. 8)

¹⁵³ Journalism's growing reliance on NGOs in Africa, for example, is creating a false picture of the state of the continent say critics of NGOs undue influence on foreign correspondents. The NGO role in journalism is lamented because "[e]ven with shrinking resources, journalists can do better than this. For a start, they can stop depending so heavily, and uncritically, on aid organizations for statistics, subjects, stories, and sources" (Rothmeyer 2011, par. 24).

independence from governments (DeMars 2001).¹⁵⁴ However, NGOs are in certain specific Western instances (and nearly all non-Western cases) directly engaged with and formally related to state operations, many of which are intelligence gathering in both its narrow and broadest sense.

Unique data acquired for this study drew a line of direct engagement between NGOs and the state, further reinforcing the contention that GNNs and their institutional structures work to enhance and extend state power. In three separate explored cases, the direct involvement has led to direct access to some of the highest levels of Western governments, with one documented case in this study in which the NGO had a direct line to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz and the NGO involvement in an Iraq post-invasion reconstruction partnership effort of which the State Department was unaware and excluded. The Western NGO representatives in this study who worked with international organizations also made it a point to emphasize that such relationships, while extant, are the exception rather than the rule and that the majority of NGO activities have no formal relationship with the state other than providing public, open source reports or private reports to funders, some of whom are state agencies.

The abundance of empirical data regarding GNNs and their formal relationship to the state is but one aspect of the interaction and interdependence of these institutions. Beyond the institutional relationships, there are also individuals who operate outside their formal roles within a GNN context, a recognized feature of these journalistic, academic, aid working, civil society promoting, industrial and trade professions where successful intelligence gathering agents operate under non-official cover (NOC) and where the individual is neither suspected nor forthcoming about his or her official acts. The better the NOC, the less likely the public is to know of the actors' behavior and activities (Plame-Wilson 2015, personal communication). The following section reviews briefly the accessible research and previously gathered empirical data of this activity. This

¹⁵⁴ The questions that arise in this article by DeMars concerning intelligence and any formal relationship between state and NGO are two-fold: "Both NGOs and intelligence agencies face (1) transparency questions of what information to make public, share discreetly, or conceal; and (2) operational questions of how they influence the policies of governments and warriors." (DeMars 2001, 193).

study has had access to some of these individuals who have performed this act in the past; while others currently engaged in this activity can only be identified as potential NOCs, with some of these suspicions held by more than one other of this study's interview subjects, but about whom there can be no confirmation.

3.6 GNN Personnel: Formal Intelligence Gathering

Individuals working within all three types of institutional GNNs participate in formal state intelligence gathering operations for any number of personal reasons and drawing on the panoply of human motivations that range from parsimony to patriotism, liquidity to love, revenge to redemption. Their relationship to GNN institutions makes their work possible, their access available, and their impact greater. The GNN not only is a force multiplier of their work and activity for the state, it is the means by which their intelligence gathering product credibly manifests itself. The history of this individual activity is long and the availability of narratives a testament that even a surreptitious activity cannot always be kept a secret and that human beings just want to share (Nicholson 1998).¹⁵⁵

Individuals who were not always driven by the need to be transparent about their activities, however, can also have their secrets shared in multiple, sometimes unintended, ways: the power of subpoena, the declassification of documents, the dissolution of a state, stolen data, stupidity. All those acts have led to individuals' activities being found out over time and, as a result, being further documented. The surprising part of the discovery is how prominent and public some of these previously intelligence-gathering participants have been.

In the 20th century, individuals like the author and journalist George Orwell freely participated in intelligence activity for the British while working for an institutional GNN. The activist, journalist, and political feminist Gloria Steinem worked for the American CIA in the late

¹⁵⁵ As Nicholson (1998, 135) puts it in his introduction, "according to evolutionary psychology, people today still seek those traits that made survival possible then: an instinct to fight furiously when threatened, for instance, and a drive to trade information and share secrets."

1950s and 1960s (M. Kounalakis 2015b), openly telling *The Washington Post* in 2008 that in her experience the agency “was completely different from its image: it was liberal, nonviolent and honorable.”¹⁵⁶ Her involvement and access was granted only because of her direct relationship first to an NGO and, second, to a larger, national GNN news organization.

Radio Sweden was employer to this author in the early 1980s and also host to one of the more active CIA employees just prior to this author’s arrival: Austin Goodrich. Goodrich was an active journalist who, once his identity was revealed during the Church Commission report, went into retirement and wrote the book *Born to Spy: Recollections of a CIA Case Officer* (2004). Goodrich recognized the unique character of journalism as a cover and, later, shared the most important aspect of the role with his wife, Mona Goodrich: “What I remember him saying is that it was a great cover because it allowed you into places that normally you might not be able to get into.”¹⁵⁷ Radio Sweden was the GNN that gave him access to all those places Goodrich sought to enter.

Intelligence gathering operations in nearly every country that fields an intelligence establishment reaches into GNNs to find willing individual participants who are ready to engage formally. Israelis have a long tradition of using journalists as NOCs and creating journalism cover for NOCs (“The Spy Cables” 2015), with Israel actively creating fake journalist credentials for its Mossad agents (Melman 2010).¹⁵⁸ The direct action of a NOC can often bring a fake journalist or other GNN personnel close to a subject for which there is more than a mere intelligence goal. Sometimes the NOC has used the access accorded to him or her as a ruse for something more pernicious, as in the case of General Ahmad Shah Massoud, an anti-Taliban Afghan leader and

¹⁵⁶ Kazin, Michael. 2008. “Dancing to the CIA’s Tune.” *The Washington Post*, January 27, sec. Arts & Living. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/24/AR2008012402369.html>.

¹⁵⁷ Gores, Paul. 2013. “Goodrich Was Undercover CIA Agent.” June 22. <http://www.jsonline.com/news/obituaries/goodrich-combined-journalism-with-undercover-service-b9939614z1-212639361.html>.

¹⁵⁸ In this Haaretz article, the Danish-Israeli journalist Herbert Pundik explained his work for Mossad: “I traveled all over Africa under the cover of [being] a journalist,” said Pundik. “In general, where is the boundary between espionage and journalism? For example, I wrote a detailed analysis of the tribes in Somalia and their attitude toward political parties, I investigated the political situation in northern Nigeria. These were things that the newspaper was also interested in” (Melman 2010, par. 5).

anti-Soviet occupation war hero who was assassinated by a fake journalist and his suicide bomber camera team on September 9, 2001.¹⁵⁹

Archaeologists (Harris and Sadler 2003) and anthropologists (Moos et al. 2005), businessmen¹⁶⁰ and bankers,¹⁶¹ one can run the alphabet of professions and personnel who perform intelligence gathering functions and participate in an even more expansive GNN framework. For this study, however, the institutions and their personnel who fall firmly within contemporary GNNs, due to their longstanding and documented participation and performance in GNNs hard power attributes, remain journalists, NGOs, and academics. While those other professions that would make up a broader GNN understanding can be appropriate in a future study, the areas and scope of this study remain focused on the professions that are being proscribed by the non-Western, more closed societies that are contemporaneously increasing and expanding their professional GNN engagement in other countries: primarily in journalism, academia, and the NGO world.

The following chart is of ideal types within the GNN framework examined in this chapter who are engaged in the Intelligence Gathering function; characterizing the participants, individual or institutional, against the formal and informal means by which they engage.

¹⁵⁹ Harding, Thomas. 2001. "Blast Survivor Tells of Massoud Assassination," October 25. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/1360632/Blast-survivor-tells-of-Massoud-assassination.html>.

¹⁶⁰ Williams, Carol J. 1996. "Russian Security Service Expels U.S. Businessman as Spy." Los Angeles Times, May 13. http://articles.latimes.com/1996-05-13/news/mn-3658_1_russian-federal-security-service.

¹⁶¹ Matthews, Christopher M., and Nicole Hong. 2015. "U.S. Charges Russian Banker in Spy Case." Wall Street Journal, January 26, sec. US. <http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-accuses-three-of-spying-for-russia-1422303712>.

GNN Personnel	Informal	Formal
	Press Corps at large, Anonymous & Confidential Sources	Goodrich, Orwell, Steinem
Institutional	The New York Times, CNN, FAZ, BBC World Service	Xinhua, CCTV, RT, RFE/RL, BBC World Service

Table 8: Intelligence gathering ideal types

Table 8 is a framework of GNN ideal types engaged in intelligence gathering with individuals and institutions in this work identified within their category. The overlap of some individuals who are in both formal and informal categories is not represented in this chart.

The table above presents the ideal types of GNN intelligence gathering individuals and institutions and their formal or informal relationships to the state. This study has conducted interviews and found data to support the breakdown of the various types. In the first cell, where an informal relationship is paired with GNN individuals, this study has found that the press corps at large engages and participates at this level. Study participants who corroborated this understanding of the role of the press or who have participated individually on an informal basis with the state requested anonymity, worried that their activity would blemish their career and credibility as news professionals. The individuals who have been discovered to have a formal intelligence gathering role but who also worked professionally as news reporters, writers or media professionals are in the second cell. The third cell is comprised of institutions; organizations that were found to have an informal relationship with the state are multiple and dominated by Western GNNs, whereas the formal relationships to the state, where state and news institution are, in fact

and in practice, one and the same, are dominated by non-Western GNNs, though not exclusively so.

3.7 GNN Institutional: Informal Intelligence Gathering

Intelligence analysts (be they in the intelligence, diplomatic, military, legislative, or administrative state structures) routinely use, and often rely solely upon, news reports to inform their policy formation and policy-making (Gendron 2005). Beyond priming and framing of the gathered and disseminated publicly presented news and information, the informal institutional intelligence gathering function evolves and develops as a result of institutions' relationships with power elites. On the one hand, the data collection that is made public via publication or broadcast is often a first look at breaking stories, with a first look at framing,¹⁶² but on the other hand, the informal relationships allow for an ongoing dialogue with a GNN's leadership and personnel.¹⁶³

Editorial board meetings are one way that this dialogue is conducted at the institutional level, but they continue at ministerial interaction and with the sharing of information at a senior most level with corporate executives. These C-suite or publisher-level conclaves between states and GNNs allow for an informal sharing of strategies and a reaffirmation of shared values and goals. Some of the GNN protocols also give a leading advantage on intelligence via tipping; a GNN will usually contact a political entity to request input on a story, either for confirmation of fact or to make sure there are no national security issues with the release of the information. While not a pre-publication censorship process per se, the conventional practice has led, in numerous instances, to the equivalent of a de facto pre-publication withholding of information (Farhi 2005).¹⁶⁴

¹⁶² It is typical for political leaders and policymakers to keep a television screen tuned to a news source such as CNN on and running in the background for breaking items that would not necessarily reach them otherwise or in as timely a fashion.

¹⁶³ Google, while part of the formal institutional intelligence gathering state operation, also has an informal role to play, as do other GNNs. A manifestation of that informal relationship is the open door afforded its executives at the White House, as revealed by The Wall Street Journal, "Since Mr. Obama took office, employees of the Mountain View, Calif., company have visited the White House for meetings with senior officials about 230 times, or an average of roughly once a week, according to the visitor logs reviewed by the Journal" (Mullins 2015, par. 4).

¹⁶⁴ When the NSA was engaged in Bush Administration-authorized surveillance, The New York Times agreed with the intelligence services to defer publication of the story." The Times said it agreed to remove information that

The cases during which a news organization and GNN institution has withheld information from the public at large at the informal request of state authorities are significant, but it is worth noting that the requests do not have the force of law in many Western societies (Kimball 2013),¹⁶⁵ with cooperation being proffered voluntarily, if not always happily. At the same time, as explored in the introductory chapter table of GNNs, non-Western GNNs institutionally have a direct and formal state relationship in nearly every case, making any informal institutional relationship superfluous. The same is true of Western Type III state sponsored GNNs, with the exception that there is a greater tradition of dissent, whistleblowing, and a long legal precedent of challenges towards pre-publication censorship.

3.7.1 Open Source Intelligence

Beyond the process by which informal national cultural, social, political, and economic shared interests between GNNs and the state feed a state's intelligence gathering needs are the informal means by which the work product of journalists, and GNNs in general, serves an intelligence gathering purpose. This is generally referred to as "Open Source" intelligence (OSINT). It is the dominant method of intelligence gathering, as "most of the information referred to as "intelligence" is obtained from open sources, but some of it is derived from secret intelligence; that is, actionable intelligence obtained by covert means, through collection rather than operations" (Gendron 2014, 398). Analysts consume public news reports, white papers, situation analyses, field studies, and other media productions, regardless of whether that material was intended for their

administration officials said could be "useful" to terrorists and delayed publication for a year "to conduct additional reporting." (Farhi 2005, par. 3). The case of James Risen and his eventual publication of this data consequently led to a legal action against the reporter and his source, not only freezing his journalistic actions and sources, but having a "chilling effect" on other journalists, leakers and whistleblowers. His case was recently resolved and, after a seven-year legal fight, he was not ultimately required to testify before a court.

¹⁶⁵ A notable difference from American first amendment protections in the West is a system of pre-publication censorship in many other Western allied nations, first and foremost in the United Kingdom. In the case involving Edward Snowden and the release of secret information, the authorities acted directly to destroy the data: "After the Guardian published a series of articles revealing British-complicity in US-led mass telecommunications surveillance, Downing Street began to turn up the heat on the London-based newspaper, forcing its editor, Alan Rusbridger, to destroy computer hard drives under the threat of legal action." (Kimball 2013, par. 2).

private consumption. One key function of any embassy is the compiling of news clippings in the host nation for the benefit of leaders in the mission's home country. Intelligence agency reading of newspapers, for example, is an expected, understood, and conventional approach to conducting intelligence gathering (Mansfield 2010) and analyses formulation.

This dissertation raises the issue of the effects of a diminishing Western presence, resources, and capacities in the informal collection and dissemination of these informed and distributed reports.

3.8 GNN Personnel: Informal Intelligence Gathering

Institutions maintain informal high-level state relationships, but GNN personnel and individuals, too, perform the unwitting intelligence gathering function in an informal fashion. Whether *The Los Angeles Times's* correspondent Carol Williams reporting on the rape of women in Bosnia (Williams 1992) or BBC and other GNN photojournalists documenting the starvation of children in Sudan (MacLeod 2001) or Somalia, such coverage affects the decisions of governments to get involved and engage the policy-making apparatus directly—regardless of the CNN Effect's otherwise impotency in the strategic policymaking process, what is at times referred to as “the myth of news, foreign policy and intervention” (Robinson 2002).

The data that is collected on the ground by reporters informs the process to a high degree, often because that ground level data would not be available otherwise, and can provide an impetus in policy decision making where there is otherwise policy ambiguity. The detailed data received by policymakers, and which may not be publicly distributed, is supplemental and additional and can be critical in decision-making, not because of any wider public effect or pressure, but because the data is unique, confirmable, and otherwise unavailable. Embassy officials or intelligence operatives are often shut out of grassroots-level investigation, for reasons concerning personal and situational security, surveillance realities, and official restrictions of movement. Journalists, however, have a much greater freedom of movement than officialdom and that freedom often translates into a

broader spectrum of inputs that create a final reporting and analysis product (Dover and Goodman 2009).¹⁶⁶

That was certainly the case in the Gulf conflicts when eyewitnesses and reporters came back with information that then directly informed intelligence analysis leading to policy decisions. Such details can go all the way to the President's Daily Brief (PDB), which is described by the journalist, Bob Woodward, as "the TOP SECRET/CODEWORD digest of the most important and sensitive intelligence" (Woodward 2002, 39).

Of course, this is simply what journalists do in the routine course of their work. There is nothing that can be construed as a conscious or unconscious act of intelligence gathering—other than for the public at large. It is not intended to serve an exclusively narrower audience. The published or broadcast work, however, is a key part of daily intelligence analysis and incorporated in the daily work of intelligence gathering analysts' routine. The dominance of Western GNNs in the 20th century also has meant that the facts, insights, analyses, and figures presented in their reports have been dominated by a Western approach both to fact-finding and implication, with a focus on Western popular audiences, shared value systems, news relevance, topicality, political sensitivity, elite impact, and popular appeal.

Former U.S. Secretary of State George P. Schultz gives some insight into how this system works. Schultz said he relied on the travelling press, and in particular the reporters from *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* who accompanied his overseas entourage, and were "extremely helpful" in order to supplement and round out his understanding of foreign situations, political personalities, and popular societal and economic pressures. Such informal collaboration or coordination at the highest levels has rarely been corroborated (Schultz 2014, personal

¹⁶⁶ A part of Dover and Goodman's anthologized volume describes the CIA reliance on open source intelligence garnered from public media sources as, for example, in the analysis and policy formulation regarding Libya's nuclear program.

communication).¹⁶⁷ In a personal interview with 94-year old Secretary Schultz, he said that he “relied” on information that he would “otherwise not have.”

While the direct admission of the informal relationship with individuals is rare, the Wikileaks cables that were released by Julian Assange and his organization were revelatory and reinforcing of the role played by both GNN institutions and individuals in both formal and informal diplomacy and intelligence gathering (Chatriwala 2011).¹⁶⁸ Aside from the substantial data and insight garnered in the Wikileaks cables, showing the extensive informal relationships and contacts between journalists and state officials, in some cases the information lead to dangerous personal and professional repercussions for journalists who were seen as collaborators with foreign governments (Associated Press 2011).¹⁶⁹

Wikileaks as a website and as a distributed organization relied on GNNs for the distribution of the previously classified materials it received. Whether Wikileaks acted on behalf of or in spite of a state is not currently known and the responsible party is in a diplomatic form of exile. Regardless of any relationship to a state, Wikileaks was leveraged by states both to distribute misinformation as well as embarrassing data. The question of whether Wikileaks is or becomes some sort of stateless GNN, with no national affiliation or headquarters, is an open one, but there certainly exists the potential for GNNs to evolve out of their current three national typologies and be all or none of the three given the ethereal, non-national nature of cyberspace.

Westerners are prominently featured in Ulfkotte’s book, *Gekaufte Journalisten* (2014), a volume that reveals names of individuals who informally cozy up to state officials and enjoy

¹⁶⁷ George P. Schultz is a former U.S. Secretary of State during the Reagan Administration and currently the Thomas W. and Susan B. Ford Distinguished Fellow at the Hoover Institution.

¹⁶⁸ This article details some of the Wikileaks cables regarding Al Jazeera and states: “There have been longstanding accusations that Al Jazeera serves as an arm of its host nation’s foreign policy, and earlier leaked documents referred to the news organization as ‘one of Qatar’s most valuable political and diplomatic tools,’ which could be used as ‘a bargaining tool to repair relationships with other countries’” (Chatriwala 2011, par. 3).

¹⁶⁹ In this case, the cables reference a cooperative opposition journalist who had shared information about a source: “The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) said reporter Argaw Ashine fled at the weekend after being interrogated over the identity of a government source mentioned in a leaked 2009 US cable. Argaw was the local correspondent for Kenya’s Nation Media Group” (Associated Press 2011, par. 5).

perquisites of international travel, access, conferencing, research, and publishing opportunities by dint of their close, but informal, ideological orientations and intelligence sharing habits. The former U.S. NOC, Valerie Plame Wilson expressed deep curiosity as to why Ulfkotte went public with this book—questioning his motivation for opening up, naming names, and identifying those who are working either directly and formally as NOCs, as well as those who are performing intelligence gathering and sharing unwittingly and informally (Wilson 2015, personal communication).¹⁷⁰

Out of the notebook that a reporter carries from which, on average, she or he uses only five to ten percent for a story, there is usually 50 to 90 percent remainder of useful intelligence in the form of names, quotes, contacts, information that stays in the notebook until it is shared informally, perhaps at an embassy cocktail party or lunch or at a prearranged meeting with an official or unbeknownst NOC, where the goal is the engaging and trading of information or idea exchange.¹⁷¹

One journalist, to whom this author had unique and open access, was frequently engaged in the informal sharing of information with Western embassies and state officials, both during and after the Cold War, primarily in Central Europe when original reporting by Western GNNs and individuals was limited, but social and political barriers and controls on Western reporters were rapidly diminishing. In at least three specific cases, the journalist shared information with the U.S. Embassy, and other Western diplomatic officials, that did not ultimately make it into his reporting. The information sharing was done informally, without expectation for remuneration and without agreement, but as a result of a typical and accepted journalistic practice of attempting to engage in information trading, data confirmation, individual identification, credibility checking, and a search for new leads (personal communication, 2015). While the admission of this action is exclusive to

¹⁷⁰ This personal communication with Valerie Plame was during an informal conversation and not an organized or planned interview with the celebrity subject.

¹⁷¹ The high percentage of data, contacts, and analysis that remains unpublished in a reporter's notebook is an estimate based on interviews with foreign correspondents and the personal experiences of this author.

this dissertation, the practice is a much more broadly enacted and acceptable one, albeit usually undisclosed publicly. The journalist's experiences have been corroborated by other journalists interviewed in this study, with one further example of an individual, Peter Laufer, willing to go on the record in this section of this study (see below).

This key anonymous journalist recounted in deep detail, and with previously unpublished and undisclosed evidence, his informal intelligence gathering, information sharing, and state interactions. Details regarding his news organization, currently living individuals with whom he engaged and interacted, and other identifying traits or characteristics are withheld. No details have been changed nor are there any composite characters or details presented.

As explained by this journalist, in 1990, while he was a news reporter and running the Prague bureau of a prominent institutional news organization, he was a frequent guest of U.S. Ambassador Shirley Temple Black at the Petschek Villa, her official residence. He always felt welcome and she always made it a point to introduce him around as he was one of the few American correspondents living in Prague immediately after the Velvet Revolution. One of the individuals he became acquainted with was the United States Embassy mission's defense attaché.

In the course of his reporting in Eastern Europe, prior to moving to the Soviet Union, this journalist came across three different stories, at three different times during his tenure, that he shared with either the attaché or, in some cases, the ambassadors of other Western nations. In each case, he was trying to get either a confirmation or a lead to advance his story "as well as to let embassy officials know about a suspicious or dangerous threat to individuals or national security" (personal communication, 2015). He and others engaged in this activity in the course of their work report that this is a professional tactic of information barter.

One story this journalist was pursuing was about the explosive plastique, Semtex, made in the Czechoslovak town of Semtin. His interest in this particular explosive was that it was the material suspected to have been used in the blowing up of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, England. His reporting took him to trace Palestinian training camps located near the town of Semtin,

attending a meeting and press availability—and having a testy confrontation—with Palestine Liberation Organization Leader Yasir Arafat, interviewing an individual who worked at the Semtex facility, and, most importantly “coming across a shadowy figure who gave me photographs of Semtex testing on the fuselages of aircraft located outside of Prague” (personal communication, 2015). Whether those photographs were of tests to check weak points on a fuselage or simply used to destroy and sectionalize used aircraft was never ascertainable, but the photographs [included below] were clearly important, required technical interpretation, and could potentially be evidentiary documents in the Pan Am case. “My journalistic instincts lead me both to a non-American, but Western embassy to ask general questions about the issue and also directly to the American defense attaché to show him the photos” (personal communication 2015). At that meeting, he shared a lead and discussed the potential involvement of the Russian “Spetsnaz” forces—an umbrella term for “special forces” that he had not previously known—and some discussion regarding the Palestinian presence in pre-Velvet Revolution Czechoslovakia.



Picture 1: Semtex testing on the fuselage of an aircraft (original document from anonymous journalist)

In the process, the journalist said that the attaché was also open to sharing technical details and his professional insights. He continued to say that in the course of the discussion with the attaché, this professional news correspondent

also revealed to him that I had discovered that a few diplomatic license plates from American embassy vehicles had been stolen. Not both front and back license plates, but only one of the two plates on a car, albeit on more than one car. I was later told that Ambassador Black had altered her plans to attend an event celebrating the American soldiers' liberation of the western Czech town of Pilsen; my source informing me that the missing license plates may have been part of a plot to crash the event without being stopped at a checkpoint by virtue of the diplomatic plates that allow for free and unhindered passage. The source further claimed that the plates were possibly set to go into a car loaded with Semtex explosives and were to attack the embassy event (personal communication with unnamed journalist, 2015)

What this means is that the information gathered by this journalist and shared by him with U.S. officials might have prevented an attack on U.S. Ambassador Shirley Temple Black. This is a clear case of a GNN intelligence gathering function potentially preventing a terrorist attack.

In neither of these cases was the information disclosed publicly until this point and in this study. In the former case of the Semtex and the photographs, the large institutional news organization the journalist worked for kept him pursuing the story after a reasonable amount of time had passed, but the level of speculation and the security implications had a higher threshold for publication than usual. What the embassy did with the information is only subject to speculation. That an informal intelligence gathering relationship existed, however, is not speculative in the least. Whether sharing information over cocktails at an embassy reception or casually talking about contacts and sources at the U.S. Embassy Marine bar in the embassy building basement, the “Dobry Den”, the correspondent affirmed that “information that never made it out of my notebook and into my public reporting was regularly and informally shared with state officials” (personal communication, 2015). This experience is a common. Multiple interviews with other correspondents and editors confirm that the practice of informal information sharing and “notebook dumps” is both usual and customary and that works both ways in the pursuit of information and source exchange.

A final instance of investigative reporting that led to intelligence sharing also had to do with highly sensitive documents the key journalist interviewed for this study received and that had a significant potential security threat. In this case, he was privy to a document [included below] that had formulations for a weaponized material known as Red Mercury and rumored to be important in the manufacture of nuclear weaponry. Red Mercury was reported in the international press and a supposed black market for the material was emerging, though its composition and import was unclear. Again, the journalist shared this document with a number of individuals in Western embassies and, in one case, he was tipped off that the material in question may be a hoax and was developed to flush out less sophisticated individuals who were operating in the underground gun running trade. “The official source had always seemed honest and credible to me, so I continued to pursue the story, a few sources, and a specific lead who was trying to purchase Red Mercury, but maintained a wariness about the material and the shadowy forces seeking it”¹⁷² (personal communication, 2015). The story never ran publicly and is presented for the first time in this study.

¹⁷² It is still unclear whether Red Mercury was a hoax. “If the intention of the Russian and Western intelligence services was to concoct a disinformation campaign designed to entrap terrorist cells trading in the black market for nuclear arms and materials, then they could not have done a better job of placing the stories than in those prestigious professional and media journals and outlets” (Farrell 2009, 142)

Approt : 0.794
 Flash NY 19
 Gross weight 35.23 kg / flask
 Net weight 30.23 kg / flask
 Form liquid
 Colour cherry red
 Density 20.20
 Purity 99.99
 Isotopic Temper 160.87
 Radio Element halo: SF 6 & 100.794
 React K 0.00016
 React ABS.TB 0.062
 React VOSA 0.30 - 0.29
 LITS 1.024
 Gemma FS 0.439
 React P 9.00 - 800
 Melting Point 160.024 f 2e
 Productions 1990
 Peter Queckelber

or: NY 22
 or: 39.50 kg / flask
 or: 34.50 kg / flask
 or: Burgundy red
 or: 0.00015
 or: 0.490

Picture 2: Red Mercury formula (original document from anonymous journalist)

One journalist who also engaged on an informal basis, recalled the process and unconsummated cooperation in intelligence gathering. NBC Radio journalist Peter Laufer recounted a visit he and a colleague made to the U.S. Consulate in Peshawar, Pakistan during the Soviet war in Afghanistan in 1981 (Laufer 2015, personal communication). He was on a reporting trip to the border region between Pakistan and Afghanistan and needed to stop at the consulate in order to take care of some personal citizen service business, specifically to have some documents authenticated and notarized for a home purchase and sale back in California.

In the course of his visit, he was invited to stay and join the Consul General for a meal; a great opportunity for him to get a background briefing on the situation from the American government perspective.

After a course or two of dinner and dessert, during the post-prandial tea, the topic of discussion had come to his planned reporting in the rebel areas and the U.S. government official did not mince words about some intelligence sought by America: Did the Soviets use the theretofore anecdotally confirmed plastique anti-personnel mines?¹⁷³

The U.S. government official told him that they had no hard evidence to date on these types of mines and was imploring Laufer to try to find and bring back such evidence. Photos, material, markings, or anything that would allow the United States finally to confirm materially the existence of these devices and press their case against the Soviets both in international bodies and back home.

Ultimately, Laufer found no evidence during the course of his reporting trip, but years later, upon reflection, he questioned whether he would have delivered such evidence if he did, in fact, come across it. He asked rhetorically: “Would I have passed along data that proved that a bunch of bad guys were maiming kids? That an offensive system and state should answer to its crimes?” (Laufer 2015, personal communication). Laufer found it difficult to admit he would pass along information to state officials, but he indicated non-verbally that he might have.

The practice of informal individual engagement in state intelligence gathering has more formal manifestations in non-Western GNNs, but the informal individual relations for Western GNNs sometimes take on a near indistinguishable characteristic to those with formal state ties. During this author’s tenure as the NBC-Mutual Radio news correspondent in Moscow, U.S.S.R., ex-pat American reporters enjoyed the privilege of using the U.S. Embassy cafeteria, a regular

¹⁷³ These mines were popularly referred to as butterfly mines because they were dropped by Soviet helicopters and fluttered to the ground where their bright colors and toy shape were meant to appeal to children, unaware that they would lose a limb or worse by playing with this dangerous device. (Personal interviews and observations, Afghanistan, December 1991)

venue for the press corps in a city where American food and hamburgers were few and far between. Reporters were given special identification badges and were allowed to be members of the embassy community for a small fee that included privileges at the gymnasium, swimming pool, and workout room, check cashing privileges (unavailable in the Moscow banks), a large lending and sharing library of English books (unavailable in the local marketplace), and the cafeteria that often served as American journalists' meeting place and hangout at lunchtime and where it was common to see the U.S. Ambassador having a quick bite as it was to run into the Political Officer or Station Chief (though it was not always apparent who that was). Invariably, the tables were a mix of journalists and embassy personnel and conversations would regularly be focused on situational analyses, sources, and stories. As Terry Philips put it, he could casually mention to a staff member, "Oh I've just been in Afghanistan," and that such a comment would provoke a friendly, informal conversation; "after all, you've just had this intense experience and you would love to talk about it. So, it happens that your interlocutor is a political officer who thoroughly mines your thoughts and feelings about that country as well as your observations along the way in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan." (Phillips 2015, personal communication).¹⁷⁴

This chapter has reviewed and analyzed the multiple processes in which state intelligence gathering relies on both formal and informal GNN relations at both the institutional and individual level. This section focused on Western GNNs' practices, given their historical dominance of the field in the 20th century, the relative transparency of their institutions, the public record of their activities and impact within these relatively diminishing Western institutions. This study relied on the strong desire of individuals who worked or work within these institutions to share insights and heretofore hidden data as well as the insights of individuals who have relied on the work product of Western GNNs.

What is clear is that in multiple instances, in multiple ways, and for a variety of reasons, GNNs provide an intelligence capacity to the state that is non-trivial and, at times, critical. This

¹⁷⁴ Terry Philips was CBS Radio correspondent in Moscow (1991-1994).

hard power intelligence capacity has been the near exclusive purview of Western GNNs by dint of their near monopoly in the last century. Those state power enhancing capacities are still available, though at a much diminished level, in the West. Further, those Western capacities are diminished due to the rapid rise and relative strength of the newly formed and forming Type III non-Western GNNs and their structural central operating rationale aimed at directly leveraging GNNs' both inherent and potential diplomatic and intelligence gathering functions.

The following sections will review the practices of non-Western GNNs in both diplomacy and intelligence gathering.

CHAPTER 4 – NON-WESTERN GNNs: DIPLOMACY & INTELLIGENCE GATHERING

The previous two chapters established and the research concluded that Western, non-state GNNs perform the hard power functions of diplomacy and intelligence gathering, both formally and informally. Further, these GNN performances, while not central to their professional *raison d'être* and in direct contravention to their professional ethical codes and standards when performed formally, are nonetheless critical to supplementing a diplomatic and intelligence gathering system that has developed a state reliance on, and a performative state indispensability for, these GNN practices and products that have evolved and are presented in this study.

The dominance of informality in the Western GNNs' systematic performance contrasts highly to the nearly exclusive formal quality of the non-Western Type III GNN systems, where diplomacy and intelligence gathering are not an ancillary, peripheral, or epiphenomenal aspect of their performance but, rather, are central to it.

This chapter on non-Western GNNs investigates the varied aspects of these performances and does so by examining the practices dominant in the Russian and Chinese cases. Both China and Russia are currently expanding their GNN structures, adding financial resources, personnel, bureaus, and legitimizing distribution structures to their publicly expressed and state leadership-desired growth strategies and trajectories. This, too, stands in stark contrast to the media ecology once dominated by Western GNNs and now characterized by their rapid demise and, in certain cases (e.g., the newspaper industry) near collapse.

As noted earlier, Type I GNN structures are under enormous pressure and the question is not only how they will continue to serve the state with an adequate amount of OSINT and diplomatic performance, but how they will survive at all. "For twenty years, intelligent people at the papers have been hoping and praying for 'a new business model.' It has not arrived. Very likely it's not hovering in the wings...The destruction or self-destruction of high-profit journalism is guaranteed" (Gitlin 2013, par. 14).

Despite the increasing importance of non-traditional journalistic GNN institutions to fill some of the emerging information vacuum—whether NGOs or academics—the traditional reliance on these firmly established and socialized news organizations is another diminished hard power capacity for the West. As one former U.S. undersecretary of state put it bluntly: “This is frightening” (personal communication 2016).

Loss of relative hard power, however, means that others are gaining or growing relative GNN intelligence gathering and diplomatic capacities. The non-West, in particular the Russians and the Chinese are fervently working to develop and deploy these capacities in the early 21st century. Most of the publicly expressed Western official criticism of these GNNs is aimed at their attempts to propagandize and reach a foreign public’s hearts and minds, with a critical emphasis on GNNs’ soft power effects. Victoria Nuland, the senior American diplomat responsible for Europe and Russia, spoke out and derided Russian efforts at influencing foreign public opinion, saying, “All you have to do is look at RT’s tiny, tiny audience in the United States to understand what happens when you broadcast untruths in a media space that is full of dynamic, truthful opinion” (Hudson 2015, par. 3).¹⁷⁵ Privately, however, members of both the Western diplomatic corps and intelligence communities recognize the ostensible soft power GNN tools as expressions of state power. As one former German politician with insight and experience dealing with Russia put it, “Putin’s a former KGB guy. He’ll use whatever he’s got to get what he needs,” (personal communication and author translation, 2015). He continued to say that the Russians see the GNNs as another tool in their “hybrid warfare” strategies.

The media component of “hybrid warfare” is mostly defined as a soft power resource, with a general emphasis of its goals in psychological operations during conflict and strategically to sow doubt in a global audience about Western governing institutions and GNNs. One article published

¹⁷⁵ Nuland was speaking at the Brookings Institution on the Ukrainian conflict and RT efforts to change the dialogue and counter the narrative of Russian military involvement. When asked by a reporter if RT should be banned in the United States, she responded by saying, “We believe in freedom of speech, freedom of media in this country” (Hudson 2015, par. 4).

as the Kennan Institute's "Kennan Cable" on Russia's hybrid warfare tried to allay the fear that Russia's GNNs' reach and effectiveness was limited to its own sphere of influence, writing "Some fear that because information warfare is part of Russia's operations against Ukraine, other places where Russia's broadcasting and messaging can be felt may be future targets for 'hybrid war' operations" (Kofman and Rojansky 2015, 5). While many argue they fear Russia's plans for hybrid warfare and its GNN component¹⁷⁶, this more sanguine report went on to say that those fears are misplaced and that "there is a vast gulf between Russia's global broadcasting and public diplomacy goals and its operational goals" (5).

Whether the publicly perceived non-Western GNN public diplomacy goals or the privately shared understanding of those GNNs' hard power capacities, the one thing that is understood across the board is the expansion and development of the scalable infrastructure and systems to attempt making manifest either or both soft and hard power ambitions. For RT of Russia, this includes the building of new broadcast facilities or the development of new broadcast, social media, or streamed productions, as Andrey Bukashkin, chief director, RT, described it in a satellite broadcast industry interview. "We have also been quick to embrace new platforms, in particularly social media. RT was the first Russian TV channel to create a YouTube channel back in 2007. Today we are the first TV news channel ever, worldwide, to cross the billion-views mark on the platform. We've created an award-winning Facebook app; we're constantly engaged with our audience through" (Holmes 2013, par. 4).

RT is also expending the financial resources to upgrade and expand its presence and its productions. While official figures are hard to come by, Ioffe (2010, par. 22) wrote, "The channel's

¹⁷⁶ The Kennan Institute is not uniform in its opinion on Russian hybrid war and the role of GNNs. Maxim Trudolyubov, the editor at large at business newspaper *Vedomosti*, also writes The Russia File blog for the Kennan Institute. In a *New York Times* opinion piece, he states: "It is not by crude force alone that Russia twists events to its advantage. By using its total control over the Russian news media to sow confusion in the West, Mr. Putin has managed, in the words of the journalists Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss, to 'weaponize' information. In a report published in late 2014 by the New York-based Institute of Modern Russia, they outlined how the Kremlin manipulates the media, ethnic tensions and trade and financial transactions abroad to further its own ends" (Trudolyubov 2016, par. 3).

budget was just \$30 million the first year, but it grew in subsequent years before taking a hit during the global economic crisis that began in 2008. RT officials won't provide specifics on the current budget, but the Kremlin has announced that it intends to spend \$1.4 billion this year on international propaganda.”

China's newest GNN institution, CCTV, has also received an enormous injection of cash, estimated by Nye to be “\$8.9 billion in ‘external publicity work,’ much of it focused on the new 24-hour news operations (qtd. in A. Nelson 2013, 17). However, Nelson adds, “[t]his figure is hard to confirm, and appears to include the costs of hundreds of international Confucius Institutes as well as media operations” (17). To put this into perspective, the total for American Type III GNNs run by the Broadcast Board of Governors is \$752 million in 2016 (Broadcasting Board of Governors 2016).¹⁷⁷ In each of these cases, there is little to no revenue generated by either Western or non-Western Type III GNNs. The differential in the amount spent by the non-West for its GNNs compared to America's GNN budgets is one sign that there is a disproportionate and recent shift in the relational capacities of institutions that are built for and intended to enhance state power. As a Western senior diplomat expressed the interest of the non-West to outpace and expand their GNN capacities, “they see them as another tool in an ongoing struggle against America” (personal communication 2016).

4.1 Non-Western GNNs' Formal Relationships to the State

The Chinese have long had a firmly established systemic process by which any GNN institution and individual has a regular and established protocol for responding to and providing raw and processed intelligence directly up the chain of command and to the highest level of the governmental and party hierarchy. This system has been acknowledged in the U.S. government

¹⁷⁷“The President's budget request for Fiscal Year 2017, sent to Congress on February 9, 2016, includes \$777.8 million for the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG)” (BBG website) and indicates only a slight increase from 2014-2016 (after a 4.2 percent decrease in 2013 compared with 2012), rather than an attempt to match the non-Western Type III GNNs expenditures and rapid capacity building.

Intelligence Threat Handbook,¹⁷⁸ in the on-going work by Chinese intelligence analyst Nicholas Eftimiades,¹⁷⁹ in Doug Young's authoritative work (2013), an important inside look at the relationship between reporters and the Chinese state directly established via the formal systemic practice known as *neican*,¹⁸⁰ and in the interviews and data collected for this study.

Neican is a critical component of how intelligence formally travels up the chain of command in the Chinese state and party apparatus. *Neican* reports are secret, internal documents with circulation limited to top officials, "designed to inform party and government officials about key policy matters deemed too sensitive for the general public" (Bandurski and Hala 2010, 121). As Young notes, the system was officially established in 1951 and "is largely based in Xinhua, but reporters at all publications are also expected to write up their own *neican* reports when they come across information that might be useful to government leaders" (Young 2013, 65).

In the course of this research, one highly placed Chinese media consultant was able to provide a confidentially constructed organizational chart that expresses the formalized relationship between the newsgathering Chinese institutions and the state party and governing apparatus. The previously classified document is published for the first time, its contents reflecting two-levels of information and intelligence flow with the formal Chinese Type III GNN system. The figure also shows the direct *neican* structure that delivers reports and responds to directions from the highest levels of the state and party apparatus.

¹⁷⁸ While the U.S. government's Intelligence Threat Handbook does not identify China's GNNs, per se, as intelligence gathering structures, it does identify the categories of institutions and individuals who make up GNNs. "A large portion of the PRC's [intelligence] collection efforts against common targets like technology is conducted directly by PRC students, delegations, and commercial enterprises" (Interagency OPSEC Support Staff 2004, 18). This unclassified document was written prior to China's development of an outward focused CCTV and its larger, structural GNN took shape, but the elements of the state's intent and intelligence gathering capacities inherent in every asset with analytical skill is understood.

¹⁷⁹ In chapter 4 of his book, Eftimiades (1994) looks at the MSS (Ministry of State Security) and provides one of the Ministry's only published organizational charts. He writes that "a sampling of the world press further indicates the wide reach of China's overseas clandestine espionage operations. Such operations have been uncovered—and publicly exposed—in the Sudan in 1964, Malawi in 1965, Kenya in 1965, the Central African Republic in 1966, Brazil in 1964 and 1977, France in 1983, and the United States in 1985 and 1987. In each case, the intelligence officer operated under the cover of a New China News Agency journalist, official trade representative, military attaché, or accredited diplomat."

¹⁸⁰ Young's book (2013) is described in the blurb as an inside look at "the role of the press in China and how the Chinese government uses the media."




Figure 2: Chinese GNN organization structure: units focusing on U.S. marketplace

The general outlines of this previously unpublished organizational chart have been confirmed by a second confidential source working within CCTV. The attestation to its accuracy is presented with only the following caveats regarding GNN-State reporting relationships and whether they are direct or indirect:

For Xinhua although I have it reporting directly to the CCP, it may be that this is a dotted relationship and it is primarily under the State Council. The head of Xinhua is on the CCP Central Committee so this is why I had it reporting to just the CCP but in other places I see it under the State Council. Not clear if he is on the Central Committee as an individual or in his capacity as Xinhua President. For the China Daily, I have it just reporting to the Central Propaganda Department (personal interview with CCTV employee, November 2014)

The organizational chart is broken into two distinct relationships between the Chinese State (State Council) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) bifurcated by a solid line. The complex and deep relationship between the State and the Party are beyond the scope of this study, but are well-researched in the literature regarding Chinese power and formal governing structures. For the purposes of this study, however, the reporting relationships are presented as distinct and do not

reflect the interdependence and intertwined nature of the two structures. The chart is designed to represent the Chinese GNN structures operating in the context of the United States, but the structural specifics are reflective of Chinese organizational operations worldwide, according to two individuals interviewed for this study.

In the top part of the organizational chart, the reporting relationships between GNN news organizations *China Daily*, *Xinhua*, and *People's Daily* all feed into the party operational and propaganda apparatus, which, in turn, defines the “Soft Power Policy Framework” that then dictates the strategies and editorial approaches and priorities of all the GNN institutional news structures, including CCTV, CRIS (the Chinese Radio International Service) and the state Film Bureau. It is a flow that harkens back to and reflects the introductory chapter’s power flow chart, showing the interlocking relationships between information, intelligence, operational capacities, and the state.

Africa is a unique case of where Chinese GNNs both have an established presence and where they are increasing their footprint.¹⁸¹ Most analyses look at this increasing presence on the African continent as a soft power effort on the part of the Chinese.¹⁸² The expanding media presence and growth of the CCTV center in Nairobi provide a substantial and substantive narrative of development, but also provide Beijing with “the pulse of the African public” (personal communication with Ugandan research assistant Jawoko, 2015) via GNN reporting and analysis. This is key as “China is steadily expanding its military footprint in Africa” (Olander 2015a, par. 1), deals with new diplomatic challenges such as the “full scale diplomatic crisis” originating from “[t]he Kenyan government’s consent to a Chinese request for the deportation of dozens of alleged

¹⁸¹ To get a sense of how quickly Beijing is using its multi-billion dollar global GNN expansion effort, a look at the media component shows that “in April 2011, the Xinhua news agency partnered with a Kenyan network operator to provide news for mobile phones. That was followed nine months later by CCTV Africa in Nairobi, the first broadcast hub to be established by China Central Television (CCTV) outside Beijing” (Shek 2013, par. 3).

¹⁸² While the news analysis often acknowledges the full panoply of tools and institutions that make up a GNN in the Chinese push into Africa, the analysis generally stays on the level of soft power justification, as in this Canadian article: “From newspapers and magazines to satellite television and radio stations, China is investing heavily in African media. It’s part of a long-term campaign to bolster Beijing’s ‘soft power’—not just through diplomacy, but also through foreign aid, business links, scholarships, training programs, academic institutes and the media” (York 2013, par. 3).

cyber and telecom fraud” (Olander 2016, par. 1), and looks to the potential markets and economic opportunities of the continent so that when “African policy makers scan the globe in search of inspiration on how to structure their economies, that search often leads to Beijing” (Olander 2015b, par. 1).

While the information and intelligence flow from the depicted Type III GNNs interact directly with the state party and governing apparatus, additionally there is an acknowledgement that there is also an important soft power component involved in these GNNs operational functions. The “Soft Power Policy Framework” is the ideological and policy aligned framework developed and implemented by the PRC’s Central Propaganda Department. All the GNN flows are affected and shaped through the lens of this Framework. As described by the source who supplied the notes for this chart, the Framework does not limit or constrict free information flow, but does exert editorial parameters on that flow so that information assembly and collection is understood to be strategically aligned with state plans, supportive of state goals, and profitable for state policies, industry, and the face the PRC presents to the world. The source concluded that the multiple GNN entities exist solely for one purpose: “CCTV and Xinhua exist to serve the state. Period” (personal communication 2014). He went on to say that the structural hierarchies developed and the systems for the regulation of the flow of information and intelligence are supportive of GNNs’ singular charge.

4.2 Non-Western NGOs

As established earlier in this dissertation, both Russia¹⁸³ and China approach Western INGOs with the assumption that their performance and work product is directed by and in direct

¹⁸³ A Latvian report (Jemberga 2015, par. 1) studied the detailed relationships the Kremlin holds with various NGOs it sponsors abroad with the intention both of extending Russian foreign policy goals and keeping the Russian intelligence services informed. It asserts that “[w]ith one hand, Kremlin strangles non-governmental organizations in Russia. With another, it generously supports the defenders of its interests in the Baltics. Russia's President Vladimir Putin knows what poses the greatest threat to the domestic stability in his country: it comes from foreign-sponsored nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) who serve as agents of Russia's enemies.”

service to the state. This assumption, however, goes beyond just those two nations' suspicions and matches the general assumption in the West that non-Western NGOs are engaged in state-sponsored and underwritten activities, nearly always with an intelligence gathering aspect of their operations. One organization, the International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW) prominently proclaims its advocacy and intelligence work, touting its ability to share its findings with Chinese officials in the pursuit of illegal poaching and sale of ivory ("NGO Intelligence" 2012). Less successful international NGO-state cooperative examples abound and can create or raise tension between states (Herman 2014).

The nascent rise of Chinese NGOs as part of a larger Type III GNN institutional structure is relatively rapid. Already, Chinese NGOs are following the lead of some of the Chinese GNN news organizations and expanding operations in Africa and Asia. Notably, "state actors are not the only ones involved in China's internationalization. Chinese nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), too, have begun to 'go abroad,' setting up in Africa and Southeast Asia. They are funded in part by Chinese state-owned enterprises and the Chinese state (in the form of 'government-organized NGOs' or GONGOs) further muddying the difficult distinction between state and non-state actors in China's overseas presence" (Hasmath 2016, par. 4). While NGOs are popularly understood in the West as being non-governmental organizations, as was seen earlier in this study, they often receive funding, direction, and coordinate with the state and are a part of Western GNNs' hard power capacity building. "In the Chinese case, however, the NGOs doing the teaching were born, socialized and evolved in an authoritarian institutional environment, in which they have adapted to tight state supervision and limitations" (Hasmath 2016, par. 11).

At the same time that China is spreading its newly established NGO presence globally, it has imposed onerous new restrictions and laws on INGOs operating inside China. "Beijing is already suspicious of foreign and Chinese nongovernment organizations that receive funding from outside sources deemed politically suspect, like the National Endowment for Democracy and the Open Society Foundations, both based in the United States. Groups that operate here with any

financing from those sources will be even more vulnerable under the new law” (Wong 2016, par. 30).¹⁸⁴

4.3 China: Diplomacy

As discussed earlier in this dissertation, a unique feature of Xinhua’s 107 foreign bureaus is that they are sometimes co-located with diplomatic missions, confounding the differences between the appearance of independent journalistic functions and state-underwritten and operational functions. Up until 1997, for example, the Xinhua bureau in Hong Kong was the de facto PRC diplomatic mission in the unrecognized British territory. (Lai 2007).¹⁸⁵ This is a formal diplomatic representation and manifestation of the dual role of Xinhua. Further, in 1958, Xinhua news agency was China’s only permanent presence in Peru—the de facto embassy, hosting functions and acting the role of a plenipotentiary as any other ambassador of a sovereign nation would. Peru’s official recognition of the People’s Republic of China came much later, on November 2, 1971.

Aside from performing diplomatic duties at times, Xinhua correspondents actively develop new and alternate public narratives. They create factual stories that have no relevance to non-Western intelligence collection—reporting instead on issues that are much more relevant to the Chinese state than others. Targeted reporting and angles of interest to the Type III GNN sponsor allow for the reports to maintain relevance to their sponsors. The result is that previously served states that once had reporting resources on the ground in areas where Xinhua is now predominant not only deprives non-Chinese policymakers of data that is relevant, but also deprives them of access to collected but undistributed information that Xinhua personnel maintain within their

¹⁸⁴ Curbing the civil society work of INGOs in China is certainly one aspect of the state’s legal action. However, reports did not mention if part of the goal was meant to curtail any intelligence gathering capacities of these Western Type II GNNs operating within China.

¹⁸⁵ According to Lai, the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is the PRC’s representational office to Hong Kong, originally established in 1947 as the Xinhua News Agency and renamed in January 2000. Xinhua played a direct diplomatic role with the chief of its news organization operating as ambassador to a country it did not officially recognize.

organization. The Xinhua perspective aims to serve its audience, the Chinese state, with facts and reporting oriented towards this audience rather than secondary audiences' needs and interests.

A feature of GNN foreign corresponding is that reporters often take a national (and nationalistic) perspective in their approach towards their topics. In the most extreme cases, as in wartime, the correspondents relate intimately with their national forces and militaries and lose the vocabulary of objectivity, as for example, when Bob Bazell of NBC reported on the first night of battle in the first Gulf War that "we only lost one casualty." The well-known American news reporter Dan Rather ended his interview with an American general by vigorously shaking the general's hand and saying to him: "Congratulations on a job wonderfully done!" (CBS 2/91). The examples continue in that specific war, with a case of a U.S. Colonel passing out American flags to pool reporters and telling them, "You are warriors, too!" (2/27/91).¹⁸⁶

The same relationships were found to hold true for those who are now being employed and engaged by the newly evolving Chinese news and information networks, with varied levels of self-conscious understanding of these biasing pressures. In Nairobi, where the Chinese have begun a large television network in January 2012, there has been a high-level hiring of native broadcast and journalism talent to collect, gather, edit, and present news on television for African audiences with familiar and credible African news presenters. Consistent viewing of the news product on this network generally reflects a non-critical approach towards stories where the topic is China or involves a Chinese subject.

China focuses much of its early GNN expansion efforts in countries where it already has high favorability ratings, welcoming leaders, and the ability to leverage its substantial financial heft to gain access and favor (Farah and Mosher 2010).¹⁸⁷ The other areas where China is disproportionately focused is on countries that maintain diplomatic relations with and continue to

¹⁸⁶ These and other examples from the first Gulf War are cited by Naureckas (1991). For an analysis of the "patriotism" of U.S. GNNs during the first Gulf War, see Craige (1996).

¹⁸⁷ This report looked at Chinese GNN presence and expansion and stated, "A great deal of emphasis is placed on forming alliances that are anti-Western and on promoting an anti-Western media model to combat what the Chinese regularly portray as part of an imperialist plan to distort the truth" (Farah and Mosher 2010, 4).

recognize Taiwan.¹⁸⁸ “The Chinese efforts often result in helping authoritarian governments expand control of their local media, while working to undermine the Western model of a free and independent media” (Farah and Mosher 2010, 4). The extension of GNNs state power to achieve state policy objectives is, in general, clearer for non-Western Type III structures.

The case of Africa was investigated in depth and revealed the high level of access accorded to the new Chinese GNNs on the continent. It further showed the pursuit of both soft power goals, while also achieving diplomatically relevant engagements and relations. According to the director of the African Media Research Center Yanqui Zhang,

China's media is much more visible in Africa, not only the state-owned media like CCTV Africa, *China Daily*, *Africa Weekly*, *Beijing Review* as well as with Xinhua News Agency, China Radio International (CRI), but also private media companies, like Star Times, the private Chinese digital pay TV operator. Meanwhile, over the last decade, as Africa's largest trade partner, China has also invested in building communications infrastructure in Africa, providing technical upgrades for state broadcasters and training journalists from across the continent (Y. Zhang 2014, 3).

The first Forum on China-Africa cooperation (FOCAC) was held in 2000 and focused on countering criticism from the West, dealing in part with how China was portrayed as a neo-colonial power (“FOCAC ABC” 2013). China promised to build a media relationship promoting a positive African image worldwide. “Cooperation in the media sector was one of the eight principles of the Chinese policy of cooperation with Africa that was announced during the first FOCAC [promoted at]...the first China-Africa Media conference in Nairobi, and the first China-Africa Media forums in August 2012 in Beijing” (Chichava et al. 2014, 3).

FOCAC was a catalyst for new Chinese companies aimed at African-Chinese cooperation: the Xinhua Mobile Newspaper started the first-ever mobile newspaper in sub-Saharan Africa (Xinhua, 2011). Chinese GNNs are complemented by the multiple media products developed in

¹⁸⁸ Taiwan remains one of the high priority policy issues for the PRC. “A secondary but important purpose in China’s new emphasis on media outreach is to demonstrate the benefits of a relationship with the PRC to those nations that still have diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The diplomatic isolation of Taiwan remains a high priority for the PRC, and the bulk of the countries that recognize Taiwan are in Latin America and Africa” (Farah and Mosher 2010, 4). For example, China recently re-established ties with the tiny sub-Saharan country Gambia, one of the small number of states that had recognized Taiwan (Bloomberg 2016; Browne 2016).

the last few years, including the African CCTV channel in Nairobi and the inauguration of the ChinAfrica Media and Publishing (Pty) Ltd. in Pretoria (owned by the larger Beijing-based China International Publishing Group, CIPG), which produces *ChinAfrica*, an English and French language magazine. In Nairobi, the company started a weekly African edition of China's most important state English-language print publication, the *China Daily*. Chinese GNNs' presence in Africa is further enhanced by expanding from 18 Xinhua News Agency bureaus to 25 in 2013. Further, an academic GNN component was added to the constellation of Chinese media structures with the creation of the first institute for African media research—the Africa Communication Research Center at the Communication University of China. The aim of this institute is to be “a first-class academic platform for research of and cooperation between Chinese and African media,” according to the director of the African Communication Research Center Yanqui Zhan (Xinrui 2013, par. 15). This center represents Chinese GNNs' engagement in Africa's media landscape and encourages GNNs to present a positive relationship between China and Africa, or, according to Liu Guangyuan, China's former ambassador in Kenya, “[to] tell the real story of China and Africa” (Chichava 2013, 3). Chinese GNNs continue to grow in Africa:

CCTV launched its first overseas news production center, CCTV Africa in Nairobi in January 2012, which has been hailed as a new voice of Africa. The launch of CCTV Africa is a milestone in the sense that CCTV has become the first international media to establish a news production center in Africa. CCTV Africa is responsible for gathering news from the continent and distributing to a global audience through the CCTV News platform. In addition, CCTV has become the first international media to dedicate more time to Africa through CCTV Africa programs such as Africa Live, Talk Africa and Faces of Africa. On average it can be noted that CCTV has a minimum of 10 hours in a week for Africa to tell its story to the world (Y. Zhang 2014, 4)

CCTV and other Chinese GNNs, like *China Daily*, are tasked with carrying out China's grand plan for Africa. As Newton Ndebu of CCTV Africa noted, China's journalism model is based on portraying Africa in a “new positive light” as a place of resourcefulness, entrepreneurships and innovation (Personal communication with research assistant Kennedy Jawoko, December 2, 2014). According to Ndebu, there have been fears expressed about China's likely influence on

professional standards in the media, but he dismisses such fears. He says the entry of Chinese media into Africa pose no threats to the practice of journalism in Kenya and Africa and that “as the world transitions from the information age to the knowledge era, there is hunger in Africa to bridge the knowledge gap that currently exists between it and the rest of the world. Many Africans are eager to be part of a new intelligent narrative that acknowledges the challenges in Africa, but does not reduce these challenges into simplistic explanations. Overall, CCTV is attempting to do that” (personal communication with research assistant Kennedy Jawoko, December 2, 2014).

Former journalist and Journalism Research Associate at the University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa, Bob Wekesa (2014a, par. 5), focuses on soft power effects and argues that when it comes to content on CCTV, there is “hardly a bent towards a communist persuasion . . . Rather, one sees Chinese media on a public diplomacy mission, angling stories to show the benefits of China-Africa relations while avoiding narratives that cast China in a negative light.”

From December 27 to January 22, 2015, this author’s research assistant, Kennedy Jawoko, conducted a brief content analysis for CCTV Talk Africa, a 30-minute weekly talk show that discusses current affairs in Africa on the platform of CCTV Africa. He summarized his findings and identified strategic geopolitical GNN engagement by corroborating Wekesa’s earlier content CCTV programming analysis and finds that “Talk Africa [is] a deliberate and ideologically loaded program,” exemplified by what Wekesa sees as an undercurrent of West versus non-West frames:

The overwhelming majority of Kenyan episodes are about the country’s electioneering and political leadership... [and that o]n the surface, these episodes may seem domestic to Kenya and therefore not worth the extensive coverage by a CCTV Africa that conceives of itself as a continental broadcaster. Closer examination reveals the geopolitical underpinnings informing this selection in that the presidential candidacy of Uhuru Kenyatta and his running mate William Ruto (and their eventual triumph at the ballot) was mired by their indictment by the International Criminal Court (ICC)—seen as a Western tool used to target African leaders—for crimes against humanity (Wekesa 2014b, 12).

Wekesa read Western GNNs as actively promoting a negative political outcome for the Kenyan presidential race and that Chinese GNNs were a counter to that narrative as well as a successful diplomatic tool.

Access to leaders is a key aspect of any ability to either perform diplomatic functions or to achieve higher order intelligence gathering. Chinese GNNs have successfully achieved a high level and frequency of access to the continent's political leadership, in this case for CCTV.

The high number of exclusive interviews with African presidents was telling: Sudan's Hassan Omar El-Bashir; South Sudan's Salva Kiir Maryadit; Ghana's John Dramani Mahama; Burundi's Pierre Nkurunziza; Somalia's Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud; Kenya's Uhuru Kenyatta; Nigeria's Goodluck Jonathan; Gabon's Omar Bongo Odimba; Malawi's Joyce Banda and Peter Mutharika and Seychelles's James Michel. The number of presidential interviews is a feat given that securing presidential interviews is often a difficult journalistic task for many seasoned African journalists. In addition, there is quite a good number of interviews with high ranking officials at the levels of diplomats and statesmen including former UN secretary general Kofi Annan and former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo to mention but two. Contingent on the fact of CCTV Africa securing these top-level-official-guests, often in their state houses/palaces, most of these prized interviewees have a kind word for China's role in their countries or the continent at large. Interestingly, the high level guests speak in favor of China on their own volition but when they don't; the anchor is more likely than not to directly or indirectly nudge them towards their commenting on China (Wekesa 2014b, 17-18).

CCTV journalist Ndebu believes that there is a lot of freedom working for a Chinese GNN and that criticism of "positive reporting" as a sign of poor CCTV journalism is unwarranted, saying that African journalists are not "trained" to follow the Chinese policy script. Ndebu also acknowledges, however, that there is an understanding at CCTV that the way western media covers China in Africa is biased and that it needs to be challenged. He notes that as a line-up producer, he is one of the key people who decide what to put out. The CCTV staff in Nairobi meet each morning at 9:30 AM to plan the news day and to get input from Beijing and Washington DC, CCTV's main newsgathering arms. "But we also have to balance what everybody else is putting out. We watch all our competitors and see how we can make a story fit our model," says Ndebu. "We prefer stories where we have our own outlook on things. So we do not rely very much on the wires. We

send our own reporters where we can but we have a long leash because there is a lot of freedom” (directed personal communication with research assistant Kenndy Jawoko 2014).

Ndebu says that there are some instances when they take guidance from Beijing. He says that coverage of the 2014 visit to Africa by China’s president was all dictated by Beijing. “On some foreign policy issues related to China, we get guidance from Beijing” said Ndebu, but did not elaborate on this issue, saying he has little information on the details. Ndebu, who was one of the journalists sent to Beijing on a “familiarization tour,” points out that at the management structure of CCTV, all the senior management (managing editor, deputy editor and bureau-chief) is Chinese. Chinese GNNs have become present at nearly every stage of the news and information gathering process and have become present in an environment that may seem otherwise neglected by the world.

Moses Wasemu, a Kenyan freelance journalist covering China in Africa, pointed out that African countries receive scant coverage from international western media, and that CCTV and Al-Jazeera are “a breath of fresh air—giving Africa a positive face” but also portraying the challenges the continent faces “in [a] more humane way rather than the doom and gloom of the western media’s coverage of Africa” (directed personal communication with research assistant Kenndy Jawoko on November 24, 2014, January 10, 2015, and January 20, 2015). Wasemu believes that African audiences relate better to non-western GNNs.

Jonathan Mueke, Deputy Governor, Nairobi City County, suggests that apart from whatever symbolic political cum public diplomacy projects in which Chinese GNNs participate, much more takes place at both official and unofficial levels to buttress Chinese soft power (personal communication with research assistant Kenndy Jawoko on November 26, 2014, January 10, 2015, January 20, 2015). This is why, he argues, that in any society, “media play a key role” as information sources on what is happening not only within the local environment, but also beyond. In this regard, Mueke argues, “Chinese media is doing what every other country’s media does. “It is serving as the face of China in Africa by playing a key role in shaping African attitudes towards

the Chinese people and products. China has strategically made investments in media and CCTV is one of those investment.”

Another GNN academic component and engagement with African media is through the China-Africa Reporting Project at the University of Witwatersrand’s Journalism Department., focused on developing journalism on Africa-China issues. Whether academic institutions such as these or news outlets like CCTV or the *China Daily*, GNNs actively blur the line between the Chinese government and other Chinese state and quasi-private entities that seek African market prominence, if not outright dominance. StarTimes’s (Uganda) digital television Communication Manager, Christine Nagujja, gave an example of that strategic market dominance strategy by sharing that China’s StarTimes is leading in the market in East Africa (Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda), having 80% share in the Ugandan market, for example. The StarTimes mission: “To enable every African family to afford digital TV, to watch digital TV, and to enjoy digital TV” (“Corporate Responsibility” 2016, par. 5).

One GNN institution in which the Chinese state is expending resources is to establish Confucius Institutes worldwide. Africa is no exception. These government-funded institutions promote Chinese language, culture, and understanding and serve as centers for outreach to local media, with the first Confucius Institute established in Kenya in 2005 at the University of Nairobi. These institutes resemble Western non-profit educational institutions and find their homes within academic institutions, but are funded and managed by the Chinese state. Confucius Institute personnel and instructors are selected and paid for by the Chinese state.

In a speech on December 1, 2014 at the Confucius Institute at the University of Nairobi, by Wang Zheng, Director of the Institute of West-Asian and African Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, one theme was that China and Africa must speak more to each other through Chinese and African media (research assistant Kennedy Jawoko in attendance; personal communication November 30, 2014). Zheng believes that media outlets such as CCTV are key for securing a more cooperative relationship between the two regions. This cooperative relationship

between Chinese GNNs and a host region reflects not only the level of access accorded to these GNN institutions, but also a deep intermingling of resources and personnel, training that reinforces a policy proximity, collaborative information researching, analysis and distribution and all within a practical and professional GNN context that aligns cultural attitudes, political interests, perspectives, and policies. Chinese GNNs have found welcoming entry points in the developing world, but their expanding operations are not limited to these regions.

In the United States and other developed countries, CCTV/X has begun a serious effort to develop the news and information infrastructure in those countries' capitals. The level of self-aware bias among Western employees varies here, too, but in a seemingly more candid moment, Barbara Dury, a former CBS producer for *60 Minutes*, who currently works at CCTV/X said that she was, "keenly aware of the issue" of sensitivities that may exist with the broadcaster she works for now—even though there has been no explicit attempt at censorship. She says she "believes that it could happen, for example, on topics such as Taiwan or Tibet" (qtd. in Hille 2012, par. 15).

As shown in earlier chapters, the relationship between states and news organizations can also be conceived of as interdependence. States have a reliance on news organization as policy and security analysts depend heavily upon reporting from a region. Much of a day is spent by diplomatic, military, and intelligence agency analysts, whether they are at foreign embassy missions or back at their national capitals, paying attention to the media reports of what is happening on the ground. They spend a considerable part of their time analyzing, comparing, and concluding the meaning of events and actions abroad via their look at media actualities and analyses.¹⁸⁹

Another part of this GNN-foreign policy intelligence nexus is the informal relationship that exists between journalists and policymakers or diplomats. As seen earlier, this informal relationship is as important as it is conventional. It is most casually represented in the form of the cocktail party, but exists in more structured fora, such as organized debriefs, think tank lectures,

¹⁸⁹ As Kingsbury (2008, par. 5) notes in a magazine piece, "The use of nonclassified information, whether news accounts or other publicly retrievable information, is gaining credibility within the intelligence community."

background conferencing, notebook dumps, and personal blog entries, to name just a few. The informality of the engagement should not be understood to reflect an insignificant level of importance that these information exchanges have for policy analysis and formation. Often times, the information gathering that is done by foreign correspondents reaches into parts of foreign societies and cultures that are inaccessible to more traditional intelligence gathering institutions and are often unique and of high value.¹⁹⁰ GNNs' institutional and individual access and credibility open doors that are often closed to non-GNNs, freelancers, and other non-institutionally-affiliated individuals as both this study author's experience and this work's interviews have indicated.

Research into these otherwise non-apparent aspects of news gathering organizations and networks indicates that the current trends in global reporting resource allocation means that there is increased capabilities and capacities for non-Western GNNs. If this is the case, then not only are Chinese capacities and capabilities increasing, putting them in a constantly improving position to gain or provide key elements of stories and analyses, but, at the same time, non-Chinese analysts and policymakers are being deprived of one of their traditional sources of informal intelligence gathering.¹⁹¹

4.4 Russia: Diplomacy

Russia, too, has a direct relationship with its state-owned GNNs, but has not elevated the use of this relationship to one of fully credentialed diplomatic status. Russia's news services hold a highly visible and active role, but the news organs cannot issue visas or their directors sign treaty documents. However, that does not preclude these institutions from performing the roles of

¹⁹⁰ As posited in Kaiser's Brookings Institution essay (2014, par. 3) that looks at the business market challenge for Western GNNs to produce high-quality, high-level access information, "there is no right to reliable, intelligent, comprehensive journalism. We only get it when someone provides it. And if it doesn't pay someone a profit, it's not likely to be produced."

¹⁹¹ See the flowchart in introductory chapter, depicting how intelligence gathering and analysis are a determined aspect of GNNs' functions.

intermediaries or mediators, nor does it diminish the tight relationship between these Russian GNN organs and the diplomatic corps of their nation.

One of the more visible of the news organizations in the United States is not only the YouTube ubiquitous RT video news product, but the nationally distributed newspaper section insert “Russia Beyond the Headlines” (Shafer 2007). Operated by the government owned *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, the eight-page supplement is added to major non-Russian newspapers around the world in non-Russian native languages, in 26 countries and in 16 languages altogether. In the United States, the supplement appears within the pages of *The Wall Street Journal*, *The New York Times*, or *The Washington Post*. According to its website, “RBTH’s mission is to contribute to a better understanding of Russia in the world, be it ordinary citizens, public officials, opinion experts or entrepreneurs” (“Russian News”, n.d.).

RBTH is based in Washington, DC, and is a part of the Russian GNN firmament. It employs and engages non-Russian personnel to report, write and edit the material, self-proclaiming itself as being “in compliance with standards of journalism, editorial policies and traditions of countries in which the content is published” (Russian News, n.d.). During the course of researching this work, the study made multiple attempts to engage with various Russian GNN representatives, to little avail until the Russian diplomatic corps was engaged in the process. The only response and engagement, openness and dialogue came as a result of the direct diplomatic engagement of the Russian Consulate General of San Francisco and the intervention of press attaché Evgeny Avdoshin, who was able to demand a response from Olga Guitchounts, RBTH Representative in Washington, DC. In an email to the author on October 27, 2014, Mr. Avdoshin made clear the line of command and the influence and relationship his diplomatic mission has with RBTH by writing “I want to make sure that they do get back to you, so let me know if anyone got in touch with you already. If not, I will make sure they are reminded :)” (personal email correspondence with Russian Consulate General press attaché Evgeny Avdoshin, October-November 2014). While there are many news organizations that enjoy friendly relations with their domestic diplomatic corps, only

state-owned media understand that they are a part of a chain of command. Mr. Avdoshin was solicitous of this study's efforts and was able to get direct results.

In the case of news agencies in Russia and China, their organizational structure is pyramidal: the hierarchy leads up to the upper echelons of political or party leadership, as with Cai Mingzhao (Pinghui 2014), a former Chinese Communist Party State Council leader, or, in Russia, Kremlin loyalist Dmitry Kiselyov as head of Russia Today (RT) (AP 2013). While the state-run organizations might operate semi-autonomously and have specific missions that are not directly related to state operation, these organizations always serve under the authority (or at the very least, the benevolence) of the state (Schudson 2002).¹⁹²

Formerly, the Soviet Union's practice of using Tass reporters as part of the *legal rezidentura* employee structure of the U.S.S.R. (Gruntman 2010, 17)¹⁹³ provided journalists with official diplomatic cover for their activities and a chain of command that was officially recognized, if somewhat obfuscated. This official diplomatic cover and relationship is no longer a contemporary Russian state practice. Russian GNN journalists, in whatever capacity, officially now operate outside of the confines of official embassy structures and protections:

4.5 Non-Western GNNs: Intelligence Gathering

U.S. Congressman Dana Rohrbacher has used his role in the Foreign Affairs subcommittee to point out, in specific terms, some of the institutional and individual intelligence gathering roles performed by Chinese journalists. He stated that of the hundreds of Chinese nationals sent to the United States every year, some may be real reporters, but many function as intelligence officers; they report on what is happening in the United States on issues of concern to Chinese leaders—

¹⁹² In this broad review of media institutions, Schudson (2002) identifies ownership and behavior of news institutions as a means of study that differentiates practices between relatively liberal and relatively repressive states, in this case, Russia and China.

¹⁹³ As Gruntman (2010) points out in his analysis of KGB activities in California, Soviet journalists operated directly out of or in direct relation to Soviet embassies responsive to the *legal rezidentura*: "Most Soviet KGB and GRU intelligence officers commonly operated in the United States and other countries under official diplomatic cover. They posed as staff member of embassies and consulates or as journalists" (17).

including the movements of Tibetan activists and Chinese dissidents—and write secret cables accessible only to a select few (Rohrbacher 2013).

According to Rohrbacher (2013), the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, the congressional body responsible for monitoring national security issues between the two countries, reported in 2009 (Bartholomew 2009, 153) that “China’s official Xinhua state news agency also serves some of the functions of an intelligence agency, gathering information and producing classified reports for the Chinese leadership on both domestic and international events.” Furthermore “the Ministry of State Security [a Chinese ministry roughly equivalent to the CIA and FBI] also makes extensive use of the news media covers, sending agents abroad as correspondents for the state news agency Xinhua and as reporters for newspapers such as the *People’s Daily* and *China Youth Daily*” (151)¹⁹⁴

Institutionally, Chinese GNNs – and CCTV/X specifically - are, in essence, an extension of the intelligence gathering services. Given the highly sensitive nature of this relationship, there are few public reports of this relationship, some of which have been confirmed by a number of interviews conducted for this study. In one public report, a Canadian reporter, Mark Bourrie, left the Xinhua agency because of demands that he perform intelligence duties (Green 2012).¹⁹⁵ This formal institutional relationship between China’s GNNs and the state intelligence apparatus was further investigated by the international organization Reporters Without Borders and, while the report focused on the propaganda aspects of Xinhua, it established traditional as well as contemporary ties.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁴ The Congressman wrote this piece for Foreign Policy magazine in order to attract attention to the practice and to advocate for a restriction on Chinese reporter working visas to the United States.

¹⁹⁵ Bourrie told the reporter that, for example, he was instructed “to collect names of all present at Falun Gong press conferences” (Green 2012, par. 3). Further, Falun Gong’s Ottawa spokesperson Lucy Zhou said it was “not unusual for ... Xinhua staff ... to collect names and take an unusual number of close-up pictures at protests” (Green 2012, par. 3).

¹⁹⁶ The report found that “[w]ith more than 8,000 employees and 105 branches worldwide, the official news agency, Xinhua, is at the heart of censorship and disinformation put in place by the communist party” (Reporters Without Borders 2005, par. 1).

One of the more detailed reports came from a Chinese foreign ministry defector, who has lived in Australia since 2005. Chen Yonglin was extensively quoted in *The Epoch Times*, saying of reporters' propaganda roles that they play a systemically critical role in formal institutional intelligence gathering: "In addition, they play the role of a spy because Xinhua is actually an outreach organ of CCP's intelligence agencies. The nature of their work means they must use all means to infiltrate and obtain intelligence" (Luo 2011, par. 10). Further, Chen said, "As part of an intelligence network, Xinhua reporters are often under two different bosses, maybe even three different bosses, mainly CCP officials. ... If they were sent by the Ministry of State Security (MSS), then they report to the MSS, if they were sent by PLA (People's Liberation Army) General Staff Department, then they answer to the PLA General Staff Department; they all have secret missions. At the same time, they help the Consulate with political and propaganda work" (Luo 2011, par. 12).

As for Russia, the Soviets had recruited the investigative reporter and journalist gadfly, I.F. Stone and, as established from KGB files opened and available for a brief moment after the collapse of the U.S.S.R., even engaged, under the codename "Argo" the journalist and author Ernest Hemingway. Hemingway reportedly may not have done much, if any, work for the KGB but was enthralled by the idea of espionage (Haynes et al. 2009). The number of NOCs in Europe and the United States formally working for the Soviets, some directly for the KGB, specifically in journalism positions was said to be at least 150 just prior to the empire's collapse, according to Yuri Yarim-Agaev. Yarim-Agaev found out about the number of NOCs during discussions he later held with former Russian acting Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov (Yarim-Agaev 2014, personal communication).¹⁹⁷

As discussed earlier in the dissertation, not only journalists and NGOs, but academics are also often part of the GNN intelligence gathering network. A Chinese example of this GNN

¹⁹⁷ Yarim-Agaev was part of the Moscow Helsinki Group and a leader of the human rights movement in Russia who was invited by the Yeltsin government to develop a system securing the exchange of free information in Russia. He is currently a Hoover Institution visiting fellow.

practice was recently brought to light when, in a case of academic espionage, the American Department of Justice charged “six Chinese citizens, including three professors who trained together at the University of Southern California” with stealing “sensitive wireless technology from U.S. companies and spirit[ing] it back to China” (Grossman 2015, par. 1).¹⁹⁸

In addition to journalist collecting data and “cloak and gown” activities where academics steal sensitive information, Open Source Intelligence is also considered to be an important informal institutional data collection form by the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS). Here the direct line intelligence relationship depicted earlier in this chapter is complemented by a less direct and informal data aggregation and reporting system that, according both to Western intelligence analysts and to individuals interviewed for this study and familiar with CCTV/X protocols, is a focused and active practice. As described in the Intelligence Threat Handbook, “[o]ther MSS activities, however, would not normally be conducted by a Western service. ‘Strategic Intelligence,’ for example, consists of culling information from sources such as People magazine, talking to pundits about prognostications, and then combining the two into a classified intelligence product for consumption by PRC leaders. The MSS considers it to be worthy of assigning intelligence resources to this product. In the West, this would be considered only news or news analysis” (Interagency OPSEC Support Staff 2004, 22). Likewise, “unregistered agents” of the Russian government have also been found to send Open Source intelligence back to Moscow. In a 2010 case where the Russian effort seemed vastly disproportionate to the hoped benefit, a “spy ring” of eleven people, placed in the suburbs of U.S. cities, were instructed “to collect routine political gossip and policy talk that might have been more efficiently gathered by surfing the Web” (Shane and Weiser 2010, par. 3).

The Soviet Union and its successor state Russia has always used its news organizations as information and intelligence-gathering operations with direct links to the KGB (Haynes et al.

¹⁹⁸ In recent years, there has been a number of high profile arrests for espionage of ethnic Chinese and Chinese nationals in the United States, raising the concern that American law enforcement is “racially profiling” (Guillermo 2015).

2009).¹⁹⁹ As Ioffe (2015, par. 5) puts it, “[i]n the Soviet era, a journalist was understood to be a Kremlin trumpet, and journalism was simply another government job.” Ioffe claims the tradition has continued in Russia, and the KGB’s successor intelligence organization, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (S.V.R.). “In post-Soviet Russia, the idea that the press is essentially a branch of the government never truly went away” (par. 6).²⁰⁰ Russian journalists working as Russian foreign intelligence agents is a basic assumption in the industry (Harris 2015).²⁰¹

The highest profile case in process at the time of this writing is the New York “spy ring” case involving the ITAR-TASS news agency (Harris 2015), but with official denials by both the news agency and its government sponsor. In the case, a Manhattan banker named Evgeny Buryakov, recruited by accused Russian spy Igor Sporyshev was asked by Sporyshev to come up with questions “to put in the mouth of a journalist for a Russian news outlet, who is apparently interviewing someone with privileged knowledge of the New York Stock Exchange” (Ioffe 2015, par. 2). It was confirmed that the Russian news outlet was ITAR-TASS. Buryakov formulated questions into how the automated trading in the NY Stock Exchange works and what forces might be possibly disruptive to trading (Harris 2015). Ex-KGB general who ran the operations in the U.S. Oleg Kalugin is quoted by Harris (2015) as saying, “Tass has long been a den of spies. ‘At least half if not more [of Tass employees] were involved in the intelligence business’ during the Cold War” (par. 11).²⁰²

The Russian news organization’s relationship with the Russian state intelligence gathering operation is another example of the formal relationships that exist between institutions. The

¹⁹⁹ Haynes et al. (2009, 331) write, “[a] 1941 KGB summary report broke down the occupations of Americans working for the spy agency in the prior decade. Twenty-two were journalists, a profession outnumbered only by engineers (forty-nine) and dwarfing economists (four) and professors (eight).”

²⁰⁰ Ioffe (2015, par. 6) goes on to saying that socialized in this tradition, lots of Russians suppose that American media work in the same way: “When I was traveling around Siberia a couple of years ago and introduced myself to people as an American journalist, many of them immediately assumed I was a C.I.A. agent.”

²⁰¹ This was best summarized in a report regarding Russia’s TASS news agency, “The agency has a long history of giving cover to Russian spies, current and former intelligence officials say” (Harris 2015, par. 1).

²⁰² This study’s author met with Kalugin at the NBC Moscow bureau on Gruzinsky Pereulok during his time living and working in Russia, in specific while reporting on a story in 1992 regarding the assassination of President John F. Kennedy and the relationship between Lee Harvey Oswald and the KGB.

individuals involved in the operations are not always engaged in a formal relationship, often working as unwitting agents or suppliers of news, information, and data. However, in the aforementioned ITAR-TASS New York case, Evgeny Buryakov is accused also of personally and formally being engaged by and working for the Russian intelligence service. This high-profile case in New York found the elaborate use of non-Russian nationals who were involved in a scheme with Russian officials to use multiple state institutions, from trade offices to journalistic organizations, to gather strategic information.

The prevalence of both institutional and individual direct engagement is difficult to discern—by its very nature—and this research project has been unable to definitively make sweeping contemporary conclusions on collusions at both the institutional and individual level. At the same time, there is evidence of this in past cases and certainly appears to be the case in the Buryakov case.

Much of the data that exists on formal Russian intelligence has been garnered via U.S. congressional investigation, judicial inquiry, law enforcement arrest²⁰³, or by willing or escaping defectors. Colonel Stanislav Lunev, for example, defected to the United States in 1992 and identified a system by which Russian journalists worked as spies, as he had done prior to his defection: “He worked out of the National Press Building and filed hundreds of stories back to Moscow. Being a Tass correspondent provided perfect cover for Stanislav Lunev, Soviet spy (Loeb 2001, par. 1).

4.5 Non-Western GNNs Performance and Practice

While contemporary research data for non-Western GNN diplomatic and intelligence gathering performance and practices are more difficult to come by given the closed nature of the

²⁰³ For example, of the ten suspected Russian spies arrested by the FBI in June 2010 in the US, one had been working as a journalist. The *Washington Post* reported, “The defendants, eight of whom are married couples, held jobs in fields such as finance and media. One, Vicky Pelaez, was a reporter for a Spanish-language newspaper in New York” (Markon 2010, par. 12).

political systems and the tighter public control on the dissemination of information, this study was able to use historic documentation, interviews, and unique documentation to establish that as Western GNNs, non-Western GNNs, too, have been engaged in intelligence gathering and diplomatic endeavors. The differences between the Western and non-Western GNN hard power practices have also been made clear in the previous sections of this dissertation. Though there have been exceptions, Western GNNs' hard power functions have dominantly been based on informal relations between the state and the GNN institution or personnel, while in Russia and China these practices are formally mandated by the state. This is a direct consequence of the different financial and managerial relationships GNNs have with the state. In the West, most GNNs fall under Type I (non-state) or Type II (hybrid) categories, whereas in China and Russia they belong exclusively to Type III (state-sponsored).

The concluding chapter 5 will draw the real and potential implications of an expanding formal non-Western GNN Type III system of diplomacy and intelligence gathering against a backdrop of diminishing capacities and the more constrained and informal Western GNN practices, with the understanding that GNNs ultimately do inherently possess extant and, in certain cases, actionable and deployable hard power.

CHAPTER 5 - CONCLUSION

Foreign correspondents are neither spies nor diplomats. Regardless, they perform both intelligence gathering and diplomatic functions, whether formally or informally, as the empirics and historic data of the preceding chapters indicate. The larger GNN framework in which they function makes their work and work product materially relevant to the states they serve or the structures of the states in which the specified GNNs are nationally based. For those in the journalism profession, this performance is uncomfortably counter-perceptive; for most public diplomacy and agenda setting analysts it is at most epiphenomenal and counter-intuitive; and for states where GNNs are headquartered it is counter-narrative and the legality of such practices ambiguous.

The material nature of the work that GNNs do goes beyond the dominant understanding of the academic literature to date that takes GNNs and their work to be performing a public diplomatic practice and a source of power within a smart power framework that is limited mostly to the soft power side of the smart equation.

GNNs operate, in the broadest sense, not merely as institutions targeting foreign audiences in order to make their national sponsors or affiliated nations appear more attractive, as a soft power argument would deduce, but are also sources and expressions of national hard power. Regardless of their type—Type I non-state, Type II hybrid, or Type III state—they all perform, in a formal or informal manner, hard power functions. The geopolitical question that remains and that this concluding chapter will address is what the dynamic changes in the GNN constellation of individuals and institutions could indicate as this hard power, material resource is relatively weakened in those states that dominated this resource in the 20th century and as new and, in the case of China, rising powers overtake other states in the presence and, perhaps eventually, the performance of this resource.

The empirical data collection for this dissertation redirected the study from what originally was research measuring the dynamic relative shift of GNN resources from Western to non-Western states, with the hypothesis that this shift could indicate a shift in soft power capacities that

could lead to strengthened state counter-narratives regarding ideologies, such as the ideological shift from a formerly dominant Washington Consensus to an evolving and arising Beijing Consensus. Indeed, it was the search for narratives and counter-narratives that led to the discourse and content analytic media paper that this study's author published, "The Press and Pressure," in the *Brazilian Journalism Research Journal* (M. Kounalakis 2015). That study focused on Chinese media and the understanding of the discourse surrounding Sovereignty versus that regarding Responsibility to Protect, concluding that the Chinese Type III state GNNs promoted more faithfully and in a perfectly aligned manner PRC state policy preferences. In this case, Chinese GNNs presented a unified critical voice against the policy of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) interventions in Syria while also upholding a unified, supportive, and legal argument for maintenance of international norms bolstering the case for Sovereignty.

The Chinese rising narrative combined with an equally growing and prevalent Russian GNN voice to counter both the Western call to action and provided an alternative voice and argument that was used actively during the United Nations' Security Council attempts to gain support for intervention in the Syrian crisis (M. Kounalakis 2015).

The rising presence of non-Western counter-narratives create new and increasingly sophisticated, widely distributed, growingly sourced, and financially underwritten Type III GNN messaging to counter effectively a further diluted, diminishing, and relatively fragmented and sometimes faltering Western narrative. The soft power dynamic of this contemporary worldwide GNN development is well documented in the academic literature to date. What this study has done is to show that not only are there losses in relative soft power via GNNs from West to the non-West, but that the West's loss of GNN capacities—in particular, the relative loss of both diplomatic and intelligence gathering capacities—has a significant and consequential material hard power effect on state power. For example, the combination of GNN power and the policy preferences of the non-West prevented direct, multilateral, internationally sanctioned, collective humanitarian and interventionist actions to be taken in Syria.

Whether such an intervention would have changed the outcome of the Syrian conflict is beyond the scope of this work; analyzing the way state capacities and policy preferences are manifested via different GNN types is not. This study has examined how GNNs do this. In Syria, the West's narratives and policy preferences at the United Nations were stopped and the non-West's policy narratives and policy preferences prevailed. GNNs were a part of that outcome.

While the earlier and more general study of multiple GNN-type narratives and counter-narratives proved intriguing and rich, unanticipated and, in many ways culturally, socially, politically, and professionally taboo practices were dominating the data regarding these dynamics. Most discomfoting was the realization that this study's author, during a full foreign corresponding GNN career,²⁰⁴ had engaged directly, if informally, in the practices that were both supportive of the soft power equation in multiple Western countries, but also—albeit to an individually limited degree—underwrote the hard power material strengths of Western states while both unconscious of this act and of its potential effect.

In the course of researching this work, it became ever more apparent as the interviews and empirics revealed, that this taboo needed to be addressed as significant in the question of what the contemporary shift in GNNs imply, but that those admitting to this taboo also mostly demanded to remain anonymous. On the one hand, the story needed to be told; on the other, those telling it wanted to remain in the shadows.

This need for anonymity was both a desire for self-protection by the subjects and for a broader professional protection of those continuing to serve GNNs as reporters, NGO workers, academics, and others around the world who are already subject to closer scrutiny and suspicion for their activities, but who also are currently held hostage or facing trial. Up until recently, Jason Rezaian of *The Washington Post*, was one of those threatened individuals.

²⁰⁴ The author has been a GNN foreign correspondent for much of his career, covering the wars and revolutions of Central Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s for Newsweek magazine as well as the dissolution of the Soviet Union from his position as NBC-Mutual News Moscow correspondent from 1991-1992. He later became the publisher and president of The Washington Monthly. His work in the GNN international shortwaves and with global broadcasters include work for Radio Sweden International, Deutsche Welle, Radio New Zealand, and MonitorRadio.

Rezaian had been detained for 544 days in Tehran in 2015 (Holley 2015) and convicted on charges that he engaged in espionage. The general findings regarding GNNs' inherent and developed hard power capacities and their role in intelligence gathering, if popularized, could jeopardize current and future cases brought against correspondents like Rezaian—as well as against those working at INGOs and academics—and make credible serious charges of espionage, while undermining the credibility of the accused and their GNN institutions. Rezaian's release was not tied to a finding that his GNN actions and activities were innocent and unrelated to building hard power capacities for the West; rather, he was released after conviction on the basis of a state deal made between the United States and Iran, potentially bolstering a previously exclusive non-West argument that foreign correspondents are, in fact, extensions of state power and authority.

As reported, “White House officials confirmed that the swap was clinched during months of secret talks that gained momentum in the days before the nuclear pact was formally implemented” (Morello et al. 2016, par. 11). This means that the negotiated release was a part of direct state-to-state negotiations that focused on nuclear weaponry and state secrets, but concluded with what Iran presented as a spy exchange where four Iranian-Americans (including Rezaian) were released for seven Iranian nationals held in the United States who were allegedly part an Iranian spy ring (Read 2016). Western GNN personnel are regularly detained or arrested in multiple nations from Azerbaijan, where RFE's Khadija Ismayilova remains imprisoned (Human Rights Watch 2014), to North Korea, where reporters travel at their own risk.

Despite ongoing threats to GNN workers' safety and security (predominantly non-Western threats), this work has benefitted from the few individuals who were willing to go on the record with their personal and professional experiences that confirmed what seemed in this work's early stages as a counterintuitive reality. Those individuals, whom this author has known for many years, helped to identify, isolate, and formalize these wider GNN practices and performances as comprising state hard power functions.

Following the establishment of these practices and performances, the data collection and interviews conducted for this study were focused on understanding how widespread the socialization of these practices and performances. This study found that the practice of diplomacy and intelligence gathering, in their broadest sense and unselfconsciously informally—but also in a narrow and self-conscious manner when done formally—was a behavioral norm in a profession that publicly denies most such activity and, at times, actively denounces such activity as counter to its interests, ethics, and professional standards. This work has often been a personally and professionally uncomfortable study for this author to pursue, despite the academic expression and focus of the final product.

The conclusion of this work is that, indeed, in answer to the central research question that evolved in this study, GNNs do perform hard power functions and, consequently, enhance state power. The central research question in its early stages questioned the reasoning of states to expend extraordinary financial resources to pursue national GNN development. If this study were focused on understanding state behavior and intention, then it may have come to the conclusion that states expended such resources in pursuit of building further their hard power capacities, with GNNs as one more manifestation of their hard power. But this study instead tacked in its research approach to answer the more fundamental question of what type of power GNNs contingently possess and how they form and express that power. The final product may open the door to further research and analysis of what these hard power GNN practices and performances could imply.

There are, however, certain dramatic implications and geopolitical consequences that can be drawn from this study and as a critical result of the GNN effect on relative state power. Rising non-West powers are deploying their GNNs to extend and enhance their global power. They do this by expending unprecedented resources to develop their production and distribution infrastructure, choosing strategic sites (Washington, DC; Nairobi, Kenya; cyberspace) to focus their expanding content options and narrow their target audiences, while making sure that the target sites are strategic centers for both intelligence gathering operations and diplomatic activity.

Further, these non-West Type III GNNs are working to develop greater efficiencies in their structures in order to improve the signal-to-noise ratio inherent in all intelligence gathering and analysis organizations. The way they do this by developing big data analysis capacities in their IT infrastructures, both the visible work of keeping undesirable information away from their population while also allowing for critical information to make it up to the policymaking and leadership levels of the state and party²⁰⁵ (Symon and Tarapore 2015; Akhgar et al. 2015).

The non-West Type III GNNs employ more and better intelligence gathering nationals in the field, no longer limiting themselves and their organizations to their own nationals. This has the effect of engaging native individuals with foreign institutional experience, training, and access to gather GNN assigned reporting and information gathering tasks. This has the multiple benefit of using Western nationals institutionally-trained and professionally developed in accepted adversarial practices and relationships to open society power structures. The Western orientations, tendency and practice of holding the powerful accountable when combined with resources and editorial direction to investigate and uncover an open society's social, political, and economic weaknesses can be a very powerful tool, both from a soft power and a hard power perspective. These practices are highly constrained within media or civil society circles in China. Type III GNNs are neither set-up to be nor do they function as national watchdogs. Instead, they focus their attentions and critical eye on nations other than the sponsoring nation's allies and serve the state's strategic interests.

These capacities were not available to non-Western GNNs in the 20th century, when Western journalism was financially healthy and when Western employment by Chinese and Russian state organizations was seen as a formal spying relationship. In the 21st century, it is common

²⁰⁵ As Symon and Tarapore (2016, 8) put it, "Consider the conflicts that flared in Ukraine and Iraq in 2014. In both cases, irregular forces—Russian-backed separatists and Islamic State militants, respectively—made rapid advances against their adversaries, not only deploying effective military force but also documenting their campaigns in social media platforms such as Twitter and YouTube. Exploiting the content and metadata of these sources, fused with data from traditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), could yield significant data about those forces' tactics, social networks, and geolocation at particular times."

practice to fill the ranks of non-Western GNNs with employees with years of experience and practice in Western GNNs, but who find themselves unemployed or unemployable within the business-model challenged Western GNNs. This study has focused on how GNNs operate and analyzed a component of diplomacy and intelligence gathering that is inherent in non-Western Type III GNNs and to bring a bit more attention to an otherwise obscure practice since “China’s intelligence services have long been underanalyzed as major bureaucratic organizations and components of state power. This may have mattered relatively little during China’s inward-looking and under-developed years” (Mattis 2012, 54). China’s rising power status and its exploitation of its material hard power resources is of both importance and relevance in the world today.

Diplomatically, non-Western GNNs are engaging in greater use of their Type III GNN institutions to perform the complex task of multi-level diplomatic practice. From working closely with state enterprises to propagating an ideological orientation, state sponsors of these non-Western GNNs leverage these institutions as one more tool in a policy toolbox that give them greater reach, access, and more points of engagement in the work of political, educational, commercial, and military diplomacy. Type III GNNs understand this as a clear aspect of their roles, as reflected in their organizational structures and aggressively fulfill this role, particularly in those regions of the world that are within their perceived spheres of influence, whether geographically, politically, militarily, or economically. For China, this means an active GNN presence in Africa and Asia, but also in parts of the world where nations continue to recognize Taiwan as the legitimate Chinese state. For Russia and China, neutralizing all Western GNNs is critical. The tools available for this practice is a combination of intimidation tactics, including non-accreditation, censorship, legal registration, physical threat or arrest. Both nations also practice denying visas and access journalists, INGOs, and academics who possess good linguistic skills and are easily able to access Chinese or Russian dissenters or data. The non-West recognizes the undesirability of GNN entities and individuals with experience, language skills, or a history of critical reporting and deep investigatory abilities. Those institutions are forced to leave the country through a combination of

tactics and laws by, for example, creating onerous conditions for their continued presence. In some cases in 2016, both Russia and China are outlawing GNN institutional activities.

Finally, the presence of non-West Type III GNN bureaus and offices overseas is used as an operational base for official and formal diplomatic performance and state power extensions. This is an historical practice that continues to find expression, particularly in areas where a formal diplomatic presence in the form of a consulate or embassy is absent. The increasing number of non-Western Type III GNN bureaus, offices, and employees around the world gives the state greater reach and deeper diplomatic resources.

Overall, the non-West is building its hard power capacities by leveraging its relatively inexpensive, seemingly open source GNN systems to enhance state power. Both Russia and China are increasing the resources they are allocating to their Type III GNN institutions, allowing them to build and deploy targeted, effective, and cost-effective, plausibly deniable intelligence gathering institutions aligned perfectly with the state's strategic—as well as soft power—goals. The result is a formidable non-West GNN intelligence agency and worldwide diplomatic service with little pretense that it serves freedom of speech or any other Western GNN Type I and Type II values or norms.

As the non-West exponentially expands its reach and capacities, the West and all three types of its GNNs continue to decline and retrench. In 2016, the third largest American newspaper chain closed all of its foreign bureaus.²⁰⁶ The Type I GNN broadcasters that remain economically viable do so by refocusing their reporting and production interests away from foreign news and supplanting the coverage and analysis with the more profitable and less resource intensive domestic political reporting, health stories, stock market business news, and dramatic shared footage of extreme weather stories. This clear trend creates a greater Western GNN absence around the world. The result is a diminution of this category of once formidable Western hard power capacities,

²⁰⁶ This author writes a regular foreign affairs column for the McClatchy-Tribune media group, the above mentioned newspaper chain.

further diminishing the intelligence collection and analysis from both informal open source assets and formal intelligence and diplomatic resources.

Further, the vacuum and remaining demand for data from Type I and II Western GNNs is increasingly being filled by the Type III non-Western GNNs that have a presence where the West has little or none. Chinese CCTV footage filled the screens of Western GNN broadcasters when an attack on a Kenyan countryside university was covered more thoroughly by Nairobi-based Chinese television. Google News in its early iteration and before algorithms had the ability to tailor news delivery to individual tastes and interests, was an active news distributor of Xinhua reports, particularly from developing Latin American countries and in Asia. Xinhua was suspected of exploiting metadata tricks to game the Google algorithm and bring its stories to the fore, putting the news and analysis of Western GNNs at a disadvantage as Google News was still evolving (personal communication with former Google employee 2012)..

Credible work done with exacting standards and following Western traditions and norms have been important for generations of policymakers and leaders. In the 20th century, there was a reliance on the West's GNN capacities in particular on the robust and widespread GNN foreign corresponding resources. This reliance went all the way and directly to the White House during "the Vietnam war, when Kennedy...confid[ed] in Schelsinger that he learned more from their dispatches than he could from his generals and ambassadors" (Halberstam 1972, 169).

Western analysts and policymakers are further bereft of the hard power GNN capacities that were once both prevalent and ubiquitous. They now face an environment where information flow and GNNs' diplomatic engagement is hindered or entirely blocked by non-Western states that actively proscribe their operations. Western GNNs further lack resources they once had. If financial wherewithal and unhindered operations were not enough friction on their activities, then add the lack of traditional GNN training, tradition, and non-advocacy systems of analysis and intelligence gathering that INGOs or academics are not always able to supplant or fully substitute.

Given the relative rise of this type of non-Western GNN capacities and the power they represent—and the concomitant drop of Western GNN capacities—Western policymakers and leaders should be raising the red flag of concern the same way they would if other hard power attributes such as military capacities or formal intelligence and diplomatic resources were being diminished. In the West, the three types of GNNs, however, have neither public constituencies to fight for them nor do states generally recognize or acknowledge the hard power aspect of their functions, giving them little public financial support so they can survive both the business model crisis for Type I and II GNNs and the flat investment funding Type III GNNs are receiving directly from the state.

This study both identifies GNNs and how they enhance state power. It has shown that non-Western states recognize this power, incorporate it into their governing and party structures, and are aggressively investing in it. The West is falling behind. The first thing that the West must do, however, is recognize the importance of this GNN resource. But the reality seems far from this imperative. Instead, the opposite seems to be the case.

Ben Rhodes, President Barack Obama's deputy national security adviser for strategic communications, explained why it was so easy to manipulate GNNs into the White House narrative regarding the recent Iran nuclear deal. Rhodes said, "All these newspapers used to have foreign bureaus. Now they don't. They call us to explain to them what's happening in Moscow and Cairo. Most of the outlets are reporting on world events from Washington." Rhodes went on to disparage not only GNN institutions and their systems, but continued to disparage those who work for those institutions: "The average reporter we talk to is 27 years old, and their only reporting experience consists of being around political campaigns. That's a sea change. They literally know nothing" (Samuels 2016, par. 48).

Implicitly, this also means that there is little ability for the state to receive Western GNNs' unique knowledge and analysis upon which policymaking, intelligence, and military

institutions have relied in the past. If Rhodes is correct, then those GNN institutions and capacities are effectively gone.

APPENDIX 1

Interview with Terry Phillips

San Francisco, 09/23/2013

In person at Tully's Cafe

Markos Kounalakis: The United States had prepared Operation Uphold Democracy, a military operational plan to invade Haiti, remove the regime installed by a military coup, and restore the elected government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. You and I directly intervened in the process, participated in the diplomatic process, and helped precipitate the conditions for a peaceful resolution to the Haiti crisis. Recount the details...

Terry Phillips: It was the summer of 1994. I had just returned to the United States from having spent about 5 years in the Soviet Union and then in the new Russian Republic following the breakup of the USSR. I was looking for my next great gig, and CBS called me back to ask whether I would be willing to sit in temporarily in Port-au-Prince, waiting for whatever came next. It was a bit of a lull in the events in Haiti. And I said, sure. So I managed to get on the last commercial flight from the United States to Haiti. We had a connection to make in San Juan, Puerto Rico, and then there was the very last commercial flight actually scheduled to land in Haiti, and I got bumped off that flight, so CBS chartered a small plane... a small private plane to fly me and a couple of other people into the country. And then I kind of hunkered down for a little while, getting the lay of the land, doing some reporting, but primarily in a caretaker role as what amounted to acting bureau chief for Port-au-Prince. And then things started to cook and we had more and more staff come in. At one point I think there were about fifty of us from CBS in Haiti, including the anchor, Dan Rather, and a lot of senior correspondents for the evening news...

MK: Fifty people. That is a large contingent by today's standards.

TP: About fifty CBS News employees. And a large technical staff, we had a big satellite uplink, I mean it became a big operation. Not the first time these people came in. We'd had an ongoing presence in Haiti. But as I said, there had been a little bit of a lull while we waited to see what would happen next in diplomatic relations and in relations internationally in general. At that time there was a military junta, the leader was Lt. General Raoul Cédras, and he and his entourage had forcibly evicted Jean-Bertrand Aristide the elected president, who was then in exile in the United States - I think he was living in Washington. And there was an effort by the US government to put him back in power. And so part of our job while I was there was to do the daily rounds, to find the bodies that were littering the streets of Port-au-Prince, to cover the various other activities, do scene-setters. It was a kind of a normal, a "normal" day-to-day type of operation. Then it became clear that the United States was going to use force. They had tried to do that once before, they had sent in a warship, and there was a huge response by the Haitians in protest of this arrival, and so they left, there was no direct interaction [USS Harlan County, Oct. 1993]. Well, they I say the American government had gotten fed up, and things were getting worse and worse and so they finally made it clear that they were going to use all necessary force. In fact I think there was a UN resolution [UN Security Council Resolution 940, 1994]. Anyway, they made a commitment to use whatever military force was necessary to put an end to the junta, and to put Aristide back in power. So one day, I was making my rounds, I went to the, to the... it wasn't the palace, it wasn't the main government center, it was the place, the building where the junta was operating - I'm sorry I can't remember the name of the building - but the headquarters for the military. And one of Cédras's underlings approached me and asked whether I knew anybody in Washington to whom I could transmit a message from them. Now, keep in mind that this time there was an active United States embassy in Port-au-Prince, but there were no direct contacts between the embassy... at least no

formal, public contacts between the embassy and the junta. I don't think there was an ambassador at the place, but I think there was a charge d'affaires but I've forgotten that detail. But anyway, they didn't have a normal relationship. So this military officer asked me whether I could communicate a message from them to Washington... Well, I wasn't in the government, I didn't have deep connections with the United States government, but I did have a couple of friends who had some connections at cabinet level and at congressional level offices... And so I contacted you and you put me in contact with the chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee...

MK: Yeah, so, you called me and we talked at length about the situation. You said that U.S. military action seemed imminent and that this Haitian contact was making a last-minute appeal to keep the military invasion from happening. I remember it all having a great deal of intensity and immediacy and that we had to decide on that phone call if I was going to go further and act. It was clear to me that if I made that call, I would be intervening directly in events. But it was also clear that I would act because the stakes were so high, the risk of violence and the death of American soldiers very real. So we hung up the phone and I called my good friend, Chris Kojm, who at the time served as the Coordinator for Regional Issues in Congress on the staff of the House International Relations Committee, under Ranking Member Lee Hamilton.

TP: That's right. That's right. And so that led to a conference call with me on one end of the line, and Lee Hamilton and several other members of Congress and staff at the other end of the line. And for, I think about a half an hour, they essentially interrogated me to find out what I knew, what really was said and what might happen, and you know, what could this really mean. So I told them everything I knew. Now, I should back up a couple of steps and say that I did not do this on my own initiative. As I mentioned, my boss, the anchor, CBS anchor Dan Rather was there also. So he and I also had a lengthy conversation beforehand. I told him what I had been asked to do and I asked him about the propriety of a reporter getting involved in a process like this. And we examined it in various ways - of course, the example of the Cuban missile crisis came up, where a similar opportunity presented itself, but that time from the American side wishing to communicate with the Soviets... And so there was precedent for it - and as long as there were clear boundaries about what I was willing and able to do - he as my putative boss did not have a problem with me serving in this role. I couldn't be involved in the negotiations and I couldn't take a position, but simply transmitting a message from one party to the other, in his view, was not a problem. By the way, I don't know whether Dan Rather talked to anybody else about this; I had the impression this was his decision. And he was the managing editor of the evening news, so this probably was the point of decision for CBS. And...so, with that, with those guidelines I then had this telephone conversation with Lee Hamilton and the others. And the upshot of it was that rather than sending in military force, the Clinton administration dispatched Colin Powell, Sam Nunn, and Jimmy Carter and sent them to Haiti where they negotiated not just an end to the crisis, but an end to the junta. And they provided a way for these military leaders to leave the country, to go to a place [Panama] that was comfortable for them, and to allow for a peaceful transition of power back to the elected president.

MK: And one of the really more telling moments of the role that you and Rather played was when that delegation arrived in Haiti...

TP: Oh right (laughing). So suffice to say that we had a slight advantage in access to this story. We knew we made it possible to happen, we knew it was going to happen. It was not a quid pro quo, but we were in a very fortunate position. We also were staying at a hotel..."hotel" is not exactly the right word for it, there were a number of hotels in town where people were staying; we stayed at a compound that was not just very comfortable and with great facilities, but it was also the place where things happened. And one of the things that happened at this place was a meeting between

these officials who came and the representatives of the military junta.

MK: You were in the middle of the mediation...

TP: Since we were the only news agency staying at this place, I mean all fifty of us had rooms at this place, when they arrived we were on the inside and everybody else of the press corps was on the outside suddenly scratching their heads wondering, how come we got this story... (laughing) I don't know that we ever explained it to them. At least I didn't ever explain it to them. So yes, that was kind of a tasty result of this exercise.

MK: And weren't you guys also on the tarmac welcoming the delegation?

TP: I was not there. That might be true. I've forgotten that. But yeah I think Dan Rather did... Yeah it's right (laughing) I've forgotten this, but yeah, I think it was Dan Rather who welcomed them as they got off their flight. Yeah. Yeah we had a...well, to call that a scoop doesn't begin to do it justice, we owned this story. We became very close to making news, very, very close.

MK: So if you were to postulate, you know, and parts of this is all speculation at this point, if you did not make that connection with the US government through my contacts, and then the engagement of congress and Lee Hamilton, who was very focused on this issue, do you think the likelihood of a non-diplomatic outcome was high?... I mean of course I'm asking retrospectively, how do you think it could have evolved? Because it was really an eleventh hour call...

TP: As far as I know, there was no other prominent, credible alternative at that moment to full-blown military invasion. It's not impossible that the junta would have found somebody else to deliver its message. Could have happened. It's unlikely, but possible, that they would have found some third party, non-journalist third party, such as another embassy, for example, or some business person, because there were still a few business people still there... Keep in mind a lot of people had left. People were leaving Haiti in droves because of genuine fear that there was going to be a massive military conflict. But there wasn't another obvious alternative at that moment. So I suppose that if... 'cause it wasn't just that they had somebody to communicate the message but someone who was fortunate to know somebody, who could then put these wheels into motion. It was - in a positive way - it was a perfect storm. We had all of these pieces lined up very nicely. So I would not have been shocked, if I had the perspective of God to look down on this and say well, this didn't happen, I wouldn't be shocked if the alternative would have been in fact, the United States to send in military force. And, of course, down the road that ended up happening, the deal didn't collapse, but the government failed and there was a lot of violence and eventually, international troops did go in, and Haiti has just been, some might say, a cursed place, for a long time, but especially in the wake of all of this. But I believe we saved lives. I'd put it that way. I believe we saved lives in avoiding - or the very least forestalling - direct conflict between the military junta of Haiti at the time, and certainly the United States. I think we saved lives.

MK: I acted very much with that premise in mind when I made my call to Washington, DC. I acted knowing that if we were successful in helping to bring about the conditions for a negotiated solution, we would be saving lives. Anything else you want to add?

TP: Yeah, there's one other thing I wanna' say, which is that I was in a fortunate position not to need a specific outcome. I didn't have an agenda here. I was doing what I did professionally: I was telling a story. And I think the fact that I had the support of my boss at that time, to tell this story to this audience without compromising our journalistic integrity, was the sort of thing that I believe journalists ought to do more often. We are often in a position to know things that other people

don't know, to have connections with people that other people don't have, and I think we oftentimes either ignore or deliberately avoid serving in other capacities, and I think it's unfortunate. We can clearly do some good when these opportunities arise. And I wish that there was some training, or some element of the so-called code of ethics for journalism that would enable, and facilitate and encourage such behavior. This is not, and this shouldn't be - a one-off. And you know, you can make this as broad as you want and go from something as simple as the question whether a reporter should help somebody who is being harmed, rather than just report the event that's happening, to something as large as the international stage I happened to be on at that time. We're not oriented to think this way, and I was very lucky to have been in the right place, to have had the support, the encouragement and the collegial help that I did. I wish we would do this more deliberately and more often.

MK: So do you know of any other instances, either yourself or others, where there has been a direct engagement with the US government in some way, or any government, to perform what is a quasi-diplomatic effort because of this privileged access, or because of a request, or because of unique knowledge of a story or individuals or networks? I mean I'm recounting one of my own in this, regarding the Semtex story in Czechoslovakia...

TP: Right.

MK:... but maybe you have knowledge of some other ones.

TP: Well, of course I've mentioned the famous case of the reporter who served as an intermediary between the United States and the Soviet Union at the height of the Cuban missile crisis. Because there wasn't a hotline at the time, and so he was delivering messages between the White House and the Soviet embassy. And I give you one other personal example. When I was in Armenia in 1990s, I was approached one day by someone I didn't know, who told me that he knew that there was a conspiracy to overthrow the president of Armenia. And he asked me whether I would deliver that message to the president of Armenia. And I said to him, 'I'm a reporter, I cannot play an interventionist role in a story. What I can do is report the story.' He said, "No, no, no, no, no, I don't want anybody to know about this, you have to do this secretly", and I said, "I'm not a spy. I do things publicly. I report the news. Now, I report to a small audience or a large audience, I don't report to an audience of one." And so he refused to give me the details. Now is that a difference with a distinction compared to the Haiti situation? I believe it is. Because in the Haiti case, I wasn't playing a role in trying to stop something from happening or start something happening, I was delivering a message from one person to the government, from one government, not from one person, from one government to another government. And as it turned out, by the way, apparently that story was either false or stopped in other ways, the Armenian story. But I felt that the distinction was that I was being asked to be a player in a developing situation.

MK: Other cases where you know journalists who have been players in a specific situation?

TP: I have a strong belief, you know, I think, you might have been in the room when this was said, that there was a reporter in, I think it was in Czechoslovakia, who was accused of carrying credentials in addition to his journalistic credentials - the implication was that he was a spy. And I have strong belief that there was a guy operating in Tbilisi, Georgia, pardon me, not Tbilisi, in Baku, Azerbaijan, who was more than a journalist. He had very close relations with the United States embassy in that country, and he found himself, not that we all don't occasionally find ourselves in interesting places in unusual times, but it seemed to be a habit with him that things would happen around him. Now, can I tell you for sure that he was a player? No, but he started to behave more and more that way. And...

MK: Do I know him?

TP: I think you might have. I'm not sure I'm gonna' tell you his name yet, not while recording.

MK: OK.

TP: But when he and I spoke privately, his views - his political views - and his philosophy lent credence to my suspicion that he was in this for more than journalism. And I can tell you one last thing in that regard. When I was in Nagorno-Karabakh, which is a separatist part of Azerbaijan that's still legally part of Azerbaijan but that is effectively more Armenian and at the very least independent, I saw Soviet tanks. I don't know that anybody else knew that. But I was able to report this. And I was then asked about my reportage by someone from the American embassy in Yerevan. Now, I didn't feel compromised telling him what I had already told everybody else. But I presume that that information figured into a report somewhere. By the way, this person who asked me later turned out to be the CIA station chief in Armenia. I didn't feel compromised because I wasn't doing anything more than what I had already done. But did I play a role in the American assessment of the situation there and policy in some way? I don't know. Maybe. But I didn't do it deliberately. And I think that's an important distinction.

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